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The Ageless Indies

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RAYMOND KENNEDY

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MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

To Albert Galloway Keller

INTRODUCTION

THE PRIMARY INTEREST OF THIS BOOK IS IN THE PEOPLE OF THE Indies. I am constantly amazed at the way native inhabitants of places in the news are treated almost as though they were not there. Even in war, when whole countries become battlegrounds, the reports from the front concentrate on troop movements and strategy, to the virtual exclusion of any mention of the people whose land is being fought over. Yet they are the only permanent feature in all the turbulent rush of events. The natives of Indonesia are the main concern of this book because I believe that they are the most important element in the whole story of the Indies—past, present, and future.

The native peoples of the islands have withstood, over the past two thousand years, successive and strong intrusions of Hindu, Chinese, Mohammedan, and European Christian civilizations without losing their own cultural and social identity. It is unlikely, therefore, that the violent upheavals of the present time will affect them profoundly and permanently. The islands still echo with the battles of past centuries; wave upon wave of intruders have swept over the shores and up into the hills of the interior. The Indonesians have seen them come and go—and have imperturbably gone their own way. History hangs heavy in the Indies; and in the perspective of centuries the present struggles of outsiders,

white and yellow, desperately fighting to gain control over the natives' homeland, become just another chapter in a strange saga the people have watched unroll for long generations. What the end will be they hardly ask; for to them there is no end, and very little change. Their life goes on, immutable, serene, only momentarily disturbed by the intruders' quarrels. They are the people who live in the Indies; the islands are their home; and they will be there after every battle has died away.

For the past hundred years the history of Indonesia has been relatively placid—so placid that few people outside Holland paid the islands much heed. It has been a shadowy faraway land, seldom appearing in the news or even in travel books. Few tourists have ever visited it; it has seemed too remote and too indefinite. Now all this has changed. Its mother country has lost independence; its bountiful products no longer flow smoothly into the world markets; and it is one of the vital arenas of conflict in the greatest war mankind has ever experienced. The vague fantasies of yesterday—the wild men of Borneo, the saronged sirens of Java, the temple dancers of Bali—suddenly seem unsatisfying. People are awaking to the realization that they know next to nothing about these islands, their history and their inhabitants. They are wanting to know these things, realistically and clearly, for they recognize that the East Indies, otherwise known as Indonesia, are one of the most important stakes in the struggle which now occupies all their energy and attention. This little volume is intended as a kind of basic introduction to the area—its geography and climate, its population, its history, the appearance and customs of the people, white colonial life and government, and the economic and political importance of the islands now and in the future.

Few sources of information on the Indies are available to readers of English. Most of the literature on the islands is written in

Dutch, a language known to few persons outside Holland. Without the access to this enormous mass of publications which my acquaintance with Dutch has given me, I should have been unable to write this book. Moreover, the Indonesian literature is hard to get at in the United States, for libraries have hesitated to spend their funds on the purchase of volumes in a language almost no Americans learn. Fortunately, the Sterling Memorial Library at Yale University is an exception. The Yale collection of East Indies literature is probably the most complete anywhere in the world outside the Netherlands. A happy combination of circumstances brought me to Yale after four years of residence in Indonesia.

Since 1935 I have been occupied, in the time my teaching duties have left free, with the preparation of a comprehensive work on the native peoples of the islands. When the present war suddenly struck the Orient at the end of 1941, I decided to lay aside this major task, which was still a year from completion, and write a shorter book embodying the salient facts about the Indies but not burdening the general reader with the details desired by specialized students. In one sense, therefore, this volume is a "quick job," but in another it represents a distillation of long personal experience in the region and years of subsequent research.*

Several volumes on Indonesia written in English have appeared within recent years, but they have dealt principally with political and economic matters. The best and most informative of them is Amry Vandenbosch's *The Dutch East Indies* (2d edition, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1941), which I have found very useful for reference on the governmental aspects especially.

*I acknowledge with thanks the permission of the Yale University Press to reproduce sections of my chapter, "A Survey of Indonesian Civilization," which appeared in the volume *Studies in the Science of Society Presented to Albert Galloway Keller*, edited by G. P. Murdock (1937).

Another excellent work concerned with administrative questions is A. D. A. de Kat Angelino's *Colonial Policy* (2 volumes, M. Nijhoff, The Hague, 1931). A purely historical reference is now available in E. S. de Klerck's *History of the Netherlands East Indies* (2 volumes, W. L. & J. Brusse, Rotterdam, 1938). The technical aspects of foreign trade are discussed by J. van Gelderen in *The Recent Development of Economic Foreign Policy in the Netherlands East Indies* (Longmans, Green & Co., New York, 1939); while a very readable account of the educational system is presented in *Island India Goes to School*, by E. R. Embree, M. S. Simon, and W. B. Mumford (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1934). The work which comes closest to achieving the plan of treatment of the present volume is *A Manual of Netherlands India*, which was compiled by the Geographical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division of the British Admiralty (His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1920) after the last war. It is now dated in many respects, but for its time was a fine reference. Finally, Paul McGuire's *Westward the Course!* (Wm. Morrow & Co., New York, 1942) contains a fascinating account of travels in Java and Sumatra on the eve of the present war.

The main reason for mentioning these books is that they represent just about all the general literature published in English on the Indies within recent years. This volume takes its place beside them in the thin ranks. Its purpose is enlightenment for those who are curious about an unknown country, an island world whose interest and importance will, I hope, appear clearly in what I write.

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The Ageless Indies

I

THE ISLANDS

THE WHITE MAN WHO LIVED IN THE EAST INDIES FOR A FEW years and then returned to Europe or America experienced two immediate shocks. One was the intensely pale skin of his countrymen; the other, their gigantic stature. He had been used to a sea of yellow and brown faces, and he had been accustomed to gazing with ease over the heads of every crowd. After these novelties wore off, he noticed other differences: the extreme variation in the seasons, especially the unaccustomed cold; the constant and loud talk; and the frantic hurry of everyone about him. Where he came from, it was always warm and humid, the people spoke softly and kept silent most of the time, and they moved slowly, with as little exertion as possible.

The Small and Graceful People

The Indonesians are among the shortest people on earth. In most regions the men average about five feet, two inches; the women a little under five feet. Men and women are delicately and beautifully built, on a miniature scale. They are almost invariably symmetrical, with none of the misshapen ugliness that afflicts so large a proportion of whites. They are almost never fat, but neither do they give the impression of excessive thinness.

Their bodies and limbs are round and "well-turned," in contrast to the slab-sided and angular physiques of many white people. Looking at a group of Javanese or Balinese women, one could easily imagine that they were life-sized brown statues, all turned out of the same mold. The color of the skin varies from light yellow to dark brown, and it has the satiny-smooth texture characteristic of Mongoloid peoples. Their hair is jet black, luxuriant, and generally as straight as horse hair, although some of the mountain tribes have slightly wavy locks. The men are almost beardless, finding more use for tweezers than for razors, and body hair is very scanty. The beauty of the small-boned bodies is somewhat spoiled from the white person's viewpoint by the facial appearance of the natives. Mostly they are flat-nosed and rather thick-lipped, with wide cheekbones and slanting eyes. The custom of tooth-filing, still prevalent in the more remote districts, and the universal practice of chewing betel-nut, which stains the mouth and lips dark crimson, also make an ugly impression on Europeans and Americans.

The Indonesian peoples have a remarkable poise and dignity, derived from their calm, unhurried, graceful movement and their quiet, soft-spoken manner. Men and women alike have a fine posture, which is brought to perfection among the women especially, since from childhood onward they are trained in carrying burdens on their heads. One never ceases marveling at the sight of a line of island women on their way to market, heads heaped high with baskets, pottery, or other articles, gliding along swiftly and smoothly, the movement of their legs barely perceptible under the ankle-length sarongs. Harsh voices are hardly ever heard; conversation is low-toned and subdued. Moreover, when a native has nothing important to say he keeps quiet. In our culture, which is highly "verbal," to use the anthropologist's term, when two persons are together they are supposed to keep up a

rapid stream of conversation whether or not they wish to talk or have anything of importance to say. Indeed, the silent individual is likely to be regarded as queer. In the Indies it is no uncommon thing to see two or more natives squatting together hour after hour, relaxed in mind as in body, with never a word spoken. This seems strange to the chattering whites, but my native friends frequently remarked to me about what seemed to them the excessive and pointless loquacity of Europeans and Americans.

Along with gracefulness and poise, extreme politeness is an outstanding characteristic of most Indonesians. It is not the formalized, ritualistic, and often insincere politeness of the Japanese, but a deep and genuine courtliness; and one finds it on all levels of native society. The poorest Javanese, receiving a guest in his tumbledown bamboo and thatch hut, acts the gracious gentleman naturally and effortlessly. I had full opportunity to observe and test this, for my business often took me to the homes of natives on the rather painful mission of dunning them for unpaid bills. Never once did I encounter unpleasantness in my victims. I may also confess that their disarming politeness cost me many a delinquent payment, for I found it very difficult to bully them as a competent bill collector should. They spotted my weakness, too, and I became known in the environs of Batavia as *tuan nyang ketawa*; "the smiling white man."

The preceding remarks apply to about 90 per cent of the Indonesian natives. The primitive tribes of interior Borneo, Celebes, and Sumatra are still suspicious of whites and likely to be unfriendly. In physical type and temperament, however, they do not diverge widely from the Javanese, Malay, and other groups in the more developed regions. The natives of eastern Indonesia and New Guinea, on the other hand, are a different matter. Here, in the Moluccas and the eastern islands of the Lesser Sunda chain, the racial type changes to a mixed Malay, Melanesian

Negroid, and Papuan hybrid; while in New Guinea most of the natives are of Papuan stock. In the whole eastern area the people are of much taller stature than true Malays. Their bodies are lankier and longer limbed, their skin darker, and their faces narrower and more angular, with thinner lips and longer noses, the latter often full-fleshed and hooked at the tip. They are also much hairier, many of them having full beards; and the hair, instead of being straight and coarse like that of Malays, is frizzy. Indeed, Papuan is derived from the Malay word *papua*, meaning "frizzy-haired." Temperamentally, too, they differ from the stoical Malays. The traveler on a ship to the eastern islands and New Guinea sees this change occur as he voyages eastward. The natives become progressively noisier, more excitable and loquacious, more pushing and aggressive; until in New Guinea one imagines that, if the Papuans could be bleached out, dressed up, and taught English, they would fit easily into the hectic New York scene—a charge that could never be laid against the serene Malays of the western islands.

The Languages They Speak but Cannot Read

There is also a difference in language between the extreme eastern area and the rest of the archipelago. In New Guinea and the northern part of the island of Halmahera, the natives speak a vast variety of languages generally lumped together as Papuan. All this means at the present time is that they have not yet been classified, and that they are not of the Malay type. The New Guinea languages are astonishing in their extreme diversity. It is literally true that the people of villages only a few miles separated cannot understand one another's speech.

Throughout all the rest of the Indies the natives speak languages of a single general stock, known as Malayo-Polynesian,

one of the most widespread linguistic families in the world. Its hundreds of branches extend all the way from Madagascar, off the coast of southeastern Africa, through the East Indies and the Philippines to Formosa on the north, up through the Malay Peninsula to the borders of Burma and Siam, and clear across the Pacific from Indonesia through Melanesia and Micronesia to the distant outposts of Hawaii and Easter Island. In the whole Oceanic area, only Australia, New Guinea, and a few interior districts of the Melanesian islands have languages not belonging to the Malayo-Polynesian stock.

While all these languages are related, and quite closely according to technical linguistic standards, they diverge sufficiently so that they are not mutually intelligible, even though many words are the same in several of them. Nevertheless, anyone who thoroughly masters one of them finds little difficulty in learning the others, for they all have the same basic grammatical structure and word roots. Besides being closely related in this way, they are simple in structure, with few peculiarities of pronunciation that would be difficult for Europeans or Americans. Verb and noun inflections, for instance, are not nearly so complicated as in Latin or German, being more like the streamlined English type. There are no significant tone differences to master either, as in Chinese or some of the American Indian tongues. The phonetic, or pronunciation, system is also easy for most Americans and Europeans; probably Italian is the Western speech that sounds most like the Malay languages; and, as in Italian, the trilled *r* presents the main difficulty to speakers of English.

Finally, the entire language problem in the Indies is simplified by the fact that there is a kind of "basic Malay," known as "bazaar" or "pidgin" Malay, which is understood throughout most of the islands. It is a minimum language, stripped to bare essentials, and can be learned adequately in a few months of steady

practice. It serves as a *lingua franca* in all except the interior districts of the larger islands; and even here, among most tribes, interpreters who speak both the local language and pidgin Malay can be found. It is fortunate that bazaar Malay is simple, for anyone going to live in the Indies must learn it. Only a minute proportion of the natives can speak Dutch; hardly any understand English; and the pidgin English found in other parts of the Orient is not used here.

Most of the Dutchmen in the islands were well educated, which meant that they knew English and one or two other European languages; but in daily life—in stores, in hotels, on boats and trains—one was in constant contact with Indonesians, to whom Malay had to be spoken. Outside the main centers, it was the only means of making oneself understood. On some trips through inland Sumatra I spoke no word of any language except Malay for several weeks. One further use of the pidgin vernacular was in talking with the occasional Dutchman who knew no English. Natives used to be immensely amused when they heard an American or Englishman conversing with a Hollander in Malay. In Europe I once met a Swede who could speak no English, German, French, or Dutch, but who had been in the Indies. We got along very well in Malay.

Over 90 per cent of the Indonesian natives are illiterate. The school system has only begun to reach the great masses of the population, and knowledge of reading and writing is confined almost exclusively to the small upper class. Insofar as the languages of the islands are written at all, the Arabic and Roman alphabets are mostly used. Until recently the former predominated, but as the educational system of the colonial administration expanded, employment of the standard European alphabet increased. The simple phonetic system of the Malayo-Polynesian languages makes transcription easy. Written native literature,

however, except for the abundant productions, particularly in drama and history, of the medieval Javanese scribes and poets, has always been restricted in quantity. Several newspapers in island languages were published in the Indies; and the printing of books for natives—originals and translations from European languages—mostly in Javanese or Malay, was slowly increasing during recent years.

Aside from Arabic and Roman scripts, some of the peoples of the archipelago, among them several quite primitive tribes, know how to use ancient alphabets all derived from the old Hindu Brahmi writing, a survival of the period when Indian civilization spread over the islands. The more advanced groups use paper, some of it made locally from the inner bark of certain trees and glazed with rice gruel; but the great preponderance of archaic native writing is done by scratching letters on the shiny surface of bamboo strips or palm leaves, which are then tied together in books. Accordionlike books made of long strips of thin bark folded together between wooden covers are used by the Batak of Sumatra. The Hindu-derived scripts are rapidly being displaced by the Arabic and European alphabets, but are still used in parts of Sumatra and Celebes, in Bali and a few others of the Lesser Sunda Islands, and even to some extent in Java. Two of the most primitive Philippine tribes—the Mangyan and Tagbanua of Mindoro and Palawan—are able to write in this archaic type of script.

Along the Equator for Four Thousand Miles

The Indies are 13,000 miles from New York, exactly halfway around the world. They are a chain of islands, thousands of them, ranging in size from the enormous bulk of Borneo to mere dots of land. The westernmost island, Sumatra, hugs the coast of the Malay Peninsula, whose tip at Singapore is only a few miles

across the Straits of Malacca. From the western point of Sumatra to the eastern border of the Netherlands territory in New Guinea, the islands stretch 4,000 miles; while from the northern extremity of Borneo to the southernmost island of Indonesia the distance is over 1,000 miles.

The archipelago lies directly on the equator; indeed, the line divides each of the two largest islands, Sumatra and Borneo, into almost exactly equal halves. The westernmost point, the tip of Sumatra, is just west of Penang in Malaya and due south of Rangoon in Burma. The northernmost points, in Borneo and Celebes, are adjacent to Mindanao in the Philippines, with chains of small islands connecting these three large land masses. The northern coast of Australia cradles the whole eastern half of the archipelago, Timor being only 400 miles from Darwin, the main city of north Australia. The eastern border is a line cutting directly north and south through the center of New Guinea and separating the western or Dutch half from the British eastern portion. Thus the entire East Indies occupy the seas lying between southeastern Asia (Indo-China, Siam, and Malaya) and Australia, and are connected to the north with China and Japan by the Philippine Islands. They form a dense screen of large and small islands separating Asia from Australia. Aside from this strategic military position, the Indies are vitally significant for their economic wealth and potentialities.

The enormous size of the archipelago usually comes as a surprise to those unfamiliar with the region. A chart of the whole area superimposed upon a map of the United States would extend from a point almost 400 miles off the California coast to another point in the Atlantic almost 600 miles east of Cape Hatteras. From north to south it would stretch from the Canadian border to central Texas. Much of this area is water, but many of the island masses are very extensive, together totaling almost 750,000 square

miles, about the size of the United States east of the Mississippi River. Borneo, the northern quarter of which is owned by Britain, is the fourth largest island in the world (coming after Australia, Greenland, and New Guinea), with a surface of 290,000 square miles, approximately the size of Texas and Oklahoma combined. New Guinea is larger, but only half of it is Dutch territory; still, the latter covers 150,000 square miles, about the same area as California. Sumatra, with its 160,000 square miles, also approximates California in size; Celebes, with 70,000 square miles, is comparable to New England plus New Jersey; and Java, the last of the big islands, is a little larger than New York State, 50,000 square miles. To take one example of traveling distance in the archipelago, a trip from one end to the other of Sumatra would be equivalent, if a straight road existed, to one from New York to St. Louis.

Only two sections in this whole vast island empire were owned in 1941 by other countries than the Netherlands. One was the northern part of Borneo, which was under British rule. The northeastern part of this territory, adjacent to the southern Philippines, though to all intents and purposes a British colony, was still administered by a chartered company, the British North Borneo Company. The northwestern section was divided between Sarawak and Brunei, two "protected sultanates." The former, and by far the larger, was under the rule of the Brooke dynasty of white rajahs; the latter was administered by a native sultan. Despite these complications of detail, the entire area functioned as a British colony, and all three sections fell within the jurisdiction of the High Commissioner of British Malaya. The other part of the East Indies not under Dutch rule was the eastern half of the island of Timor, lying just north of Australia. Here the Portuguese held onto a last remnant of their once extensive possessions in the archipelago.

The East Indies are divided into four main geographical areas. The first of these includes the four large western islands—Sumatra, Java, Borneo, and Celebes—and is called the Greater Sunda Islands. This is the most important region of all, in size, population, and wealth. The second division comprises the chain of islands that stretch from Java to Timor along the southern rim of the archipelago. Called the Lesser Sunda Islands, they include, from west to east, Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa, Sumba, Flores, Savu, Roti, the Alor-Solor group, and Timor. They are considerably smaller than the Greater Sunda group, although three of them—Sumbawa, Flores, and Timor—are of fair size; and are much lower in population and development than the big islands to the west. Between the Lesser Sundas and Celebes to the west and New Guinea to the east, lies a vast aggregation of islands, large and small, scattered over the Moluccas and Banda seas. They are the so-called “Spice Islands” of romantic fame, otherwise known as the Moluccas. The southern chain of these islands, between Timor and New Guinea, includes the sizable Tanimbar, Kei, and Aru groups, as well as numerous smaller clusters, such as Wetar, Kisar, Roma, Damar, Leti, Moa, Lakor, Luang, Sermata, and Babar. The northern Moluccas include two large islands, Halmahera and Ceram; several of intermediate size, such as Buru, Obi, and the Sula group; and some small clusters, notably Ternate, Tidore, Ambon, and Banda. The Moluccan islands are the connecting link between the Greater and Lesser Sundas and New Guinea. They also form a series of stepping-stones from the Philippines to Australia, a kind of “back-door” route from north to south. With this in mind, the Dutch established one of their two strongest naval bases right in their center, on the island of Ambon. The other big naval base of the Indies, and the chief one, was at Surabaya, on the northeastern coast of Java. The fourth and final main geographical division of the Indies is the Dutch half of New Guinea, a region only partially explored and very slightly developed. It is indeed one of the least-known areas of the world, a land of the future, whose natives and resources are only beginning to be investigated.

The Swamps and the Mountains

The Indies are not the islands of South Sea romance, low-lying, with gleaming sand and coral beaches. Most of them are continental islands, broken off not so very long ago, as geological time is reckoned, from Asia and Australia. The central ones—Celebes, the Lesser Sundas, and the Moluccas—rise sheer from ocean chasms of enormous depth; but the Greater Sundas rest upon a suboceanic land shelf that extends out from Asia, while New Guinea and the Aru Islands are portions of a similar shelf that reaches north from the Australian continent. The seas that separate these two areas from Asia and Australia, respectively, are very shallow, and most of the coastal land consists of tidal swamps extending far inland. The whole of eastern Sumatra, nearly all the coastland of Borneo, much of the northern shore of Java, and the whole southern half of New Guinea are vast, almost impenetrable jungle marshes. Natives in these regions travel almost exclusively by boat on the sluggish rivers, for overland movement is all but impossible.

Next to the swamps, the most impressive topographical feature of the archipelago is the mountains. The Indies are almost entirely either very low swamps or very steep, rugged mountains. Sumatra, for instance, is half marshland—on its eastern side—and half a high mountain chain that runs down its western flank like a backbone. Java is much the same, except that the slopes there are more gradual and the flatter lands in the folds of the mountains are more extensive. Borneo has few real mountains, but the whole interior is composed of rolling hills, covered with either thick forest growth or wide, infertile savannahs of tough, high grass. This inhospitable central portion is ringed on all sides by the endless marshes of the coast, which extend inland in some

sections over a hundred miles. Celebes, the spider-shaped island to the east of Borneo, is simply a mass of mountains, wildly tumbled into a landscape all steep angles and jagged profiles; here even the coastal swamps are lacking or very narrow.

Almost all the rest of the islands, from Bali east to Timor and north to Halmahera, are either very hilly or mountainous, most of them covered with dense tropical forest growth. Some of the smaller Moluccas approximate the typical South Sea island appearance, with long, sweeping beaches and low-lying land; but most of them, even though small, are rugged and mountainous. New Guinea represents the ultimate extreme in this whole swamp-mountain contrast. Its southern half, opposite Australia, is one vast marshland, while in the center the mountains rear precipitously to such a tremendous height that, even though they lie almost on the equator, their tops are mantled with eternal snow.

The Beneficent Volcanoes

This is an area of great volcanic activity, and also one of the most dangerous earthquake zones in the world. While the majority of the active volcanoes are situated in the western islands, most of the earthquakes occur in the eastern part of the archipelago. There are well over a hundred active or recently active volcanoes in the East Indies, and almost half of these are in Sumatra and Java. The characteristic landscape of interior Java or Sumatra would include, in addition to thatched bamboo huts, flooded rice patches, and mightily horned water buffalo, at least one, better two or three, smoking volcanoes in the distance. Next to these two islands, the greatest concentration of active volcanoes is found in Flores and at the northern tip of Celebes. Perhaps the most famous volcano of all is Krakatao, which lies partially sub-

merged in the narrow strait separating Sumatra from Java. When this island caldron blew up in 1883, seismologists recorded the eruption as the most violent in history.

While East Indian volcanoes bring death, they also nourish abundant life. Wherever active or recently active volcanoes occur in the islands, population is densest, for volcanism means fertile soil. Where there are no volcanoes and no volcanic soil, the earth is relatively sterile and population is sparse. Good examples of the former situation are Java, the most densely inhabited and the most volcanic of all the islands, and some of the interior valleys of Sumatra, where thick clusters of settlements are found directly under smoking mountains. Borneo illustrates the opposite condition: here there are no volcanoes, the land is old and stable, and, for all its enormous size, it has only about one-twentieth the population of Java.

The Heat and the Rain

The general climate of the islands is hot, but the heat decreases as one ascends the mountains. The almost invariable rule is that for each 300 feet of altitude the average temperature drops one degree. Thus, in Batavia, on the coast, the average annual temperature is about 80°, while in a mountain resort town like Bandung, lying some 2,000 feet above sea level, the annual average is only 73°. But the humidity is always high; and in most districts, even during the so-called dry season, rain falls sometime during every day. The consequence is that the coastal heat, even though it may not rise much over 90° (the record for Batavia is 96°), seems very oppressive. Moreover, there is little relief, for the seasonal variation is slight and breezes seldom stir.

Rainfall, like temperature, increases with altitude. In some mountainous parts of Sumatra the precipitation reaches 12 feet

per year. The amount of rain depends largely upon the season. During the west monsoon, which blows during the period approximately coinciding with winter in the United States, the wet season prevails. So heavy is the rain at this time that roads are washed away and mold grows rapidly on shoes and the leather bindings of books. The dry season, or west monsoon, which occurs during our summer, is merely a season when there is less rain.

Bacteria and Beasts

In addition to heat and constant dampness, the Indies offer two other great annoyances: constantly lurking disease and animal life too abundant for comfort. Snow and cold never come to drive away the insects. It is impossible to sleep except under a mosquito net; flies and ants swarm everywhere; and spiders, scorpions, and giant leeches demand constant wariness. Disease parasites are a steady danger. All water must be boiled or otherwise treated in order to avoid dysentery, typhoid, and cholera. Vegetables and fruits have to be peeled before eating, and preferably cooked. Lettuce is virtually taboo.

Malaria, carried by the anopheles mosquito, is perhaps the greatest threat of all; few white men who stay for any length of time in the Indies escape it, and a fairly high proportion of them die of it. In areas where it is particularly bad, the natives seem largely immune to its fatal effects; but most of them have it in their systems, and it breaks forth intermittently, especially at changes in the weather. They call it *sakit dingin*, "the cold sickness," because it causes chills and fever, and they regard an attack of it much as an American would a common cold. To white people, however, it is very dangerous, particularly in its more virulent form, known as "malaria tropica." The Dutch insist that a

high intake of alcohol, preferably the heavy Holland gin, is a fine preventative of malaria; the alternative is to absorb a steady ration of quinine, which leaves one feeling much as gin does the morning after. Fortunately malaria is less prevalent in some places than in others, and the danger zones are well known, so that one can take special precautions in such regions. More spectacular diseases, such as elephantiasis and leprosy, are quite common among natives, but seldom afflict Europeans.

In this jungle country wild life is abundant and varied. The large western islands have Asiatic types of animals, while the eastern parts of the archipelago possess fauna related to that of Australia, such as numerous kinds of marsupials and, in New Guinea, an enormous nonflying ostrichlike bird called the cassowary. Elephants roam wild only in Sumatra, where, moving in large herds, they constitute a threat to settlements and plantations. In North Sumatra they are also a danger to motorists, and when the elephant alarm is telephoned down the road all traffic must stop until the herd has passed. Borneo and Java are the home of the giant wild cattle, or benteng, a beast which is more than a match for a tiger.

Tigers infest the jungles of Sumatra and forested places in Java and Bali, but are found nowhere else in the islands. Ordinarily tigers are not especially dangerous to man, although they will attack humans when impelled by hunger. The old tigers are the worst, for they have lost their teeth, and, once having discovered the tenderness of human skin and flesh in contrast to the toughness of animal hide, they become man-eaters, prowling around villages and terrorizing the inhabitants. The only way to be rid of such a beast is to kill him. One of the worries of driving at night in a place like central Sumatra is the risk of having tire trouble; many a man has been killed by a tiger while working on his car at the side of a jungle road.

The rhinoceros has a wider distribution than the tiger, being native to Sumatra, Borneo, and Java. Monkeys of several varieties swarm in the wooded areas of all the islands except the Moluccas and New Guinea, but the great orang-utan ape lives only in Sumatra and Borneo. The beautiful little mouse-deer, standing a foot high, is found in all the large western islands; it is the hero of innumerable Malay animal fables, playing a role similar to that of Br'er Rabbit, the weak but clever trickster, in American Negro folk tales.

The snakes of the Indies include numerous poisonous varieties, such as cobras and some kinds of water reptiles; but the largest of the snakes, the python, is nonpoisonous, killing its prey by constriction. A python over thirty feet long and more than a foot in diameter is no uncommon sight in the Indies. Probably the most dangerous beast of the islands is the crocodile. The rivers teem with these enormous reptiles, and hundreds of natives fall victim to them every year. They lurk around the places where people bathe and launder their clothes, and constant vigilance is necessary to guard against them. Only the most unwary person would think of taking a siesta on the bank of an Indonesian stream.

Where the Seventy Million Live

If the physical size of the East Indies came as a surprise to many readers, the population of these islands, particularly of Java, will probably be little short of astonishing. The total population in 1930, the year of the last complete census report, was about 60,000,000, almost half that of the United States. By 1940 it was approaching 70,000,000.* The distribution of population, however, is

* The population figures which follow are based on the census reports for 1930. The Japanese invasion interfered with the publication of detailed statistics for 1940.

decidedly uneven. About two-thirds of the total, over 40,000,000, live in Java and its neighboring island of Madura. Sumatra comes next, with about 8,000,000 inhabitants; then Celebes, with approximately 4,000,000; and, of the large islands, Borneo last, with about 2,500,000 in the Dutch and British sections combined. These four Greater Sunda Islands account for almost 55,000,000 of the total 60,000,000 population of the entire archipelago. The Lesser Sundas have a population of about 3,500,000; but here again the distribution is uneven, for Bali alone has over a million of these, and Lombok, the island adjacent to Bali, 600,000. The remaining 1,900,000 are thinly spread over Sumbawa, Timor, Flores, and the other Lesser Sundas. Population becomes even sparser in the easternmost regions, the Moluccas and Dutch New Guinea together having only about 900,000 inhabitants.

The density of population varies markedly. The average density per square mile in Java is over 800, a world's record for a country of its size. New York State, for instance, with about the same area, and including New York City, has a density of only 265 per square mile. Java's heavy population appears even more amazing when one considers that the island is almost entirely agricultural, with 90 per cent of its inhabitants living in the countryside and only 10 per cent in cities. Batavia, the largest city in the Indies, has a relatively small population of about 450,000; and the only city outside Java with over 100,000 inhabitants is Palembang in Sumatra.

By contrast with Java, the population density of all the rest of the archipelago reaches the low figure of 28 per square mile. Whereas in only two districts of Java does the density fall below 250 per square mile, five districts alone in all the other islands rise to this point of concentration: Macassar, two sections of Bali, the island of Lombok, and a part of eastern Sumatra. If these five

areas are deducted, all the rest of the Indies have a density of only 18 inhabitants per square mile.

Javanese Fecundity and Dutch Dismay

Obviously, the situation would seem to call for some kind of planned population policy, and the Dutch have done their best to induce Javanese to emigrate to other islands, principally Sumatra, Borneo, and Celebes. Despite all the efforts of the government, however, the Javanese have stubbornly clung to their native island. By 1930 only 1,500,000 Javanese were living outside their home territory. Probably the main root of the difficulty was that the Dutch, with good humanitarian ideals, expanded and improved health services—vaccination, clinics, and free quinine—for the natives without at the same time attacking the problem of birth control. The result of this policy can be seen at once in the fact that the Javanese population, 20,000,000 in 1870, has since doubled.

It is difficult to see how an efficient birth-control program could be operated among illiterate, penniless natives; perhaps it would be impossible, for both education and equipment are needed in modern contraception. In any case, the fact is that the Javanese are now literally breeding themselves off their small island. The natives are conservative and hate to leave their birthplace, for their village and family organization is very close-knit. Their ancestors lived in the village for countless generations before them, and their spirits still hover over the community. To leave this place, where friendly spirits protect them from the ever-threatening forces of evil and death, and go to a strange region teeming with unfamiliar and hostile demons, seems to the Javanese utterly unreasonable and even terrifying.

Before the introduction of European medicine and sanitary improvements, the death rate, especially in infancy, counterbalanced the extremely high birth rate; but now this natural check has been interfered with. The situation is easy to comprehend from the vital statistics of Java: the birth rate is 38 per 1,000, the death rate 22 per 1,000 population. By contrast, the United States birth and death rates are 18 and 11 per 1,000, respectively. Thus the annual rate of increase in Java is twice as high as in this country. Here we have a profoundly impressive case of interference with natural forces: the Dutch, with the best intentions in the world, labored to preserve and lengthen the lives of the Javanese; and their reward was one of the most difficult overpopulation problems in the world. I remember hearing a Javanese student at the University of Leiden bitterly bewailing the high infant mortality in his native town. A Dutch colonial official sitting with us quietly asked him: "Have you ever thought what would happen if we kept all the babies alive?"

The Foreigners

The white population of the Indies was very small in 1940, totaling only about 250,000, of whom almost 200,000 lived in Java and Madura. The Chinese, who controlled most of the small-scale commercial enterprises in the islands, numbered approximately 1,200,000, about equally divided between Java and the other parts of the archipelago. All other "alien Asiatics" totaled 115,000; 70,000 of these were Arabians, and 30,000 British Indians. Strangely enough, Japanese and Filipinos were included in the category of Europeans, probably because of legal technicalities. Together they numbered only a few thousand; indeed, in 1940 one could live for years in the Indies and never meet a Japanese.

Tribes of Tens and Hundreds of Thousands

In discussing native areas of the world it is customary to refer to the larger social groupings as tribes. In all, one could enumerate about 130 separate native East Indian tribes, but many of them are so large that they might better be designated as nations or peoples. Anthropologists used to working with American Indian tribes of a few hundred members marvel at the enormous size of the native groups in the Indies. The area is, indeed, an anthropologist's wonderland, with vast aggregations of people living in a primitive or semiprimitive stage of culture. It is, in short, the greatest existing "native" region in the world.

The Javanese of central and eastern Java, with 27,000,000 population, are the largest single group in the islands. They are followed by the Sundanese, or western Javanese, with 8,500,000. Next come the Madurese, inhabiting the island of Madura and the adjacent coastland of northeastern Java, and numbering 4,500,000. The largest tribe (or "people") of Sumatra are the Coastal Malays, inhabiting the lowlands opposite the Malay Peninsula; their population is close to 3,500,000. The Macassarese and Buginese of southern Celebes total 2,500,000. Two groups living in the interior mountains of Sumatra, the Minangkabau and the Batak, number 2,000,000 and 1,000,000, respectively. The only other single people with over a million population are the Balinese, with 1,200,000; although the coastal inhabitants of Borneo, a mixture of Malay, Javanese, and Buginese mainly, total together about 1,000,000.

The following table is presented for convenient reference. It classifies the native peoples of the archipelago, first of all into eight main divisions, with the approximate area and population of each; and then into the constituent tribal complexes or islands of these divisions, with the estimated population of each. The Roman and Arabic numerals of the table provide a key to the accompanying map.

	<i>Population</i>
I. Sumatra and adjacent islands (180,000 sq. mi.)	8,000,000
1. Atjehnese	750,000
2. Gayo and Alas	50,000
3. Batak	1,000,000
4. Minangkabau	2,000,000
5. Coastal Malays	3,500,000
6. Redjang-Lampung (Redjang, Lampung, Lebong, Pasemah, etc.)	500,000
7. Kubu (Kubu, Mamak, Sakai, Akit, Lubu, Benua, etc.)	25,000 ¹
8. Niassans	200,000
9. Mentawcians	10,000
10. Enganese	300
11. Orang Laut ("Sea Gypsies"; many small scattered groups in Sumatra and other parts of the archipelago)	10,000 ²
II. Borneo (290,000 sq. mi.)	2,500,000
1. Bahau (Kenya, Kayan, etc.)	300,000
2. Ngadju (Ot Danom, Maanyan, Lawangan, Katingan, Biadju, etc.)	400,000
3. Land Dyak (Landak, Tayan, etc.)	200,000
4. Klamantan (Murut, Dusun, Milanau, Kalabit, etc.)	300,000
5. Iban ("Sea Dyak")	200,000

¹ Seminomadic bands of the primitive Kubu group are scattered through the Redjang-Lampung territory of southern Sumatra and the Malay zone along the east coast, as well as in the islands between Sumatra and Malaya.

² A remarkable group of maritime nomads who spend most of their lives in their boats. They are found wandering about the islands off the east coast of Sumatra, but clusters of them are also encountered in other parts of the archipelago as far east as the Moluccas, as well as along the shores of Malaya and Burma.

	<i>Population</i>
6. Punan (Bukit, Bukit, Basap, etc.)	50,000 ³
7. Coastal Malays, Javanese, Buginese	1,000,000 ⁴
III. Java and Madura (50,000 sq. mi.)	40,000,000
1. Javanese	27,000,000
2. Sundanese	8,500,000
3. Madurese	4,500,000 ⁵
4. Badui	1,200
5. Tenggerese	10,000
IV. Celebes and adjacent islands (70,000 sq. mi.)	4,000,000
1. Macassarese and Buginese	3,500,000 ⁶
2. Toradja (Palu, Napu, Poso, Besoa, Parigi, etc.)	200,000
3. Sadang (Sadang, Seko, Rongkong, etc.)	500,000
4. Mori-Laki (Mori, Bungku, Laki, Kabaena, Muna, Buton, etc.)	200,000
5. Loinang (Loinang, Wana, Balantak, Banggai, etc.)	100,000
6. Minahasa-Gorontalo (Minahasa, Gorontalo, Bolaang Mongondou, Sangirese, Talaut, etc.)	500,000
7. Toala	100

³ Dispersed groups of nomadic Punan range the jungles of the interior of Borneo in the regions held by the more settled tribes.

⁴ In Borneo great numbers of Javanese, Buginese from Celebes, and Malays from Sumatra and Malaya have settled in the coastal sultanates.

⁵ The Madurese occupy a section of the northeast coast of Java as well as the neighboring island of Madura.

⁶ The Buginese, who with the allied Macassarese constitute the largest ethnic and cultural group in Celebes, have spread from their homeland in the southwestern peninsula to settle coastal regions in other parts of the island and in adjacent parts of Borneo.

	<i>Population</i>
V. Lesser Sunda Islands (35,000 sq. mi.)	3,500,000
1. Bali (Balinese, Bali Aga)	1,200,000 ⁷
2. Lombok (Sasak, Bodha, Balinese)	600,000 ^{7,8}
3. Sumbawa (Sumbawanese, Bimanese, Do Donggo, etc.)	300,000 ⁹
4. Sumba	100,000
5. Savu	27,000
6. Roti	60,000
7. Timor (Belu, Atoni, Kupangese, etc.)	700,000
8. Flores (Manggarai, Ngada, Sika, Roka, etc.)	500,000
9. Alor-Solor	150,000
VI. Northern Moluccas (25,000 sq. mi.)	300,000
1. Ceram (Patasiwa, Patalima, Bonfia, etc.)	60,000
2. Ceramlaut	6,000
3. Goram	6,000
4. Watubela	2,500
5. Ambon	60,000
6. Banda	6,000
7. Buru	20,000
8. Halmahera (Galela, Tobelo, Tobaru, etc.)	50,000
9. Ternate-Tidore	35,000
10. Batjan	10,000
11. Obi (no permanent population) ¹⁰	

⁷In the interior of both Bali and Lombok, small groups, called respectively the Bali Aga and the Bodha, retain a more ancient type of culture than the general population.

⁸The Hinduist Balinese have spread from their own island across to Lombok, where, until recently, they ruled the Islamized natives, who are known as Sasak.

⁹In the eastern mountains of Sumbawa, the small Do Donggo tribe has preserved vestiges of an archaic culture in the midst of Mohammedan neighbors.

¹⁰Obi, a relatively large island in the Moluccas from which the original population has disappeared, now supports only a few transient fishermen and gatherers of forest products.

	<i>Population</i>
12. Sula	15,000
VII. Southern Moluccas (10,000 sq. mi.)	125,000
1. Wetar	7,500
2. Kisar	9,000
3. Leti-Moa-Lakor	15,000
4. Luang-Sermata	5,000
5. Nila-Teun-Serua	3,000
6. Roma-Damar	3,000
7. Babar	10,000
8. Tanimbar	25,000
9. Aru (Arunese, Gungai, Tungu)	20,000
10. Kei	30,000
VIII. Dutch New Guinea and adjacent islands (150,000 sq. mi.)	500,000
(Largely unexplored; tribal divisions not definitely established)	

II

THE PAST

A THOUSAND YEARS AGO A GREAT EMPIRE FLOURISHED IN THE Indies, with its center in Java. The period from 800 to 1400 A.D. marked the height of native civilization, when, under the powerful central Javanese and Singosari states in Java and the Shrivijaya dynasty in Sumatra, all the islands and part of the mainland of Asia were gradually brought together in a centralized empire known as Modjopahit. From the capital in eastern Java, it ruled over the entire archipelago as far north as Luzon in the Philippines, east to the coastland of New Guinea, and northwest in the Malay Peninsula to the borders of Burma and Siam. This great efflorescence of culture and power took place as a consequence of the spread of Hindu civilization from India, and is known as the Hindu period of East Indian history.

Java Man and His Successors

Written records go back only a little before the Hindu period, the earliest inscriptions on stone dating from the fifth century A.D. Anthropologists and archeologists, however, have partially reconstructed the prehistory of the area thousands of years back—indeed, back to the very dawn of man's existence on earth. For here in Java have been found the oldest skeletal remains of hu-

mankind, the famous Java Man; or *Pithecanthropus Erectus*, the nearest thing to a "missing link" ever discovered. This humanoid creature lived in the Indies about 500,000 years ago. Since those distant days of first habitation, the archipelago has received countless waves of migrants pouring down the funnel neck of southeastern Asia and fanning out into the islands. Some have remained to mingle with later arrivals or to succumb to annihilation before their onslaughts; others have pushed on or been forced out into the Pacific, where they have settled the distant islands of Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia. Far back in time the ancestors of the Papuans of New Guinea and of the aborigines of Australia, as well as of the now extinct Tasmanians, most primitive of all historic peoples, passed down the island highway of Indonesia to reach their ultimate homes. Thus the entire Pacific area was in large part populated through the archipelago; and from an anthropological viewpoint it has been truly termed the "threshold of Oceania." Its history is therefore long and complicated, and much of it lies hidden in the mist of the ages; but the present racial strains give a good clue to the progression of peoples who have come there from Asia.

Four principal racial strata may be distinguished. The most ancient of these appears to be the Negrito, or dwarf Negro, stock, which exists relatively unmixed only in Malaya (among the forest-dwelling Semang), the Andaman Islands (which lie north of Sumatra in the Indian Ocean), the Philippines (among the very primitive Aeta), and the interior of New Guinea. Traces of this short, dark, flat-nosed, woolly-haired strain, however, are clearly apparent in Sumatra, Java, Celebes, and some of the eastern islands, notably Timor, Alor, and Wetar. The only other area in the world where pygmy Negroes are found is central Africa; whether the Negritos of Asia are anciently related to the little African jungle people is a point of dispute among anthropologists.

Another very archaic racial stratum in the Indies is the so-called Veddoid strain, found in relatively pure form among the Vedda of Ceylon. This small, frail, weak-chinned, light-brown, wavy-haired, flat-nosed, long-headed type occurs mainly among the most primitive tribes of the islands. The largest group of Veddoids, the Kubu, roam the impenetrable jungles and swamps of eastern Sumatra, while other Veddoid populations inhabit isolated districts in Celebes, Borneo, and Ceram. The more remote the region, the higher the proportion of Veddoid blood in the inhabitants—good evidence that they are the descendants of very ancient primitives who have been pushed off into the least desirable areas of the islands. Indeed, it may well be that in very early times, before the advent of the first true Malays, most of Indonesia was inhabited by Veddoid tribes, among whom small groups of Negrito stock were interspersed.

Before proceeding to the two remaining principal racial strains in the archipelago, the so-called earlier and later Malays, mention should be made of three other ethnic types which migrated into and through the islands in pre-Malay times. The most ancient of these, probably predating even the Negritos, is the Australoid stratum. The earliest human skeletal remains, excepting only those of Java Man, are the so-called Wadjak skulls found in Java, which show decidedly Australoid characteristics. So ancient is this type, however, that it has now vanished from possible detection in most parts of the archipelago; perhaps 10,000 years have passed since the ancestors of the present primitive aborigines of Australia lived in the Indies. Only in the Flores-Timor zone of the Lesser Sundas, opposite the northern coast of Australia, do occasional individuals of unmistakably Australoid type occur, with bearded faces, beetling brows, and coarse features.

A second archaic type, also found in the Flores-Timor area, is the Melanesian or Oceanic Negroid strain, with frizzy hair and

very dark skin. Here again we have a remnant of a past migration, in this instance a survival of the time when the ancestors of the modern Melanesians—who now live in the Solomon Islands, Fiji, and other islands in the Pacific beyond New Guinea—passed through Indonesia on their way out to the great ocean. The Flores-Timor region, at the eastern end of the Lesser Sunda chain, seems to have functioned as a geographical cul-de-sac for most of the waves of migration into the archipelago, and is now a kind of living museum of all the past and present racial types of the islands: earlier and later Malay, Veddoïd, Negrito, Australoid, Papuan, and Melanesian.

The third of the subordinate archaic racial strata is the Papuan, whose archetype is represented by the natives of New Guinea. Tall, slender, long-legged, dark-brown, curly-haired, bearded, big-nosed, narrow-headed individuals of Papuan type begin to appear as one goes from west to east in the Lesser Sundas and eastern Celebes. They increase in regular progression until, in the islands closest to New Guinea, they form by far the most numerous element in the population. In the Moluccas, a transitional area from the racial viewpoint, intermixture of the Papuan and earlier Malay types has produced the so-called Alfur hybrid, characterized by medium to tall stature, slender build, medium- to dark-brown skin, straight to wavy hair, a relatively hairy body, and features ranging from the broad-faced, flat-nosed earlier Malay norm to the narrow-faced, "semitic"-nosed Papuan conformation.

The latest arrivals in Indonesia, aside from the historic Hindu, Chinese, Arabian, and European immigrants, are the Malays, customarily subdivided into the earlier and later Malay types. The earlier Malay strain is the principal racial element among all the inland peoples of the Greater Sundas and most of the Lesser Sundas. The more strongly Mongoloid later Malay type pre-

dominates in the coastal populations. The reason for this seems to be that the earlier Malays left the Asiatic mainland before the Mongoloids, descending from China and Tibet in the north, swept in force over the southeastern part of the continent. Thus they retained to a greater degree their original type, which approaches more nearly the Caucasoid, or white, than the Mongoloid, or yellow, racial appearance.

The earlier Malays are distinguished from the more Mongolized later Malays by shorter stature, darker skin, slightly higher frequency of wavy hair, much narrower skulls, and a markedly lower frequency of the typical Mongoloid eye-fold, which gives true Orientals, such as the Chinese and Japanese, their familiar slanting- and slit-eyed appearance. In short, the inland peoples of the archipelago look more European, despite their dark skin, than the coastal groups. It is apparently from this earlier strain that the Polynesians of Samoa, Hawaii, and other islands of the central Pacific are derived; for, as anyone who examines photographs of the South Sea islanders can readily see, most of them could pass more easily as Europeans of swarthy complexion than as Mongoloids.

It is not strictly true that the earlier and later Malays represent two distinct waves of migration into the archipelago. Rather is it probable that from very early times onward until about 2000 B.C., when the final Malay influx appears to have come into the Indies from Asia, a constant flow of population from the southeastern part of the continent drained into the islands of the archipelago. As time went on, the Mongolian peoples from the north descended in ever-increasing numbers into southeastern Asia, and, mixing with the ancestors of the Malays who were settled there—in Burma, Siam, and Indo-China mainly—finally changed the character of the latter from a predominantly Caucasoid to a pre-

dominantly Mongoloid type. In the Indies the less Mongolized Malays, having arrived earlier, were gradually driven inland by the progressively more Mongoloid newcomers.

This agrees with the present racial situation in the islands. The hilly and mountainous interiors are the home of tribes of the earlier Malay type, and the coastal areas are inhabited by groups of the later stock—obviously the latter have pushed the former back into the hills and forests. Moreover, the later Malay strain occurs mainly in Sumatra and Java, the islands nearest Asia. It has only recently spread in appreciable force to the coastal lands of Borneo, Celebes, and the eastern islands, where again the earlier Malay groups are retreating to the interior districts. Finally, to complete the reconstruction, the later Malays, inhabiting the coastal regions principally, have received the full impact of the historic immigrations of Hindus, Chinese, Europeans, and other aliens; and the resultant interbreeding has further altered their physical character as compared with that of the more secluded earlier Malays.

Hindu Princes of the Indies

Almost fifteen hundred years ago, as a result of the venturings of Hindu voyagers and traders into the island world of the eastern ocean, Indonesia entered upon its historic era. The newcomers brought with them, among the accomplishments of the civilization that had been evolving for centuries in India, the art of writing. The earliest fragments of written history in the Indies, in the form of scattered inscriptions found in Java and Borneo, date from the fifth century A.D. The oldest Sumatran inscriptions thus far unearthed go back no further than the seventh century.

These earliest records consist of short disconnected references to the rulers of Hindu colonial states in the islands, and tell little

except that Indian dynasties were establishing themselves in various parts of western Indonesia by 500 A.D. Judging from these fragments, the typical mode of procedure was for a prince of some Indian ruling house to come to the Indies and there insinuate himself into the graces of a native chieftain. Acting as adviser, sometimes marrying the chief's daughter, the Hindu would then establish, on the basis of the existing loose tribal organization, a state government copied after the Indian model. In this way Hindu-native states were gradually set up all along the coastlands of Java and Sumatra, and in parts of Borneo and Celebes.

More extensive than the early inscriptions, and exceedingly valuable for Indonesian history, are the travel notes of two Chinese Buddhist pilgrims: Fa-Hsien, who passed through Java and Sumatra on his way to India in the fifth century, and I-Tsing, who visited Sumatra in the seventh century. These travelers tell of the Hindu states they saw, and also record that at this early period the coastal populations of the western Indies were already largely converted to Hindu religion, either Brahmanism or Buddhism, or, more commonly, peculiar combinations of both.

After the eighth century, inscriptions became more plentiful and more detailed in Java and Sumatra; and by the eleventh century the scribes and poets of the Javanese courts were recording the chronicles of the archipelago in connected narrative form. Indian and Chinese writers of the period were also making numerous references to the islands, and regular communication and trade had been established throughout the region. Two centers of power were emerging at this time, one in southern Sumatra and the other in central Java. The ruins of cities and temples of the latter state are still standing, the most impressive of all being the enormous pyramidal Borobudur in Java, with episodes from the life of Buddha carved in relief along miles of walls rising tier after tier from the ground to the peak of the structure. It was built about

the time of Charlemagne. This is only one of the hundreds of striking architectural remains of the Hindu period scattered over Java and Sumatra.

Intermittent wars punctuated the medieval history of Indonesia. The empire of Shrivijaya in southern Sumatra passed through a troubled period of naval and military engagements with the states of southern India and Ceylon in the eleventh and again in the thirteenth century. The armies of the Singosari empire in eastern Java defeated a great force sent by Kublai Khan, the Chinese potentate who was Marco Polo's host, to the north coast of the island in 1294. Even in these early days, the Indies were a rich prize for ambitious conquerors. Then, as now, the wealth of the islands offered a temptation to foreign powers. Nowadays the main goals of conquest are rubber, oil, and the labor of millions of cheaply paid native workers; a thousand years ago the stakes of war were gold, sandalwood, spices, and slaves.

Most important for the history of Indonesia itself was the constant struggle, marked by a long series of wars, between the Sumatran and Javanese dynasties for the control of the archipelago. The issue was finally decided in favor of the Javanese; and the great empire of Modjopahit, with its capital in eastern Java, exercised supreme dominion over most of the Indies, the Philippines, and the southeastern part of Asia during the fourteenth and most of the fifteenth century. It was during this period that Hindu-Javanese civilization spread most widely over the entire area; and even today relics of this influence—in the form of ancient Indian alphabets, artifacts of gold and other metals, stone monuments, and innumerable traits of culture and language—are found as far north as Luzon in the Philippines and as far east as New Guinea on the outermost fringe of the Indies. The Hindus have also left their mark on the physical type of the people of Indonesia, but this is true mainly in the coastal districts of Java and Sumatra, and

principally among people of the higher classes. The nobility of Java and the royal families of the Sumatran sultanates show the strongest evidences of Hindu blood admixture, with taller stature, longer limbs, narrower heads, and finer features than the general run of common folk.

The Mohammedan Revolution

The seeds of defeat lay in the fruits of victory for the medieval Hindu-Javanese. At the very height of its power the Modjopahit empire was suddenly threatened by a new force which entered the Indies from the west. Mohammedanism, brought from India to Malaya and Sumatra in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, spread inevitably over the vassal states of Modjopahit in Sumatra and western Java. The converted dependencies revolted one after another and broke away from the rule of the Javanese empire. The whole debacle was not caused by purely religious conflict, although, as in India, it was convenient for the princes of the various states to strengthen their cause by giving rebellion the appearance of a holy war. The empire itself, administered on a feudal plan like the medieval kingdoms of Europe, was always rather loosely knit; and the system of vassalage, with each member state ruled by a semi-independent prince, encouraged in each of them ambitions of complete independence. Mohammedanism merely functioned as the precipitant of outright revolt in a situation of constant potential upheaval. The process of dissolution was long; but finally, late in the fifteenth century, the last strongholds of the old regime in eastern Java fell before the attacks of the Islamized rebels.

Thus ended the greatest era of East Indian native history. Mohammedanism replaced Hinduism as the dominant religion wherever the latter had formerly prevailed, except in the island

of Bali. There the cult of Brahma, Shiva, and Vishnu lives on to-day as the last survival of the medieval Hindu church in the archipelago. Bali, indeed, is a kind of museum piece, a living replica of fourteenth-century Java. Many of its noble and high-caste families are descended from refugees who fled from Java when the old empire collapsed. The fall of Modjopahit not only spelled the doom of the Hinduist religion in most of Indonesia, it also marked the end of whatever political unity had been attained in the islands. In place of the single empire with its loosely affiliated vassal principalities, most of the archipelago was split up into innumerable petty states, all professing Mohammedanism, but engaged in constant war and intrigue one against another.

The Coming of the White Men

Such was the situation when the first European voyagers reached the islands in the early part of the sixteenth century. Playing ruler against ruler and fighting savagely among themselves, the Western powers enacted a bloody drama of colonial imperialism for three hundred years.

The Portuguese were the first Europeans to establish themselves in the islands. Under Albuquerque they took Malacca, the main port on the Malay Peninsula, in 1510; but their principal goal was the Moluccas, or Spice Islands, to the east, as the spice trade was the great attraction of the Indies in these early days of colonization. Operating out of Malacca, and sailing under the direction of Malay pilots who knew the waters of the archipelago, they succeeded by 1521 in establishing trade bases in the Moluccas at Ternate, Tidore, and Banda. The native rulers of the Indies states from the very start opposed the spread of European trade. In the west, the sultanates of Java and Sumatra harried the Portuguese ashore and at sea; while in the Moluccas naval skirmishes

over the spice trade culminated in a decisive victory for the Portuguese fleet over combined Javanese, Macassarese, and Bandanese forces in 1537. In 1580 Portugal was united with Spain; and the Spanish took over the Portuguese holdings in the Moluccas, directing them from their center of power in the Philippines.

The defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 opened the Indies to the British and Dutch. The latter moved rapidly, sending two expeditions under de Houtman to the islands in 1595 and 1598. By 1600 they had established flourishing commercial bases in the Moluccas, and the British immediately took steps to get their share of the rich spice trade. The English East India Company was formed in 1600, and two years later the Dutch countered this action by setting up the Netherlands East India Company. Whereas the British company was merely a private organization, the Dutch association operated under the auspices of the government, and in the ensuing competition could count on direct financial and military aid from the state. This linking of business enterprise with government has been characteristic of the Dutch colonial system all through its history; it has been the source of some weaknesses, but, especially in the pioneer days of colonization, it strengthened the power of the Dutch against their competitors.

The main goal of the British and Dutch in the early seventeenth century was the defeat of the Spanish-Portuguese spice monopoly in the Moluccas, and they co-operated in this endeavor, sinking their own rivalry until it was accomplished. Then the Dutch, winning out against the Portuguese in the eastern islands, and having seized Malacca from them in 1641, turned on their former allies and new rivals, the British. Their aim was complete and undisputed monopoly of the island trade. They did not quite achieve this, but came very close to it; and by the middle of the seventeenth century English trade was restricted to certain native states in western Indonesia with whose rulers the English East India

Company had commercial contracts. Spain had retreated from the Moluccas, and entrenched herself in the Philippines to the north, until driven out at last by the United States almost three hundred years later. Portugal retained only a few trading posts in the eastern islands, principally in the Timor region of the Lesser Sundas.

Dutchmen Who Did Not Want To Be Kings

Having cleared the field of European competition, the Dutch intensified their efforts to reduce the resistance of their native rivals. Whereas until about 1650 the Moluccan spice trade was virtually the only prize at stake, a new and even more promising sphere for profits now appeared; and, as usual, the shrewd Dutch were not slow in seeing its great possibilities. This new commercial endeavor was the economic exploitation of the larger western islands, mainly Java and Sumatra, where the land was suited to plantation cultivation of such highly marketable products as coffee, indigo, and pepper. As years went on, the spice trade of the eastern islands became progressively less important by comparison with the plantation economy of the Greater Sundas, a trend that was successively reinforced as new products—tea, rubber, sugar, palm oil, and quinine—were brought under large-scale cultivation.

When the Dutch began their intensive campaign to secure complete monopoly of the archipelago, most of the accessible territory in the islands was under the rule of native potentates, each of whom dominated a fragment of the shattered Modjopahit empire. The Netherlands concentrated their operations first upon the Moluccas in the east and Java in the west. In the former area the two most powerful rulers were the sultans of Macassar and Ternate; in Java, three states dominated the island: Bantam in the

west, Mataram in the center, and Balambangan, ruled by Balinese princes, in the east. In both areas the Dutch policy was to "divide and rule." The rivalries and antagonisms between the scores of petty princes made this policy highly effective, and at no time during their colonial expansion in the Indies did the Dutch face anything approximating a united front of native states allied against them. The agents of the East India Company conducted a remarkable series of intrigues all through the seventeenth century. With only a few thousand Netherlands troops at their disposal, by playing upon the perpetual dissensions among the island sultans and shifting alliances shrewdly, they were able to hold in check and defeat piecemeal the hordes of the native armies. By 1654 the sultanate of Ternate had been reduced to a mere shadow power; and in 1667 the ruler of Macassar, with all his vassal princes in the Moluccas, was forced to swear fealty to the Company.

Having thus brought under their control the leading eastern Indonesian potentates, the Dutch then turned full attention to Java. The sultan of the western Javanese state of Bantam became a puppet of the Company in 1685, leaving the central and eastern portions of the island to be dealt with. Until 1745 the Netherlands applied only diplomatic pressure to Mataram, the middle Javanese sultanate; but in that year the emissaries of the Company began an amazing succession of intricate maneuvers that resulted in tearing the native state asunder. At one point in the intrigues they actually succeeded in pitting one part of the royal family against another in open conflict. Mataram became a mere tool of the Company in 1758, and by 1774 the last independent Javanese state, Balambangan, was reduced to impotence.

The Company's policy was not to depose rulers unless they were stubbornly intractable, but rather to rule through them. This system of indirect rule, as we shall see, has remained a dominant

element in Dutch colonial administration. Because the Company did operate through native puppet rulers, there arose the situation of a business concern acting as a governmental organization. The traditional scheme of vassalage continued, but now the vassal princes of the formerly powerful overlords paid homage to the high officials of the Netherlands East India Company, who came to occupy the position of virtual maharadjas in the archipelago. The Company had not planned this, and accepted it only reluctantly. It desired not governmental power, but business control. However, these practical-minded Dutchmen who did not want to be kings found that they had to accept the role of feudal rulers in order to ensure their monopoly of trade.

The Company's aversion to governmental functions proved well grounded, for the expense of constant wars and military expeditions undermined its financial stability. Then a series of losses in trade weakened it even further; and, when Holland went to war with England in 1780, the doom of the great enterprise was sealed. The last dividend was issued in 1782; a second war with England blockaded the Java trade in 1795; and in 1798 the bankrupt Company was dissolved.

This debacle forced a complete change in the administration of the Indies. The islands were put under direct government control. Private enterprises were invited to take over commercial ventures in Indonesia, and the government instituted a system of taxation for revenue.

British Interlude

The new scheme had no chance to operate, for Holland itself disappeared as an independent country in 1806. Napoleon conquered the Netherlands; his brother Louis was installed as ruler; and William of Orange fled to England as a refugee. Relations

between England and Holland were remarkably similar to those existing between Britain and the Vichy government of France in 1941; but the British acted more decisively then than in the present situation. To ensure that the Indies should not fall to Napoleon, and with the consent and encouragement of the exiled Dutch king, English Far Eastern forces seized the whole archipelago in 1811. Sir Stamford Raffles, the great colonial administrator, was made lieutenant governor of Java, with power over the entire Indies. He adopted a firm policy toward the native rulers, who, all through the islands, were taking advantage of the Dutch collapse to regain their former power. Raffles defeated the rebellious sultans one after another, deposed those who persisted in hostility, and set up friendly rulers in their place. He also organized an efficient system of colonial administration, based upon his profound knowledge of native culture and his long experience in the Orient; and many of his reforms were later kept by the restored East Indies government of the Netherlands. His name is commemorated in many ways throughout the Indonesian and Malayan regions: a giant Sumatran flower, the largest blossom in the world, is called *Rafflesia*, and the Raffles Museum and Hotel in Singapore are named after him.

Profits by Pressure

The Convention of 1814 between Great Britain and the Netherlands restored the East Indies to Holland, and in 1818 the British occupation was ended. Heartbroken at the British surrender of the island empire which he knew was to become the richest colonial possession in the world, Raffles made a last gesture by securing the island of Singapore for Britain, confirming the transaction in a treaty with the sultan of Johore.

A treaty concluded with Great Britain in 1824 defined the ter-

ritories of the two nations in southern Asia and the archipelago. The Dutch surrendered their ports in British India and renounced all claims to the Malay Peninsula, while the British in return relinquished their holdings in Sumatra. The general agreement was that Holland was to have a free hand in the islands, Britain full rights on the mainland of Asia. However, no specific understanding was reached with regard to Borneo, still largely unexplored at the time. The final delimitation of Dutch and British territory in that island was not decided until 1891. The boundary between Dutch and British—and, at that time, German—New Guinea was not definitely set until 1895. Portugal still held Timor and some adjacent islands when Holland recovered the Indies from the British after the Napoleonic period; but in 1859 a treaty between the Netherlands and Portugal gave all the islands surrounding Timor, as well as the western half of the latter island, to the Dutch. The eastern part of Timor was retained by Portugal.

During the nineteenth century the Dutch, having reached full agreement with their former rivals, the British, concerning the Indies, devoted full energy to extending their control over the outer islands of the archipelago. Some districts they obtained by peaceful means, but most of the century was marked by constant warfare with recalcitrant natives all the way from Sumatra to New Guinea. The Dutch faced an almost immediate difficulty in Java with the outbreak of a strong rebellion in the central sultanate of Djokjakarta in 1825. Other districts joined the revolt, which was not finally suppressed until 1830, after having cost Holland heavily in money and men. This struggle, however, marked the end of serious Javanese resistance to Dutch rule. After it, the territory under the control of native princes was reduced to a small section of central Java, where four sultanates

were allowed to survive, but completely under the thumb of the colonial administration.

This outbreak, called the Java War, caused a complete reversal of the liberal tendencies of Dutch native policy. Also, the near-bankruptcy of Holland at this period made the mother country ready to go to almost any lengths to get a profit from the Indies. The outgrowth of this combination of circumstances was the notorious "culture system" introduced in Java in 1830. Here again, as in their scheme of indirect rule through the native princes, the Dutch operated on the traditional feudal principles which have never died out in the islands. Just as on the medieval manor in Europe the serfs had to labor a set number of days per year, so also, under the culture system, Javanese were required to devote a certain part of their land and labor annually to the production of crops for the government, which then sold them in the European markets for the profit of the Dutch treasury. The system was not applied to all districts in Java, and where it was not in force the natives paid a tax on their land holdings.

The culture system does not seem bad in principle, but the demands of the administration became heavier as profits increased. Moreover, the government officials were distracted from their primary function of administrators, and became degraded in the eyes of the natives to the status of despised tax collectors and labor bosses. Finally, as might have been predicted, the system opened easy ways to graft on the part of corrupt officials, European and native alike. One of the honest officials, the idealistic Douwes Dekker, in 1860 wrote an impassioned novel called *Max Havelaar*, a book known in Holland as the "Uncle Tom's Cabin" of the Indies. It laid bare the abuses of the culture system, and, achieving a tremendous sale in the Netherlands, caused such a popular furore that the government was forced to take action. The Agra-

rian Law of 1870 removed the worst features of the system, but allowed government cultivation to continue. By 1890, however, the administration had practically withdrawn from this feudal type of business enterprise, and income and land taxes replaced forced labor and deliveries of produce.

One survival of the forced labor system still persisted in the Indies in 1941. All able-bodied men up to the age of fifty had to toil a certain number of days per year on the roads or public works. A native might provide a substitute or, if he could afford it, might pay a head tax instead of performing his labor duties. Most Indonesians were too poor to buy themselves off, however, only about 600,000 of the 3,000,000 natives subject to forced labor being able to do so each year. The average number of days required annually was approximately twenty. I can imagine no more convincing proof of the inefficiency and morale-destroying character of the scheme than the mere sight of a gang of natives doing their duty on a Javanese road. It was common knowledge that they all hated the system, and the best term to describe their behavior was "slow sabotage."

Conquest of the Outer Islands

While the nineteenth century was a period of profit-making for the Dutch in Java, in the other islands they were occupied principally with extending and consolidating their control. They faced two types of situation among the native groups they had to deal with. The coastal areas of all or most of the islands were dominated by native states, while the interior regions, especially in the larger islands, were inhabited by independent, loosely organized tribes, with no centralized governing power. The Netherlands government followed the pattern set by the old East India Company in its dealings with the native princes. In every in-

stance an attempt was made to keep these sovereigns in power over their hereditary dominions, and to rule through them. Only when a sultan or radja proved hopelessly intractable were military means taken to depose him and to set up in his place a conciliatory ruler. In some cases, in which it was impossible to find a suitable person of the requisite rank to assume the throne, the traditional state organization was dissolved and the territory put under the direct administration of the colonial government. Even when this was done the lesser chiefs of districts and villages were usually retained by the Dutch and paid salaries by them. In the interior tribal areas, where no state organization existed, direct rule was introduced immediately upon incorporation of a region into the colonial system. Here again, so far as possible the native chieftains were kept in power over their people, being required only to prove their loyalty to the new administration.

In Sumatra the coastal sultanates were rapidly brought under control. Many of the rulers were allowed to retain their power upon signing the so-called "short declaration," which included recognition of the supreme authority of the Dutch government. Other potentates were deposed, and in some cases the native states were abolished and their territory placed under direct rule. The conquest of the interior tribes proceeded gradually all through the nineteenth century. Considerable opposition was encountered in the Minangkabau country of western Sumatra, where from 1820 to 1835 the Dutch forces were at more or less constant war with fanatical bands of Mohammedan guerrillas who called themselves Padris. The last interior regions of the island to be pacified were the Batak and Gayo lands in the central mountains. The former tribe were mostly pagans; and, although they resisted the expansion of Dutch rule into their highland homes, their opposition was by no means so fierce as that of the Gayo, a Mohammedanized group whose fighting spirit

was enhanced by religious hatred of the infidel Christians. Their resistance was finally broken in 1904, when Colonel van Daalen, with a small force of only 240 men, drove straight through the heart of their mountain land in a campaign that lasted over five months. Van Daalen's account of this amazing exploit is one of the bloodiest records of native warfare ever written. At every barricaded village the Dutch forces attacked they were opposed not only by all the men, but also by women and even children, who fought savagely with krisses and spears until killed.

The worst war the Dutch ever had to fight against East Indian natives lasted thirty-five years, from 1873 to 1908. It took place in Atjeh, the northernmost sultanate of Sumatra. Among the natives of this region Mohammedan fanaticism reaches its highest intensity. The Atjehnese, one might say, are the Moros of the Dutch Indies. Like these Mohammedan people of Mindanao in the Philippines, who have never been completely pacified by either the Spanish or the Americans, their hatred of the infidel whites seems unquenchable. The immediate causes of the Atjehnese War were piracy and resistance to Dutch expansion into the borderlands of the sultanate on the east coast of Sumatra. Although the Netherlands armies encountered little difficulty in seizing the main coastal towns of Atjeh, the native forces, operating in the mountainous and forested interior districts, conducted a successful guerrilla campaign for over three decades, costing the Dutch the lives of thousands of men and enormous financial loss.

As one traveled over the roads of Atjeh a few years ago, the marks of this desperate war were still visible. Cemeteries of Dutch soldiers were frequently seen, while along the highway and up over the hills and rice fields hundreds of upright smooth stones indicated the places where Atjehnese warriors had fallen and were buried. The hatred of the natives still smoldered. White

men were warned to be wary of Atjehnese who might sidle up to them at night and quickly slip a curved dagger under their ribs, then as swiftly disappear into the darkness. Such stealthy murders were frequent in this land of vengeance. I remember a typical instance in the town of Bireuen on the east coast of Atjeh. My business took me there frequently, and during one of my visits the young Dutch controleur met me with the matter-of-fact statement: "They got the doctor yesterday."

All through the night every government resthouse in Atjeh was guarded by a sentry with upraised saber, for the white men sleeping within were in constant danger. The land was not yet pacified in 1941, and patrols of native soldiers led by Dutch officers criss-crossed the interior continually. The newcomer would be surprised to see every man in the company carrying his saber unsheathed and on his shoulder, ready for instant use; but this was an army regulation in Atjeh; for, traveling in single file along narrow jungle paths as these patrols did, they were likely to be attacked suddenly from the bush by natives, each of whom picked his man, tried to get in a quick slash, and disappeared immediately into the forest. Atjehnese were seldom recruited into native regiments, for the Dutch were reluctant to give them access to arms. The garrisons and patrols in the region were composed of troops from other parts of the archipelago, mostly Menadonese from northern Celebes and Ambonese from the Moluccas, Christianized tribes who had no sympathy for the Mohammedan Atjehnese.

In Borneo the Dutch experienced relatively little difficulty in subjecting the coastal sultanates to either conquest or diplomatic control. Many of the expeditions to this island in the nineteenth century were for the purpose of extirpating piracy, for the native rulers were apt also to be pirate kings, whose buccaneers roamed the trade routes of the China and Java seas. Their swift and skill-

fully handled *praus* were more than a match for the Dutch ships until the introduction of steam gunboats, which rapidly swept most of the pirate craft from the ocean. In western Borneo the Dutch encountered unexpectedly strong opposition from the so-called *kongsis*, long-established Chinese colonies that were independent of the native rulers. Several expeditions were dispatched to the region, particularly the country around Pontianak on the western tip of Borneo, between 1816 and 1884, when finally the Chinese "republics" were pacified. The interior of Borneo, beyond the limits of the native states, is still inhabited by loosely organized tribes, some of whom have never even been visited by white men. This whole partially penetrated area was blocked out into governmental districts, with Dutch officials in charge; but the tribes pursued their primitive ways largely undisturbed and unaffected by European civilization. There were no roads or railroads in this vast interior, only forest paths and river routes. The Dutch in 1941 were still in process of exploring the territory, and had barely begun its exploitation.

In Celebes most of the difficulties the Netherlands faced in solidifying their power over the island were offered by the Macassarese and Buginese states of the southern peninsulas. The Minahasa people of the northern peninsula had maintained a generally friendly attitude toward the Dutch ever since the early days of colonial history, when the latter aided them in throwing off Spanish rule. They were mostly Christianized, and a large proportion of the native East Indian army was recruited from among them. In the military service they were usually called Menadonese, after the name of their principal town, Manado, on the tip of Celebes just opposite Mindanao. The Mohammedan sultanates of the south, however, were not completely subjugated until 1910, after a long series of intermittent wars with the Dutch. The interior of Celebes, though not so vast as the

Borneo hinterland, is extremely difficult of access because of the very mountainous terrain. Here countless tribes still live under primitive conditions, their principal contacts with European civilization having been the visits of the Dutch officials on tours of duty through their jurisdictions and the missionaries, for in this region Christianity has been more successful in converting the natives than anywhere else in the archipelago. The Netherlands had some trouble with certain of the interior tribes in the early years of the twentieth century, but the lack of centralized opposition made pacification relatively easy. These tribal districts, like those of the Sumatran and Borneo hinterlands, were put under direct rule, although native chieftains were retained wherever possible.

In the Lesser Sunda islands, the Dutch encountered most active opposition in Bali. The whole of this densely populated island was divided into several native states, and all through the latter half of the nineteenth century military expeditions were being sent to quell disturbances in one principality after another. The last serious revolt occurred in 1908. At the end of this uprising, faced with certain defeat, the ruler of Klungkung and his entire retinue committed mass suicide in a magnificent gesture. Dressed in the full splendor of Balinese royal regalia, they advanced, spears in hand, on the heavily armed Dutch position, refusing to halt, and were mowed down to the last man. The garrisons in Bali were finally removed in 1914; and recently, within the past few years, the colonial government restored the hereditary princes of several of the Balinese states to their thrones.

The Balinese radjas of Lombok, the island adjacent to Bali, were subjugated in the last decade of the nineteenth century; and then, after a brief period of revolt by the Mohammedan Sasak natives, Lombok was finally pacified. The sultanates of the other Lesser Sundas were not completely brought under Dutch control until

1907. During the first half of the nineteenth century, the government's problems in this area were complicated by disputes with the Portuguese over territorial rights. In 1859, however, a working agreement was reached with Portugal whereby the latter nation accepted restriction of its colonial possessions in the Lesser Sundas to the eastern half of the island of Timor. The interior regions of the larger islands were still primitive tribal territory in 1941, ruled directly by colonial officials with the aid of native chieftains.

In the Moluccas the Dutch found little difficulty in bringing the scattered islands under the colonial government. This region from earliest days of white contact had been subjected to European domination of varying strictness. By the nineteenth century only two important native potentates held power in the whole area—namely, the sultans of Ternate and Tidore, who exercised a nebulous control over the Moluccas and the eastern coastlands of New Guinea from their capitals on two small islands off the shore of Halmahera. It was relatively easy for the Dutch to lop off island after island from their possessions, finally bringing them to terms and making them sign the "short declaration" of acceptance of Netherlands sovereignty in the early part of the twentieth century.

Thus the little kingdom of the Netherlands won the Indies. The vast island empire, fought over successively by primitive native tribes, by Hindu radjas, by Chinese khans, by Mohammedan sultans, and by the Portuguese, Spanish, British, and Dutch kingdoms, finally fell to the shrewd and able Hollanders. The "riches of the Indies," the goal of Columbus when he discovered America accidentally, have lured men and nations as far back as history extends. The wealth is still there; indeed, it increases as new areas are opened and new potentialities are discovered.

Throughout all these long centuries of struggle and competi-

tion among alien powers for the right to exploit the islands for profit, scores of generations of natives have lived and died, pursuing their traditional way of life largely unperturbed by the shifts in political control of their homeland. Most writers on the Indies concentrate almost entirely upon historical, governmental, military, and economic affairs. The natives, when they are discussed at all, appear merely as inert pawns in the colonial game. Yet they are the only permanent element in the whole past record; and in the uncertain future we can be sure of only one thing: whatever happens, the natives will still be there.

III

THE INDONESIANS

THE PEOPLE OF THE INDIES LIVE CLOSE TO THE EARTH. THEIR existence partakes of the serenity of the rich nature that surrounds them. It has a slow and simple beauty about it that fits the languid climate and the luxuriant scenery of their islands. Nearly everything they have they produce with their own hands out of what the land offers them. They are in tune with nature because they live intimately with it, and their mode of existence is closely dependent upon their environment. The wandering tribes of the swamplands pursue a course different from that of the bow and blowgun hunters of the deep jungles, while the agricultural peoples diverge from both of these in their daily and seasonal round. But all of them, with negligible exceptions, are people of the streams and the forests and the soil.

Men and the Earth and Rice

Most of the Indonesians are agriculturists, and rice is by all odds the mainstay of native subsistence. Two methods of cultivation are used. The more primitive way is clearing and burning the natural growth and planting the grains with digging-sticks in the ash-covered earth. This prevails in the more backward regions, and also wherever irrigation is impossible. Irrigated rice

fields, either on flooded flat lands or on artificially constructed hillside terraces, flourish in the more advanced areas, notably Java, Sumatra, Bali, and the southern sections of Celebes. Wet-rice agriculture was apparently introduced into Indonesia at a much later date than the "burn and plant" system, and has not yet spread to the remoter regions. Wherever it is introduced the yield of grain increases tremendously, and population rises with almost miraculous speed. Wet-rice cultivation on terraced hills is the secret of Java's ability to support its enormous population, for the volcanic soil is almost limitlessly fertile; and, in the virtual absence of seasonal change, crops can be grown the year round. Where dry rice is planted on burned-over fields, as in central Borneo, the land is quickly exhausted, and the people must move constantly seeking fresh soil. Because of this, the Borneo tribes shift their great longhouse settlements every ten or fifteen years. Obviously a dense population cannot be supported by this type of agriculture.

The terraced irrigation systems of the Indies are marvels to behold. Water from mountain springs and streams are led to the tiered fields, which rise hundreds of feet up the sides of hills, by means of ditches and bamboo pipes. If a ravine lies in the way, the water will be carried across by a bamboo aqueduct. The level of water in the stepped terraces is regulated by sluice gates set in the retaining mud walls. In the flooded fields of the flat lands, the level of the streams during the dry season falls below that of the rice plots. Gigantic water wheels, with bamboo buckets tied to the outer rim, and kept in motion by wooden paddle vanes, are then set to work raising water from the sunken rivers up to the ditches that lead to the planted fields.

The teeming bird life of the Indies is a constant danger to the ripening grain. Consequently, over every large rice field is stretched an intricate network of strings with fluttering streamers

attached. Cords lead to an open hut in one corner of the field, where a little boy is always on duty pulling at a master string tied to his big toe, thus keeping the whole bird-scaring system in constant motion. Smaller fields are equipped with squeaking or whistling pinwheels, or with native versions of scarecrows.

The western islands are the main rice area of the archipelago, although the grain is planted in many of the eastern islands. Rice cultivation has never been introduced, or has come in only recently, among certain very primitive tribes of the western region. Yams and taro, a tuberous vegetable, and sago, a tapiocalike meal beaten and washed out of the pith of a kind of palm tree, are the staples in Nias, Mentawai, and Engano, isolated small islands off the western coast of Sumatra, and in Banggai, a similarly situated island off the eastern point of Celebes. Two other western Indonesian groups, the nomadic Kubu of the eastern Sumatra swamplands and the wandering Punan of central Borneo, have not advanced to rice cultivation, and subsist by hunting and collecting the wild products of the jungle. The Kubu, especially, will eat almost anything, from decayed elephants to grubs and worms. The Orang Laut, or "Sea Gypsies," who spend their lives sailing around the unfrequented coasts of the western islands, also eschew agriculture and live principally by fishing.

In eastern Indonesia rice is replaced as the main crop by either maize or sago. The former, known in America as corn, predominates in the Lesser Sundas east of Lombok, while sago meal is the staff of life throughout most of the Moluccas and in Dutch New Guinea. Thus one can map out three main agricultural areas in the archipelago: the rice zone of the large western islands and Bali and Lombok (with subsidiary wet- and dry-rice subregions); the central maize zone of the Lesser Sundas; and the eastern sago zone of the Moluccas and New Guinea. This would leave certain

restricted enclaves where yam and taro cultivation or very primitive hunting and collecting types of economy still prevail.

The Importance of Fish

Vegetable food predominates in the diet of the Indonesians. Customarily, however, they supplement their rice, corn, or sago dishes with bits of meat or fish, principally the latter. Fishing, indeed, is the second most important source of food in native economy. Inland the people fish the lakes and streams; and even the flooded rice fields yield quantities of little minnowlike creatures. On the coasts fishing is the principal economic activity everywhere, and the second largest fishery of the world is located at Bagan Si-api-api, on the east coast of Sumatra. The stench of drying fish hangs heavy over every shore village in the Indies. Trade between lowland and hill regions of the islands consists mainly of salt and dried fish in one direction and rice from the mountain terraces in the other. Nets, lines, a wide variety of exceedingly ingenious dams and traps, and stupefying drugs are all used in fishing.

Hunters Brown and White

Hunting holds a definitely subsidiary place in native economic life except among the nomadic and seminomadic tribes of Sumatra, Borneo, and some of the larger eastern islands. Wild pigs, deer, monkeys, and wild fowl are the principal kinds of game. The more advanced peoples have guns; but among the remoter tribes, where hunting is more important, spears, the bow and arrow, and the blowpipe with poisoned darts are used. The wide variety of Indonesian fish traps is matched by those used for game.

Noose-traps and stationary spring-spears, operating on the principle of the bow and arrow, are suitable for smaller animals; while for larger ones deadfalls and heavily weighted suspended spears are used.

Perhaps a word may be said here concerning big-game hunting by Europeans in the Indies. Deer, wild pigs, elephants, rhinoceroses, and tigers are the main types of animals hunted for sport by the whites. Boars, elephants, and rhinoceroses are dangerous animals, and shooting them is risky business; but, contrary to popular opinion, tiger-hunting is relatively safe. The procedure is to build a tree nest, place under it the partially decomposed and strong-smelling carcass of a deer or some other animal, and then, after nightfall, climb up into the tree platform and wait. When a tiger comes and begins to eat the bait, one of the hunters flashes a light on him and another shoots. Next morning the standard foot-on-tiger's-head photograph is taken.

Animals of the Villages

The domesticated animals of the Indies include dogs, cats, chickens, pigs, water buffalo, cattle, horses, goats, and sheep. Hardly a group can be found, even the lowliest forest nomads, who do not have dogs. Except among those tribes who do considerable hunting, however, they are seldom regarded as pets. At best they are tolerated for their usefulness as scavengers of filth around the villages. The dogs of the Indies are probably the sorriest-looking canine specimens in the world—skinny, mangy, mongrel creatures, with spirits broken by constant ill-treatment. Cats are not so numerous—why, I do not know. Considering the hordes of rats and mice that infest the native settlements and destroy quantities of grain, both stored and standing in the fields—to say nothing of the danger of plague infection from their fleas—

an increase in the feline population of the islands would be most desirable. Oriental cats, of whatever breed, always have a kink at the end of the tail, sometimes forming almost a right-angle knuckle. Owners of Siamese cats can verify this by feeling the tails of their pets. All Indonesian peoples, with the exception of the wandering savages of the jungle, keep chickens. Even the "Sea Gypsies" carry them along in their boats on their endless voyages. The chickens are allowed to roam at will and live largely by scavenging, which lends an unpalatable flavor to their meat.

Until five hundred years ago, pigs were raised in nearly every part of the archipelago. Since then, their numbers have been continually decreasing, for with each advance of Mohammedanism the taboo on pork makes the people get rid of them. The practiced traveler in the islands never needs to inquire whether a section through which he is passing is Mohammedan or not; he merely observes the presence or absence of pigs. They are scrawny, razor-backed animals, not far removed in ancestry from the wild pigs of the Indonesian forests. Since the domesticated ones are allowed to range freely, they frequently mate with their untamed jungle relatives. Among the non-Mohammedan tribes, pork is the favorite food, and pigs are prized so highly that women may suckle orphaned piglets along with their own babies.

The gigantic water buffalo, or carabao, is the principal work and draft animal of the islands. Despite the advent of the motor-car, most of the heavy local transport is still done by buffalo cart. The animals are used mainly, however, in plowing and trampling the fields before planting. The natives slaughter and eat buffalo also; but in general they prefer fish to meat, except for pork in the non-Mohammedan areas. The carabao are found only in the more accessible regions; they have never been introduced into the interior parts of Borneo or into some of the eastern islands. They are impressive animals, standing as tall as a man at

the shoulder, with horns sometimes spanning six feet across. The hide is extremely thick and poreless; consequently, being unable to sweat, the carabao must be allowed to cool off for a certain period each day by wallowing in mud. If this is not done, an animal may become insane.

I once saw a water buffalo run amok through the streets of a Sumatra town. The natives scattered wildly in all directions while the carabao tore up a gasoline pump, overturned an automobile, and was heading for further damage when a troop of armed police killed him with a fusillade of heavy-caliber bullets. When cared for properly, these enormous beasts are gentle toward natives and easily handled by little boys; but they seem to hate white men. When playing golf in the Indies, one had to keep a safe distance from the buffalo grazing on the course. If a ball landed near one, it was advisable to send a caddy ahead to lead the animal away before the next shot was played. Natives say that the white man's acrid odor infuriates the carabao; and, they add, the animals are right: white people do smell bad, especially when sweating.

Cattle, either the hump-backed Indian variety or recently imported European breeds, are not nearly so numerous as water buffalo. Still, in some areas, notably in northern Sumatra and the island of Madura off eastern Java, great herds of them are raised, mostly for shipment to urban centers in the Indies and other parts of the Orient. The government agricultural service encouraged the extension of grazing, and tried to improve the quality of the cattle by selective breeding, stock shows with prizes, and popular educational programs. The horses of the islands are diminutive animals, intermediate in size between the European type and a pony. They are related to the small wild horse of central Asia, and were apparently first introduced into the islands by the Hindus. The natives use them as pack and riding animals,

and in the towns to draw little two-wheeled carriages in which driver and passenger ride back to back. Thousands of these *sados* ply for hire in the cities of the Indies, offering stiff competition to taxicabs because of the cheaper fare. The Dutch crossed the Indonesian horse with imported Australian animals, producing a compact, rugged type of intermediate size, used widely in the cavalry and artillery units of the army. Goats are raised in nearly all the islands, being used for food and, to a lesser extent, for their milk. The Indonesians, like most Orientals, care little for milk, butter, or cheese. Sheep were apparently first imported by Europeans, and are still of relatively minor importance in native economy.

Poverty with Independence

The two most important facts about the economic life of the Indonesians are: first, that most of them are independent workers; second, that nearly all of them are very poor. The first point is borne out by recent occupational statistics, which show that about 70 per cent of the people worked for themselves. Sixty per cent of these were farmers; 5 per cent merchants; 3 per cent cattle-raisers, hunters, or fishermen; and 1 per cent in some profession. The remaining 30 per cent were wage-earners, mostly in the employ of European concerns. Plantation labor occupied a large proportion of these. Thus it can be seen that the great majority live in the "closed economy" of their native communities. By this is meant that the villages are virtually self-sufficient, producing what they consume and having little left over to sell for cash.

This leads to the second point, the poverty of the people. They are poor not only in money, but in food and possessions as well. Their houses are mostly mere bamboo and thatch huts, their clothes simple and few. Beyond these they usually have only the

land and the rough tools they work with. Food, especially in overpopulated Java, is not plentiful; but fortunately Indonesians require very little, perhaps because they are so small themselves. A bowl of rice, sprinkled with a little dried fish or meat and a vegetable sauce, makes a meal; and two such dishes a day are sufficient. As for money, the income-tax statistics tell the story. The tax started on incomes of about fifty dollars per year. Only 5 per cent of the natives earned incomes above this figure. In Java, for instance, the average income per person was \$15 a year. One-twentieth of 1 per cent of the Indonesians received over \$450 per year; and only 2,000, or 1/300 of 1 per cent, earned as much as \$2000 cash per year. For comparison: the Europeans, who formed 4/10 of 1 per cent of the population of Indonesia, paid about 50 per cent of the income tax; while the Asiatics, mostly Chinese, constituting approximately 2 per cent of the population, paid about 30 per cent. Thus, while most of the money of the Indies went to nonnatives, the Indonesians themselves lived virtually without cash in the self-sufficient "closed economy" of their ancestral village communities; and, it must be admitted, they seemed little the worse for it.

Architectural Simplicity with Elaborations

Although most of the Indonesians are dwellers in small villages, there are some exceptions. The wandering Kubu of the Sumatra swamps, the nomadic Punan of central Borneo, and some of the very primitive peoples in the eastern islands have no set habitations, but move constantly in small bands searching for food. These tribes are hunters and gatherers of forest products, and they cannot stay long in one place because they quickly strip it of game and wild foodstuffs. When on the march they do not even bother to build huts for overnight sleeping, but merely creep

into a cave or nest down under a leafy bush. If they chance upon a likely spot, they pitch camp for a few days or weeks, constructing simple shelters of sticks and leaves. Perhaps the most remarkable routine of life in the Indies is that of the "Sea Gypsies," who live in small boats with rude mat coverings over one section. Except for occasional stops ashore to forage for vegetable foods as a supplement to their monotonous diet of fish, their existence is one continuous voyage. Seafaring is second nature to them—they ride the bosom of the ocean like aquatic birds. Seasick passengers on interisland steamships used to marvel at the sight of a fleet of their little vessels riding out a storm in the open sea.

Aside from these land and water nomads, the island peoples have fixed settlements that are more or less permanent. The degree of permanence depends mainly on the type of economy. Where crops are grown in irrigated fields, the land stays fertile; and the villages, nestled under groves of trees in the midst of the flooded rice plots, remain generation after generation. Where planting is done in dry ground cleared by burning, which is the case in the remoter regions, the soil is periodically exhausted, and whole settlements must be moved every few years. This happens in most of inland Borneo and in backward districts of the other islands. Another difference between areas of wet and dry agriculture is that in the former the settlements are much larger than in the latter because of the greater productivity of fields. A Javanese village, for instance, may have thousands of inhabitants, while an inland Borneo settlement will seldom include as many as a thousand people.

Throughout the archipelago, housing is generally very simple. The principal building materials are bamboo, and leaf or fiber thatch. In nearly all regions the ground plan of the dwellings is rectangular, but some groups build their houses directly on the earth, while others raise them up on piles or stone platforms. The

pile house appears to be the more ancient form, as it occurs in the more isolated districts. Except where the Dutch authorities have tried to modernize the sanitation of the villages, all waste material, human and otherwise, is usually merely dropped through a hole in the floor, or, where the houses are not raised on piles, in open ditches near the dwellings. The animals—dogs, chickens, and pigs—perform the function of scavengers. Even more archaic house forms than the rectangular pile dwelling are encountered in some islands. Oval-shaped structures occur in a part of Nias, while beehive huts on high stilts were built in Engano until recently. These are isolated islands off the west coast of Sumatra. Round or oval dwellings are also found in the Lesser Sunda islands of Timor, Flores, Lomblem, and Savu; in the Land Dyak section of western Borneo; and in the northern part of Halmahera in the Moluccas.

Although most of the Indonesian houses are small, some tribes build enormous structures accommodating scores and even hundreds of people. The extreme development of the longhouse occurs in the inland parts of Borneo, where a single building may shelter an entire village population. These Borneo tribal houses must be moved every ten to fifteen years, as the people live by the "burn and plant" method of agriculture and quickly exhaust the soil of a district. When the time comes to move, the entire structure is dismantled and the bamboo and thatch parts thrown away. But the hardwood shingles and floor planks are taken along to the new site. Because these planks are so long and heavy, they can be transported only by pulling them behind canoes on the rivers; consequently, the houses are always built on the banks of streams—a nice case of adjustment to the exigencies of a semi-nomadic existence. The Batak and the Minangkabau longhouses of central Sumatra and the multifamily dwellings of the island of Nias are smaller than the gigantic Borneo structures, but are

solider in construction and much more ornate, with elaborately carved and painted pillars, walls, and gable ends.

Balinese houses are different from any others in Indonesia. A whole group of closely related families live within a high-walled enclosure, in a close-packed cluster of small clay-sided, thatch-roofed structures. Part of the courtyard is devoted to the various shrines of the family deities.

Even today in regions where the government's authority has penetrated insufficiently to ensure peaceful conditions, the settlements are protected by ingenious fortifications. In flat country the clusters of houses are surrounded by earthen walls, sometimes with a dry moat on the outside, the entire breastwork being thickly planted with thorny bamboo very difficult to penetrate. Narrow passageways, easily blocked up, are the only means of access to the settlements. In mountain districts a village is preferably located on the top of a high hill, and can be reached only by scrambling up a narrow winding path, parts of it so steep that ladders must be used. In time of war these ladders can be pulled up, leaving the settlements almost impregnable. The set defenses are often supplemented by concealed pitfalls, trigger-spears, and hidden bamboo spikes, sometimes poisoned at the tip, which impede the progress of barefoot attackers. Recently, when Dutch law and order were spreading to even the remotest regions, the ancient fortifications were being leveled, and the hilltop people were coming down out of their lofty strongholds to lower land. Under peaceful conditions, also, settlements formerly closely clustered for the purpose of defense were becoming more dispersed.

Although Indonesian dwellings are almost never constructed of stone, the extensive ruins of medieval Java and the modern Balinese temples display remarkable skill and artistry in stone architecture. Even today, while actual stone building has disap-

peared from all places except Bali, sculpturing still flourishes in a few regions. For the most part, stone carving is employed for tombs and monuments, but in some islands entire village plazas are paved with smooth slabs. The finest stonework done at present, aside from the Hindu-derived temple architecture of Bali, is seen in the massive sculptured tombs of the Batak in central Sumatra, the Minahasa in northern Celebes, and the Sumbanese in the Lesser Sunda Islands; but, above all, Nias, a little island off the west coast of Sumatra, stands pre-eminent in this sphere.

Here megalithic art reaches a peak which is truly astounding among a people otherwise so primitive. In addition to extensive stone paving of the village plazas, great walls often surround the settlements, some of which, on high ground, have majestic stone staircases leading up from the lower land. One village in southern Nias is approached by an enormous flight of hundreds of steps, about twenty feet wide, the balustrade being decorated with elaborate carvings. Bathing pools, also finely sculptured, and massive human figures memorializing dead chiefs add to the wonderment of a traveler in Nias, whose first query is how the people manage to handle such huge blocks of stone. The answer is that they do it by means of long vine ropes, with hundreds of men pulling, and by a combination of digging and levering. The stone creations of the isolated and primitive people of Nias, though not nearly so widely publicized as the great stone faces of Easter Island, are actually much more impressive.

The village pavilion, used for ceremonials and council meetings, is characteristic of Indonesia. Where no separate building is devoted to such purposes, as in parts of Borneo and Celebes, the chief's house or his section of the longhouse includes a portion which serves as a communal meeting place. In some regions—notably Mentawai, an island off the western coast of Sumatra, parts of Borneo and Celebes, and most of eastern Indonesia—

the council houses also function as the temples of pagan cults, and are fitted out with altars, fetish-bundles, and other esoteric paraphernalia. In other places the villages have separate temple buildings, formerly—and to some extent even today in remote districts—adorned with the skulls or scalps of defeated enemies and human sacrifices. In many regions the community pavilion is the boys' clubhouse, where they congregate in the daytime and sleep at night. Guests of the village are also accommodated in the pavilion.

Once, during a military expedition in one of the outer islands, a company of Javanese soldiers, arriving in the evening at a settlement, were quartered overnight in one of these council houses. The wind freshened suddenly in the middle of the night, and all at once the air was filled with ghostly moans and whistles. The Javanese, startled from sleep, kindled torches and looked up toward the source of the sounds. In the dim light above them they saw hundreds of skulls hanging from the rafters. Despite the explanation of the officer in charge that the eerie noises came from the wind blowing through the hollow skulls, the whole company insisted on spending the rest of the night outdoors.

The pagan temple of the remoter regions is replaced in Bali by Hinduist places of worship, beautifully wrought in stone. Every Balinese village has at least one, and usually several, of these lovely structures, so delicately carved that from a distance the sculpturing resembles fine lacework. It has been said that the Balinese are born sculptors. That is not literally true, of course; but the fact is that training in the art of stonecutting is part of the education of most boys. Profoundly religious, the Balinese turn this skill devotedly to the service of their gods, constantly enriching the lavish beauty of their island by building and decorating more and more of these elaborate temples. In Mohammedan regions the mosque takes the place of the ancient pagan

shrine. Smaller communities have mosques constructed of wood, bamboo, and thatch, differing from the other buildings only in size and design. In larger centers the Islamic church is often a large edifice, built in Byzantine style, with cement walls and a metal roof. Most of the Mohammedans of the archipelago, however, make their salaams to Allah in little village mosques, not much more pretentious than the pagan temples where their ancestors prayed and offered sacrifice a few centuries ago.

Minimum Wardrobes

As simple as most of the houses is the daily dress of the Indonesian peoples. Where weaving is known, or where imported cloth can be purchased, the customary attire is a cotton blouse and batik sarong for women, and a shirt and sarong or trousers for men. Women drape over one shoulder a long strip of cloth which can be used to carry bundles and babies or as a head shawl. Men cover their heads with either cloth turbans or fezzes, the latter usually made of velvet. The ordinary man may wear a fez of any color except white, which is reserved for *hadjis*—those who have made the pilgrimage to Mecca. The Indonesians almost never wear shoes, although the more Europeanized city dwellers are taking more and more to the white man's type of dress, including shoes. European clothes, however, are seldom worn by the women; indeed, it is almost literally true that only native prostitutes dress like white women. In the rural districts both men and women remove their blouses when at work; in a few places, notably Bali, women regularly go naked from the waist up. Simple though the daily dress is, the festive garments, particularly those of the women, are very elaborate and beautifully made, of the finest batik and specially woven cloth intricately brocaded with silk and gold thread.

Locally woven or trade cloth is used for clothing in most regions, but there are still a few remote tribes who either have no knowledge of weaving or are not yet in contact with traders. These primitive peoples—and there are some in the interior districts of nearly every large island—manufacture *tapa*, or bark-cloth, by stripping, soaking, and beating the inner bast of certain trees. Even where textiles are known, the Indonesians often make their “working clothes”—that is, kilts for women and loincloths for men—of this material. The most elaborate development of bark-cloth garments is found among the mountain people of Celebes, the Toradja. The women of the western Toradja wear brightly painted *tapa* blouses and wide crinolinelike flounced skirts of the same material. The women of a few isolated islands—Mentawai and Engano, off the western coast of Sumatra, and Buru, Aru, and Ceram, in the Moluccas—still wear primitive leaf and plaited-fiber skirts.

Costume Jewelry

Body ornaments of the Indonesians include a wide variety of earrings and disks, head decorations, necklaces and neck pendants, arm and leg bracelets, belts and corselets, and miscellaneous jewelry such as finger rings, pins and brooches, buckles and buttons. The more primitive tribes make their ornaments principally of flowers, feathers, wood, bone, and shell; metal decorations—of gold, silver, brass, tin, and copper—predominate in the more advanced regions. One encounters some remarkable types of adornment. The warriors of Nias, the island of the great stone-work lying off the Sumatra coast, wear enormous metal hoops in their ears, sometimes linking two of these rings together so that they hang down nearly to the waist. They fasten on their heads filigreed copper or gold helmets which extend down over

the face something like a baseball catcher's mask, then top off this startling outfit with bristling false mustaches of human or animal hair. The women of northwestern Borneo encase their bodies from thighs to breasts in scores of brass-covered rattan hoops; while the men of the interior of this island deck themselves with feathered helmets and jackets, and insert in their ears not only heavy rings that hang down to the shoulders, but also, if they have an enemy's head to their credit, curved panther teeth that run through holes in the upper part of the ear shell. The women of Bali and southern Sumatra, when dressed for festive occasions, adorn their heads with high tiaras of silver and gold worked so finely that the metal resembles starched lace.

Improvements on the Human Body

Not satisfied with the rich variety of their ornamental attire, the Indonesians exercise their decorative fancy on the flesh of the body itself. The ears, as mentioned above, are pierced for the insertion of rings and disks by virtually every people in the islands. Generally, the more extreme types of ear mutilation are encountered among the more backward tribes. In Borneo and Nias, for instance, the lobes of the ears are so stretched that they can hold a whole row of metal rings. Occasionally an overvain person will go too far and hang an extra-heavy loop in his ear, causing the thin strip of soft flesh to break. Then the local surgical expert is called in to sew the severed ends together. After a few weeks the ear is ready for use again, with only a little lump marking the mended break. In more advanced regions the men are rapidly abandoning the practice of ear-piercing, but among the remoter peoples both sexes undergo the operation.

Filing of the front teeth—to points, down in an even line (in many cases to the gums), or with concave grooves on the outer

surface—while not so widespread a custom as ear-piercing, is a very general practice in the archipelago. Horizontal filing is the most prevalent form, but pointing and grooving are by no means infrequent. In some places teeth are simply broken off or knocked out by the roots. The women of Engano, a small island off western Sumatra, must have their canines removed before they may marry. Among the western Toradja of interior Celebes, the front teeth of women are knocked out entirely, and the incisors of men are broken off at the gums; while among the eastern Toradja tribes both sexes submit to the snapping-off operation. The fashion of wearing gold caps over the teeth, and gold or other metal pins between or through them, is common in large parts of Borneo and Celebes and to a lesser extent in certain districts of Sumatra.

These tooth operations, performed with abrasive stones and rude chisels, are extremely painful, and the European is bound to be curious as to why people will readily undergo such torture. It may be that, in the remote past, removal of a piece of the body, such as the teeth, was performed as a kind of partial sacrifice to the spirits. This may, for instance, be the explanation for the origin of circumcision. Another theory is that noticeable mutilations, such as those on the teeth, or tattooing, grew up as a special tribal mark, to distinguish friends from strangers. These are anthropological hypotheses, and may be true. But when I questioned the people on their reason for filing teeth, their answers invariably emphasized the point of beauty. If sacrifice or symbolization of tribal membership was the origin of the custom, such purpose has been forgotten. Typical was the answer of an old Batak, with betel-reddened stumps of teeth, when I asked him why his people so mutilated themselves. "Because we don't want to look like dogs," he said, staring at my gleaming white fangs.

Another part of the body subjected to mutilation in the Indies is the genital organs. It appears that the more ancient operation

for boys is supercision, for this is generally practiced in the more backward regions. The foreskin of the penis is stretched over a smooth stick or a piece of stone and then struck smartly with a knife, splitting it open on the upper surface. The traditional nature of this operation is indicated by the ceremonial which accompanies it, marking the boy's "coming of age"; and also by the fact that the knife employed is made of bamboo or stone, archaic materials used for cutting instruments before metals became known. Actual circumcision, which removes the prepuce entirely, is confined almost completely to Mohammedanized areas, and may well have been introduced with the Islamic religion. The same is true of female incision, although this practice is much more limited than either supercision or circumcision of boys. Sometimes it involves merely making a slight cut in the skin of the vulva; more often a little piece of the inner labia is snipped off. These genital mutilations are as hard to explain on logical grounds as tooth-filing, and the people usually say merely that they perform them because their ancestors did. Sometimes they will tell a fable purporting to explain why the custom originated, but such stories are obviously pure rationalizations and explain little or nothing.

Some tribes practice kinds of genital mutilation whose purpose is completely clear. The Bahau of central Borneo, for instance, who perform no other operation on the sex organs, pierce the penis for the insertion of small knobbed rods or rings of anteater scale, which are removable when not in use. Their purpose is purely erotic—to augment the sensation of women in copulation. The Katingan, a Ngadju tribe of southern Borneo, and the Sadang and Minahasa of Celebes also employ this strange device, the latter often substituting a goat's eyelid, with eyelashes intact, for the usual rod. The Dutch medical service tried to stamp out the practice, for physicians encountered cases of vaginal contusion

and infection caused by the penis rods. Instead of co-operating in the hygienic efforts of the government doctors, these tribes actually grant divorces to women who complain that their husbands refuse to equip themselves properly. The Batak of Sumatra sometimes resort to a somewhat less spectacular erotic stratagem: the men make small incisions in the flesh of the penis and insert little round stones in the cuts, which are allowed to heal over, leaving minute bumps on the surface of the organ.

Tattooing, formerly a general custom in most of Indonesia, is still practiced in the more backward districts of nearly every island, with the exception of Java, Sumatra, Bali, and Lombok. Usually, both sexes submit to the operation; but in a few tribes, either men or women only are so decorated. The general stated purpose is beautification, but tattooing is in some regions a mark of distinction in war or, especially in the case of women, a sign that they are of marriageable age. Customarily, the color is blue, produced by tapping into the skin a needle dipped in soot, but in some parts of Borneo red and yellow pigments are used. Borneo is probably the greatest tattooing center in the world. The Bahau tribes of the interior use wooden stamps to imprint the pattern before pricking the skin; certain Punan groups do "negative" or "relief" tattooing, coloring the surrounding surface of the skin in order to make the design stand out in the natural shade of the body. An inland Borneo native, clad only in loincloth or skirt, often gives the impression of being fully clothed, so completely is the body covered with intricately traced tattoo patterns.

Perhaps because tattooing is so general, body-painting is quite rare in Indonesia; but it occurs in some parts of Sumatra, Celebes, and the Moluccan island of Halmahera. A variation on mere painting is practiced by the western Toradja of Celebes, who stipple the face and hands with resin in dot-and-line designs. A substitute for tattooing is found in some remote parts of Celebes,

in Nias, and in some of the Moluccan islands, where the natives burn cicatrized patterns on their bodies. This occurs also in New Guinea, but there a more prevalent custom is to cut lines and dots in the flesh, and then keep the wounds open long enough so that in healing they leave raised welts on the surface of the skin. Another rare form of bodily disfigurement is artificial deformation of the skull. Only three tribes—the Milanau Klamantan of northeastern Borneo, the Gorontalese of northern Celebes, and the Redjang of southern Sumatra—alter the cranial shape of their children. Redjang mothers narrow the heads of their babies by pressing them with their hands; in the other two regions parents use special wood and cloth compressors to flatten the forehead and back of their infants' skulls.

Two types of bodily alteration are encountered only in the eastern islands and New Guinea. One, bleaching the hair with lime, occurs in the Moluccan islands of Kei, Babar, and Tanimbar, and also in New Guinea; the other, piercing the middle portion or sides of the nose for the insertion of ornaments, is confined solely to New Guinea.

It is obvious that deliberate mutilation of the body is carried to remarkable extremes, in both variety and general prevalence, throughout Indonesia. It is also apparent that, wherever Western civilization penetrates, these ancient practices quickly die out. Nowadays in most of Java and Sumatra and in the coastal districts of many other islands, almost all that is left of the spectacular disfigurements of former times is simple ear-piercing of women and ceremonial cutting of the genital organs, the latter being kept alive principally because the Mohammedan religion prescribes it. But back in the hills and jungles the old ways persist, and the individual tortures undergone for beauty's sake are a testimony to the vanity of primitive man. Even in the more advanced regions, where decorative mutilations have largely dis-

appeared, new imported discomforts for the purpose of ostentation—such as tight shoes and stiff European jackets—are taking their place.

The Deadly Blowgun and Other Weapons

As hunting has been displaced by agriculture in more and more districts, and as native warfare has been steadily restricted by the extension of Dutch rule over formerly tribal territory, the importance of weapons has decreased. Most Javanese, for instance, no longer have weapons of any kind except for ornamental krisses kept as heirlooms; and in remoter areas, such as interior Borneo, where the blowgun and spear are still used for hunting, the head-chopping ax is disappearing for lack of use. The most important native weapons in the Indies are the sword, spear, blowgun, bow, and shield. Swords, spears, and shields are used throughout all of the islands, but bows and blowguns vary in importance in different areas. Generally speaking, the blowgun is a western Indonesian weapon, while the bow predominates in the eastern part of the archipelago. There is, however, much overlapping in this plan of distribution. Slings and clubs are rare in the Indies, and the same is true of throwing-sticks.

The most interesting weapons of the islands are the blowguns. They vary in length from little tubes not much longer than pea-shooters to eight- and nine-foot pipes. The easiest material for making a blowgun is bamboo, as it is hollow except for a little soft pith. It bends easily, however; and, in order to keep a long bamboo blowgun rigid, the barrel is often made double, the thinner inside tube being slipped into a thicker external one. Better blowguns are made of wood, by either of two processes. The simpler procedure is to run grooves down the center of two flat sticks and then lash them together so that the grooves combine to form

a circular passage. The other method is to drill a hole down through a long stick of wood in the manner of a gunsmith boring a rifle. To do this the workers construct a platform on which they can stand to drill the upper end of the shaft, which is held vertical by passing it through a hole in the platform. As they bore down through the wood, they occasionally stop and pour water in the hole in order to float off the filings. When one half of the tube is completed, the shaft is turned on its other end and drilled from that direction until the borings meet in the center. Since the blowgun may be eight or nine feet long, it is obvious that the drilling has to be very precise. This is not the whole story, however, for thin as the finished barrel will be, it is bound to bend a little when held in shooting position. The blowgun makers compensate for this by boring the tube, not in a straight line, but with a slight dip in the middle. When the blowgun is held at the mouth end, the sagging at the extremity brings the bore into a perfectly straight line.

Except for bird shooting, the darts are always poisoned, as by themselves they produce only a scratch on larger animals. The toxin is made of the sap of certain trees, notably the *antiaris toxicaria*. Bamboo slivers and the midribs of some types of leaves are used for darts. In order to get air pressure behind the dart, it is provided with a wadding of fiber when inserted into the barrel. The blowgun is an excellent weapon for jungle hunting; for, although its range is short, the heavy foliage enables a hunter to approach close to his quarry unobserved, and the very slight noise made by the shooting puff does not scare off other animals. Thus a man can pick off several monkeys sitting on a branch before the rest of the band takes alarm. The prick of the dart is hardly more painful than a fleabite, and a monkey which has been struck merely scratches a little harder than usual before

plummeting suddenly to the ground, overcome by the swiftly acting poison.

Baskets, Balance Poles, Busses, and Boats

Native travel and transportation are being revolutionized by the importation of motorcars and the extension of good roads. This applies particularly to Java, Sumatra, Bali, and the northern and southern extremities of Celebes. Borneo, by contrast, has very few roads, and the same is true of interior Celebes and most of the remaining islands. The Dutch, after building a system of railroads in Java and several parts of Sumatra, realized almost twenty years ago that the future of land transportation lay with the automobile. They stopped all railroad construction and concentrated on highways. In Sumatra, where grading and bridge building for a projected cross-island railway were partially completed, they changed their plans and turned the route into a motor road. Highway construction progressed rapidly in this island. In 1930, for instance, one could not travel by car from one end to the other of Sumatra, as no road connected the central and southern regions. By 1940 a full thousand-mile route ran the full length of the island. Nearly all road building in Indonesia is difficult and expensive because of the alternating mountains and swampy land. Moreover, constant repair is necessary, for the torrential rains of the wet monsoon cause washouts and landslides. Much of the highway construction and maintenance under the Dutch was performed by the required labor of natives, for whom such work was a substitute for tax-paying in many districts.

The Indonesians took readily to the automobile, and wherever roads were built sales of cars began immediately. Most of the vehicles were trucks and busses. Whereas formerly buffalo carts,

pack horses, and human porters carried goods to market, and people traveled mainly on foot, recently in regions where there were roads, motor trucks did most of the heavy transportation, and natives going to town for a market day or an evening at the cinema crowded into busses whose fares—and correspondingly the seating space per person—were very small. When one saw a Batak youth skillfully driving a big bus over the mountain roads of Sumatra, and conversing fluently about carburetors, transmissions, and generators, it was hard to realize that thirty years ago his parents had never seen a white man and were still cannibals. The Indonesians make excellent mechanics, and in the local plants of automobile companies, mostly American, they performed about as well on the assembly line as their occupational brethren in Detroit.

The airplane has yet to affect native travel appreciably, and it is doubtful, considering the nature of the terrain, largely unsuited for landing fields, and the expensive fares, that it will supplant the motorcar to any substantial extent in the predictable future. Air transport was used mainly by Europeans, and for long trips. In addition to interisland air service, an excellent network of regular steamship lines linked the various parts of the archipelago. Nearly all the interisland trade was carried by the vessels of the Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij (KPM), a Dutch company operating with government subsidy. This line had a fleet of almost a hundred and fifty ships, totaling over 300,000 tonnage. The vessels ranged all the way from luxury liners of 25,000 tons to little river boats of under a hundred tons, the latter running on regular schedule far up the rivers of Borneo, New Guinea, and Sumatra into the remote interior. It was possible to travel by KPM into the very heart of Borneo along the great Barito River, changing to smaller and smaller boats, the last leg of the trip being made on a miniature flat-bottomed stern-wheeler.

Where roads have not yet been built, the ancient methods of transportation prevail, and this goes for most of the land area of the islands. Buffalo carts and pack horses are used to a considerable extent; but most of the travel is on foot, and most of the transportation by human porters, women as well as men. In the interior districts, the principal carrying device is the back-basket, supported by a tump-line passing across the forehead or by shoulder straps, or, if the load is heavy, by both. A different arrangement prevails in the more advanced regions, where porters use balance poles, which rest on the shoulder and have the load tied onto both ends. The pole has a slight springiness, and the bearer moves along at a steady trot, the rhythm of his pace causing the burdens to bounce a little at each step, thus easing the weight.

The coastal people are expert seafarers, and before the coming of the steamship most of the water commerce was carried by their big sailing *praus*, some fitted with outriggers and some not. The smaller boats used by the Indonesians are mostly dugout canoes hewn from a single log and provided with outriggers. On inland lakes and rivers, however, the external floats are often omitted. Some of the rowing canoes of the Sumatra lakes and the Borneo rivers are long enough to seat fifty paddlers, who make remarkable speed in them, keeping time to their strokes with rhythmic chants. Very seldom does one see in Indonesia a canoe with an outrigger on only one side, which is the usual type in the South Sea Islands. Nearly all the dugouts of the Indies have double outriggers, supported by two booms passing across the vessel. Sometimes the dugouts are made more seaworthy by building up the sides with planks attached to the log keel by lashing or wooden pegs. The Indonesians made excellent seamen in the Dutch navy and merchant marine, and thousands of them manned the vessels of the Netherlands. In the East Indies Navy, for instance, they formed a third of the enlisted personnel.

Before 1933 native sailors were almost 50 per cent of the force, but in that year a mutiny occurred on the cruiser *De Zeven Provincieën* off Sumatra, and Indonesian seamen were involved. After that, the proportion of white men in the crews of navy ships was increased, although it was virtually certain that very few of the native sailors could have been suspected of disloyalty.

Malay Mariners of Manhattan

A small colony of Indonesians—Javanese, Malays, Ambonese, and others—live in New York City, some in a section of Brooklyn, the others on the lower East Side. Nearly all of these men, for there are no women, have “skipped ship” from some Dutch vessel touching at the port of New York. Consequently, they are here illegally, and try hard to keep their presence inconspicuous. The round-up of aliens recently carried on by the Federal authorities has turned up a surprising number of these gentle and elusive seafarers from the islands. Ten years ago in Sumatra I first heard of this secret colony. One morning, sitting in an automobile agent’s showroom in a little town of the interior, I was approached by a Minangkabau who saluted smartly and said in English, “Good morning, sir. How are things in America?” Hardly believing my ears, I asked him how he had ever come to learn English. He then told me that, slipping off a ship in New York Harbor, he had spent five years in Brooklyn, working on a railroad gang. He had returned to his native village because his mother begged him to come home before she died, and his main regret was that he had had to leave “his girl” in Brooklyn. He showed me a photograph of a white woman, and said he always carried it with him. Some of the Malay men in New York today are married, in one sense or another, to white women, mostly of recent European immigrant stock.

Artistry with Practical Workmanship

Any good museum collection is proof of the high general development of handicrafts among the Indonesian peoples. Within the area, however, there are definite levels of material cultural development; for knowledge of certain techniques has yet to penetrate many districts. Two manufacturing accomplishments are common to all the groups in the islands—namely, woodworking and carving and the plaiting of mats and baskets. Even the lowliest nomadic tribes possess these skills, and in many regions the decoration of wooden articles—from bamboo containers to house posts and walls—and the working of baskets and mats display a high degree of artistic excellence. Pottery making is somewhat more limited in spread; and several groups, notably in the eastern islands, appear never to have learned the technique. Perhaps in some instances its lack is owing to the absence of suitable material to work with. In any case, native Indonesian pottery is generally poor in quality and scantily decorated. The potter's wheel is almost never used—the vessels being made by scooping and patting into shape a lump of clay—and no glaze is applied.

The two arts of handicraft in which Indonesians reach highest achievement are textile weaving and metalwork. The latter is far more widespread than the former, and apparently is much more ancient in the islands. Entire sections of Celebes and many of the eastern islands had never advanced beyond the bark-cloth level of textile development until the recent introduction of foreign fabrics. They skipped the weaving phase entirely. But very few tribes lack the knowledge of metal manufacture, most of these being located in the remoter sections of the eastern islands. For ironworking, the Indonesians use a piston bellows with bamboo cylinders and wadded plungers, and temper the iron by plunging

it into cold water after it has been hammered into shape. Most of the iron is bought from traders in the form of bars, but there are some interior tribes, notably in the central part of Celebes, who mine and smelt local ore. The products of the blacksmiths range all the way from simple knife blades and spear heads to beautifully curved krisses in a wide variety of shapes and sizes.

Copper and brass objects are made in many regions, the materials being mostly obtained by trade, although copper mining and smelting are carried on in several islands by natives. The simpler artifacts are made by beating the metals, but knowledge of the *cire perdue*, or "lost wax," method of copper and brass casting is widespread; and very elaborate articles are produced by this technique. Gold and silver, found in several of the islands, have been worked for centuries; and in some regions, especially Java and parts of Sumatra, the products of the local artisans are amazingly fine, even to the eyes of a skilled European goldsmith. The delicately drawn gold and silver woven wire artifacts of the Minangkabau craftsmen in central Sumatra are true masterpieces of metal art, and the jewel-studded hilts of the ceremonial Javanese krisses are among the finest products of their kind in the world.

Weavers in the Indies work with two types of loom. The more primitive kind, found mainly in the interior districts, has the warp threads tied at one end to a fixed horizontal stick and at the other to a bar which passes behind the small of the back of the weaver. As the woman shuttles her woof threads across the warp from side to side, she alternately loosens and tightens the weave by leaning slightly forward and backward. In a sense, she herself is part of the loom. The more complex kind of loom has a set frame. Weaving is steadily diminishing in competition with manufactured cloth, but throughout most of Indonesia the women still manufacture at least some of their textiles, especially the more elaborate cloths used for ceremonial dress.

East Indian textiles are decorated in two ways. One is brocading, done with silk or gold or silver thread, embroidered into the general design of the cloth. The other is dyeing, and in this technique the natives show remarkable versatility. Nowadays imported aniline dyes are supplanting the locally made coloring materials brewed from roots, leaves, and bark. In every district where cloth is made, however, the people also know how to prepare their own dyes, and do it for the better textiles. For simpler cloths, whole-dyed thread may be woven directly; but far more complicated methods are also used. They all come under the general heading of "resist methods," but details of technique vary markedly. By resist dyeing is meant the coloring of fabrics by covering up certain parts of the cloth with such materials as wax, leaves, and fibers, so that when the dye is applied it does not "take" in these places, and thus a design is produced. For multicolor dyeing, the sections already tinted are covered up and a different color is applied to the remainder of the cloth.

Three methods of resist dyeing are employed in the islands. They are called *ikat*, *plangi*, and *batik*. The first of these, *ikat*—which means "to tie" in Malay—is done by winding fibers or leaves around threads which are being prepared for weaving. The threads are then dipped in dye, which colors the exposed parts. When these threads are woven into cloth, so carefully have the dyes been applied that the desired design appears in the finished fabric. Some of these cloths are amazingly intricate in pattern. In one village of Bali, Tenganan, double-*ikat* textiles are still made; for these, both the warp and the woof threads are dyed before weaving. The story is that the older Tenganan double-*ikats* were dyed with the blood of human sacrifices and woven only by naked weavers in the dark of the moon. *Plangi* ("rainbow") cloths are dyed by covering certain parts of the fabric with leaves or other resistant substances, and then tying these sections into small

bundles, so that when 'dipped in the dye they do not take the color. By successive tyings and dippings multicolor designs can be produced. *Batik* cloths are colored by smearing wax over the parts which are not to be tinted and then applying the dye. The wax is removed by boiling the fabrics in water. Here again, several colors can be produced on a single cloth by repeated waxing and dipping in dye. The *batik* cloths of Java are the finest fabrics of their kind in the world. Some of the best ones, with intricate patterns and many colors, may take as long as a month to make.

Drums and Gongs to Gamelans, with Dancing

The artistic talents of the people of the Indies also appear in their music and dancing. The more primitive tribes use gongs and drums principally, although they have some wind instruments and rude violins. The nose flute, played by blowing through the nose rather than the mouth, is found only among the most remote groups, and is apparently an extremely archaic instrument. It makes a very faint, melancholy sound, and has only a few notes. The dancing of the interior tribes, like their music, is also quite simple, running largely to pantomime, except for the trance dancing which the spiritualistic mediums perform when they are conducting séances. These are wild and hysterical, and obviously the manifestation of abnormal states of mind induced by some sort of self-hypnotism.

The music and dancing of Java and Bali stand on a level quite different from that of the more primitive tribes, and show clear evidence of influence from India. Still, the old types of music and dancing survive even in these relatively civilized regions, underneath, as it were, the more sophisticated patterns. The drums and gongs, and many of the rhythms, are directly descended from the dim primitive past; and some of the religious dances especially

are clear survivals of pre-Hindu times. But the music of the grand *gamelan* orchestras of Java and Bali is as different from that of the backward tribes as symphonies are from simple peasant folk-songs; while the elaborate posturing dances and the beautifully synchronized group performances are as far from the pantomimic animal and war dances of the jungle peoples as the Russian ballet is from the polka.

The *gamelan* orchestras have as their principal instruments copper-bowl xylophones, which carry the burden of the music; while violins, flutes, clarinets, and trumpets embroider on this basic pattern, and the big drums and gongs keep up a running undertone of complicated rhythms. The music is certainly strange to European and American ears, but—unlike most Chinese music, for instance—it is quite pleasing. Sometimes these orchestras play in concert style, but frequently they accompany singing and dancing. Some of the dancing goes without singing, but almost never is the reverse true. The dancers move their feet very little, and most of their “message” is put over by intricate, highly symbolic posturing with the body, arms, and hands. It is impossible for a European or American to understand the significance of this type of dancing without long study, but the gracefulness of the performers is fascinating even to one who knows nothing of the hidden meaning of their posturing.

Plays with Puppets

The dramatic art of the islands, which among the more remote tribes consists mainly of the pantomimic dances mentioned above and some religious pageantlike performances, reaches a peak of development in Java and Bali. The stories are largely derived from the Indian epic poems *Mahabharata* and *Ramayana*, but some of the dramas are based upon purely Indonesian tales. The

generic term for drama is *wayang*, but there are many kinds of *wayang*. One is performed by human actors, usually masked, and in this type the players themselves speak the lines. Another kind, perhaps the most ancient, consists in the unrolling of a long scroll on which the scenes of the play are printed, and the parts are recited by a monologist. All the other types of *wayang* are puppet shows, the figures being made of various kinds of material.

Most popular of all is the shadow play with flat leather puppets. This kind has the most elaborate repertory of stories; and the reciter of the lines must have a prodigious memory, for he alone speaks all the parts. The intricately carved puppets are manipulated, not by strings, but by thin stick attachments, from beneath the stage. A peculiar feature of the shadow play is that all the men in the audience sit behind the screen where they can watch the actual puppets, while the women must sit before the screen, seeing only the moving silhouettes. Rassers, the great authority on the *wayang*, claims that this is a survival of the time when male secret societies flourished in the islands, and women were excluded from the esoteric rituals of the fraternities. To Europeans and Americans, even those who understand the language, the *wayang* shows quickly become quite boring; but Indonesians sit fascinated hour after hour, never tiring of the long, involved, and seemingly naïve stories. They must see some significance in them that foreigners cannot grasp. It is a situation similar to that of the symbolic dancing; both express something that can be fully comprehended only by those nurtured in the native culture.

Movie-Mad Malays

Oriental and Occidental minds meet in the movies. The Indonesians—that is, those who live in districts where there are cinema theaters—love them, and go to them whenever they have the price.

They tend to be bored by pictures with too much talk and little action, even though condensed Malay translations are flashed on the screen. Animated cartoons of the Mickey Mouse variety bring them up shouting; this is something they have in their own folklore, which is full of animal fables of the Aesop type. But for steady fare they want westerns. Tom Mix, Eddie Polo, Buck Jones—these are their movie heroes. Their eyes shine when they recount the marvelous exploits of the invincible two-gun men. I can remember a Malay boy of a friend of mine returning one night from the movies, where he had seen "Bucka Jonas." He came in trembling with excitement and asked if he might have a word with us. Then he proceeded to tell what he had witnessed at the show, acting out a good deal of it himself. The climax of the story came when "Bucka Jonas," nonchalantly whistling, entered a den of villains, laid aside his coat, and in one-two-three fashion knocked the bad men cold; and then, still whistling, dusted off his sleeves, picked up his coat, and went out. The boy went through all this himself, even to going out the door whistling, and then quickly returned and asked: "Tell me the truth, *tuan*, can there be such men in America?"

The movies made us Americans something of heroes in the eyes of the natives. They used to pester us to tell them about the wonderful country of the cowboys. When they asked us if we could do these things too, we told them modestly that we used to when we were younger, but had not kept in practice and could not find the proper equipment in the islands. The cowboy craze was capitalized by one Chinese storekeeper I knew in a little Sumatra town. He laid in a stock of children's cowboy hats, with COWBOY stamped on the bands. Within a few hours he was sold out, and proud Malays were imagining themselves on the western plains. I even saw a bus named "Cowboy" on the Padang-Emmahaven line. This seems a far cry from the *wayang*, but if

one looks deeply he notices that the clean-hearted, mighty-muscled men of the Hollywood cattle country, eternally defeating the personified forces of evil and rescuing the beautiful virtuous damsel, are basically the same characters as the heroes of the native drama cycles.

Despotism and Democracy

The social organization of the Indonesian peoples shows three levels of development. A small proportion of the natives live in the few modern cities such as Batavia, Bandung, and Surabaya in Java; Macassar and Menado in Celebes; Medan and Palembang in Sumatra; and Bandjarmasin and Pontianak in Borneo; and among them the traditional social groupings have been largely forgotten. They are the semi-Europeanized, and their type of community life is a product of recent Western influence in the islands. This is the first level.

The second level is that of native states—the sultanates, radjads, and principalities—still semi-independent despite the fact that they were geared in with the Dutch colonial administration. This type of social and political organization, although it impinges directly on more natives than the European urban system, is still restricted to Java and the coastal regions of the other islands. It came into Indonesia about fifteen hundred years ago as an imported Hindu element. Before that, the social system of the Indies had never developed beyond the tribal or village community stage. Even now only a minority of the people are directly concerned with these petty states, which have never extended anything but a nebulous influence over the interior districts of the outer islands. Even within the area of the native states themselves, only the upper class of Indonesians are much concerned in their daily life with the organization and function-

ing of the sultanates. Like the European city system in the Indies, they represent a superimposition on the truly native tribal and village groupings, which continue functioning now in virtually the same way they have since the distant past, before more complex types of social organization began to come into the Indies with conquerors and enterprising adventurers from other parts of the world, Asiatic and European. The latter have taken possession of the Indies in the broader political sense, but they have never conquered the native peoples in the social sense.

Waves of imperialistic expansion have swept over the Indies for hundreds of years; Hindu, Arab, Portuguese, British, and Dutch captains of empire have "taken" the islands in succession; but underneath the surface shifts and struggles the native communities have gone their traditional ways relatively undisturbed. The masses of the people in their countless little tribes and settlements have been left essentially untouched by foreign governmental systems. They are like the humble peasants of eastern Europe, whose community organizations have persisted through all changes of conquerors, so that in Serbia, Slovakia, and the Ukraine—as in the East Indies—the pulse of native life has varied hardly a beat despite the surface disturbances and the changing complexion of the higher government. These people are rooted to their native soil; their horizon of social and political concern stretches scarcely beyond the village or small district where their ancestors lived and died for long ages before them. To them, beyond the next hill lies the end of the world.

It is true that one can delimit large tribal groupings, some of them so extensive that they might better be termed nations. These, however, are mostly areas within which the customs and language are the same, and the people remember an ancient bond of relationship. Throughout a vast territory of central Sumatra, for instance, all the inhabitants belong to the Minangkabau nation,

which totals around two million souls. They all follow the same customs and speak the same language, with minor local variations. Moreover, they know that centuries ago, when the tribe was smaller, their ancestors lived concentrated in a much more restricted area. They also know that to the north live people called Batak, who are different in ways and descent from themselves. But, despite this general "consciousness of kind," there is no central tribal government; and the largest functioning social units are clusters of villages which combine to form districts. The district chiefs are all independent one from another. Almost invariably, if you ask a Minangkabau what he is, he will say that he is a man of such and such a village. Sometimes he will add that his village is in such and such a district. But only if specifically queried on the point will he mention that he is a Minangkabau. The same thing is true of the Batak people to the north of the Minangkabau. They number about a million, but their "sense of belonging" extends hardly beyond their village and district.

In less advanced areas a similar situation prevails. The Borneo tribal complexes sometimes, as in the case of the Bahau people of the interior, are very large, the Bahau totaling around 300,000 population. All through this section there is a general similarity of customs and language, as well as a legend of common descent. Within the broad Bahau grouping there are several tribes—with such names as Kayan and Kenya; here the cultural similarities are closer, and the tradition of former unity much stronger. Still, even on this level there is no central government—no chief, for instance, of the Kenya. The functioning social and political unit is the subtribe, consisting of a group of closely related families who live in the same great longhouse or cluster of longhouses. Such a unit does have a chief. Occasionally, when threatened by outside enemies—the Iban of western Borneo or, formerly, the

Dutch forces—several Kayan or Kenya subtribes might unite for defense, and at such times the tradition of ancient relationship is revived. Occasionally a whole tribe has combined forces in time of war; and at least one instance is recorded of a tribal complex uniting for military purposes. This occurred in the early part of the twentieth century, when nearly all the subtribes and tribes of the great eastern Toradja complex in the interior of Celebes joined together in a defensive alliance against the Dutch. In every case, however, as soon as the crisis has passed, the smaller units have split apart again and resumed their independent existence, even to the extent of fighting among themselves over such questions as disputed subtribal land boundaries.

Each of the native communities, then, represents a social and political unit almost entirely independent of its neighbors. The most common type of organization is the village; although sometimes, as already mentioned, a cluster of villages may be welded together into a district federation. On the most primitive level—among the nomadic tribes of Sumatra, Borneo, and several of the eastern islands—the basic unit is the band, led by the oldest or ablest man. The Indonesian community is not only typically democratic; it is also to a high degree communalistic. The chief and his assistants are chosen by vote of the villagers, but the offices tend to be hereditary. That is, unless there are serious objections on the grounds of ability or character, a deceased chief's nearest male relative will usually succeed him in office. Which relative is considered closest depends upon the kinship system in the particular region. Where descent is reckoned in the male line, a chief's successor is most likely to be his son; but where the "mother-family" organization prevails, a man's nearest male kin is his sister's son, for relationship through the female side of the family is considered far more important than connection by way of males.

A voice in community affairs is given to all, or nearly all, the adult males of the settlement, not only through their having a vote in the selection of officials, but also by way of membership in the village council. Descendants of slaves, newcomers to the settlement, and, in some regions, persons of a traditionally inferior class may be either entirely disfranchised or allowed only restricted privileges in community affairs; but the general tone and functioning of native political life are democratic. The officials are subject to control in their decisions by the council, and they must never violate the traditional rules, or *adat*, of the community. In some places—for instance, Bali—the ancestral laws are actually inscribed in ancient palm-leaf volumes; but, even where no knowledge of writing, and therefore no written lawbooks, exist, the traditional ways are passed down orally from generation to generation. Caught between the power of the village council and the rigidity of the local *adat*, the native chiefs have little chance to indulge any inclinations toward dictatorship. Whatever despotism has grown up in the Indies has been on the part of alien rulers and foreign systems of government; and the wiser administrators have generally refrained from much interference in the local communities. Peace and taxes, and perhaps a limited amount of personal and military service, are all they have asked of the village people. Even the Dutch left the local social and political systems unchanged, for they ran smoothly and tranquilly in the deep grooves of ancient custom.

Communalism of Property

The democratic political functioning of the local communities in most of Indonesia is complemented by a prevailing communalism of property. These small societies are closely knit through centuries of living together and through an interlocking series

of marriages within the settlement. Individual property, therefore, is restricted to movable and personal articles, such as clothes and weapons; houses are generally regarded as collective family property, and land belongs to the whole community. Exclusive private possession of land is an idea strange to most Indonesians. The territory of the community is owned by all the people collectively, and each individual or family gets a share of the land. Such shares cannot be sold, because they are not owned by their holders. With the consent of the whole community, parcels of land may be leased for set terms to outsiders; but alienation by sale is impossible. The Dutch government wisely reinforced traditional law on this point by statutory enactments; and no one could buy land from Indonesians or native communities. The great plantations of the Indies, for instance, occupied leased land; and the companies paid rent to the native owners. The miserable record of the United States government in its administration of the land-holdings of the American Indians stands in sharp contrast to this enlightened policy. The Indians, like the Indonesians, did not understand the white man's laws concerning land property and transfer, and no safeguards were set against exploitation of this ignorance by unscrupulous persons. Recently the American government has acted to correct this situation, and alienation of Indian tribal land is now forbidden by law.

In many of the remoter districts of the Indies, land is reapportioned every year or two among the families of a community, each receiving a share in accordance with need. A family which has increased in size since the previous allotment will be given a larger portion, while one which has declined will have its share proportionately reduced. This ancient system of true communalism has been undergoing steady alteration for centuries, however, and the tendency has been toward a kind of "permanent family leasehold." This change has followed the

spread of wet-rice agriculture, and the reason for the association of the two things is that irrigated fields represent a capital investment in the form of ditches, sluice-gates, dams, and terraces. When an individual or a family has invested labor and material in the improvement of a field, the village can hardly take such land away and give it to others. Consequently, it stays in the hands of the improvers indefinitely. Nevertheless, they may not sell it; and, if they move away from the village, after a set period of time their land reverts to the community. Absentee ownership is outside the *adat*.

Class and Caste

In the same way that the primitive communalism of Indonesian villages has been modified in areas where improved methods of cultivation have introduced permanent capital investment in land, so also can a correlation be noted between decline in the pure democracy of native society and the spread of "higher" culture. Social class stratification tends to develop and become rigid in the more advanced areas. Where Hindu civilization never penetrated, for instance—as in the isolated islands of Mentawai and Engano, and among the Toradja of Celebes and the nomads of Borneo and Sumatra—complete social democracy prevails. Intermediate grades of stratification, with more or less rigid maintenance of "noble" and "commoner" classes, characterize the groups on the periphery, as it were, of higher civilization. Strongly developed hereditary nobilities, linked in most cases with dynastic state governments and despotic systems of feudalism, prevail, or did until recently, in all of the more advanced regions.

The great mass of the natives, even in areas where social stratification exists, still live in their own communities relatively untouched by imported ideas of superior and inferior classes of men.

In Bali, for instance, although there is not only a class of nobles but also a caste system on the model of India, the vast majority of the people stand outside both schemes of rank. If nobles or high-caste members live in a village, the commoners address them in a special language of deference and observe certain distinctive rules of etiquette toward them; but so far as the daily life and community administration are concerned, all stand pretty much on the same level. In this island the caste system restricts marriage choice; but, since most of the people are noncaste members, this makes little difference. Classes occur also in some quite unexpected areas—for instance, among several of the interior tribes of Borneo; but here the system is more a formal matter having to do with hereditary chiefly families rather than a vital scheme of social distinction deeply affecting the communities.

One qualification must be made to the statement that Indonesian native society is fundamentally democratic: slavery, more or less highly developed, prevailed until recent years in nearly all parts of the islands. Slaves were mostly war captives or the descendants of conquered people, and the status was hereditary in virtually every case; but as a rule it involved no inhuman treatment. Some exceptions to the latter remark should be indicated, for in several tribes slaves were used for human sacrifice. Interestingly enough, such slaves were usually not the hereditary inferior folk of the community, but either fresh war captives or persons purchased from outside the local group.

The Importance of Genealogy

The Indonesians, like the South Sea Islanders, are great genealogists, and reckon relationships far beyond the immediate family. Such extended systems of relationship are important, for on them are based marriage rules, regulations concerning residence, obli-

gations of blood vengeance, and property laws. Some of the tribes emphasize descent in the maternal line; others stress male descent; while still others reckon relationship on both the mother's and father's side, as we do in America. The last system, which anthropologists call "bilateral," prevails all through Borneo, Celebes, and Java, and in much of Sumatra. Patrilineal descent, reckoned through the male line, is characteristic of most of the mountain peoples of Sumatra and of the vast majority of groups in eastern Indonesia, from Bali to New Guinea. Matrilineal descent, in which relationship is traced through the female line, occurs only among the Minangkabau and one or two other tribes of Sumatra, and in restricted enclaves in some of the eastern islands.

The rules governing marriage link closely with the type of descent. Among peoples who reckon relationship bilaterally, choice of a spouse is restricted only by incest rules, which prohibit marriage with close relatives on either side of the family, usually extending to first cousins. Where connection with the father's family is the important criterion of kinship, taboos on marrying paternal relatives may extend to very distant degrees of relationship; while maternal kinsmen, even those closely linked by blood, may wed. Typical in a patrilineal system such as that of the Batak of Sumatra, for instance, is the rule that a man may marry the daughter of his mother's brother, a relative on the female side, but not the daughter of his father's sister, a relative on the male side; even though in actual blood relationship both of these first cousins are equidistant. The reverse rule may apply in a matrilineal society.

In certain parts of Sumatra, and in some areas of eastern Indonesia, the patrilineal and matrilineal systems of reckoning kinship become vastly elaborated by the development of clans. Where this occurs in a patrilineal tribe, one is not only prohibited from marrying blood relatives on the father's side, but the taboo is also

extended to all members of the father's clan, no matter how distant the relationship may be. A Batak, for instance, may go to live in a part of his country where neither he nor his family has ever been before; but he may not select for his bride any woman belonging to his—that is, his father's—clan. In a matrilineal tribe with clans the same rule applies, except that here a person may not marry a member of his mother's clan. Thus, a Minangkabau moving into a village far from his native community and looking for a wife, first inquires concerning the clan membership of the eligible girls and crosses off his list of possibilities all those with the same clan name as himself and his mother. Such a system is based upon the belief that all members of a clan are descended from a common ancestor, male or female, depending upon the type of kinship reckoning. It is as though we were to recognize that all persons named Smith are descended from an original "Great Smith" who founded the lineage, and tabooed marriage between all individuals with this name. Clan rules of marriage are just as stringently enforced as incest regulations, and the penalty for transgression, as in the case of real incest, used to be death in Indonesia.

The mode of reckoning descent influences the place of residence of a couple after marriage. In areas where bilateral kinship prevails, usually a man and his wife may live with either of their families. In some places, however, this is not so. For instance, among most of the interior tribes of Borneo, although relationship on both sides is reckoned equally, a married couple go to live in the village or longhouse of the wife. Anthropologists call this "matrilocal" residence, and some authorities believe that it is a survival of a former system of reckoning descent in the female line only.

Almost invariably, where kinship is matrilineal, residence is matrilocal; whereas, when the male blood tie is the test of rela-

tionship, residence is patrilocal—that is, with the husband's people. Once in a while one encounters an exception to the general rule, and when this happens the natives say that the marriage is *ambil-anak*, "to get the children." In the Batak tribe, for instance, if a man has no sons he faces the distressing situation of having his family name die with him, for descent here is reckoned in the male line. He tries then to find a youth willing to marry one of his daughters, come and live with him, and surrender claim to any children born of the union. Thus the old man "gets the children," gives them his name, and his lineage survives. Generally boys are reluctant to agree to such an arrangement, for a prime ambition of all men is to have sons of their own name. The feeling is that they are "selling out" their lineage; and this is pretty much the case, for usually only a poor boy who cannot afford to pay the price of a bride marries into an *ambil-anak* arrangement, which involves canceling the bride-price on the part of the girl's father.

Standards of Sexual Morality

The peoples of the Indies are much freer, in general, about sex relations among young people than we are in America. In most of the less civilized tribes especially, it is considered not only normal, but rather a good thing, for youths and maidens to learn about sex before they marry. The Batak of Sumatra have a saying about girls: "It is a poor cake on which a fly never lights." Courtship in the jungle therefore tends to be direct and lusty, and the young people are not inhibited by repressive rules concerning what these people of nature consider perfectly natural.

This all sounds more extreme than it really is. If a girl becomes pregnant during her "courtship" period, the boy involved is generally required to marry her. Moreover, the time between adoles-

cence, when sex relations begin, and marriage is usually very short; for as a rule girls marry at about sixteen, boys a year or two later. When a girl marries her whole life immediately changes. No longer is she free to dispose her sexual favors as she pleases; for, lax though the courtship system may be, the adultery rules are savage in their strictness, and in most districts a couple discovered in adultery are punished by death. This, at any rate, is the native law on the matter; where European rule was in force the penalty for adultery was no longer death, but heavy fines.

The rules concerning marital fidelity invariably give the husband more freedom than the wife. The Indonesians work on the principle that loose sexual dealings on the part of a man are relatively unimportant; for, after all, the men do not bear the children. Consequently, it is much harder for a woman than for a man to claim divorce on the ground of adultery. Moreover, in nearly all tribes a man may have as many wives as he can manage or support; while polyandry is not allowed.

I remember arguing the case of polygamy with a Javanese who had four wives, the maximum number allowed by the Mohammedan religion. I tried to tell him that, according to the ideas of my people, multiple marriage was a bad thing, and immoral. He replied: "I know that white people believe this. But I cannot understand why. You say having more than one wife is bad, and the missionaries say so too; and they show me the rules their god has made against it. But the Koran says differently, and the Koran is the book of rules of Allah, my god. My wives and I get along very well. My older wives are glad I have the others, because it lightens the work, and they are proud that I can afford four wives. Also, as my earlier wives get older, they can no longer bear children, even though I can still conceive them. Naturally I want as many children as possible." I tried to

find other arguments, but could not. There was no jealousy; family relations were serene. I left him, rejoicing that I was not a missionary with the job of selling monogamy to the Indonesians.

The really big men of the Indies—the native radjas and sultans—are among the champion husbands of the world. In addition to the four “status wives” allowed them by Islamic rule, they also support squads of concubines, and the offspring of the various women are ranked according to the position of their mothers in the royal household. Thus, a son of the third concubine of a Javanese sultan is likely to stand pretty high in the legion of royal children, because there are so many other concubines ranked beneath his mother. This whole system begets an enormous proliferation of titles, meticulously graded from the ruler downward. Moreover, a special kind of language must be used when speaking to persons in each grade, depending in turn upon the relative grade of the speaker.

The great majority of Indonesians can afford but one wife. “Afford” is a good word in this connection, because throughout most of the islands a man has to pay for a wife. The bride-price generally varies according to the rank of the girl’s family, which tends to keep the poor from marrying above their station. Even the most primitive tribes require the bride-price, which is paid to the family of the girl. Thus, a man with many daughters has a nice potential source of profit. For poor boys there are provisions for “working off” the bride-price; and many a youth labors for his father-in-law in order to pay for his wife. The *ambil-anak* mode of marriage, mentioned above, is a good alternative for a penniless man, who, under this system, can marry into a family consisting only of daughters, and, in return for letting his father-in-law have the eventual children, secure cancellation of the bride-price.

Love Lyrics

Much has been made of the claim that primitive peoples have no notions of romantic love, and the apparently commercialistic character of the bride-price would seem to corroborate this. But the truth is that tender affection controls the mating of Indonesians about as much as it does our own. Money barriers impede marriages of true love in our society too; and the Cinderella-Prince Charming story generally is just a story. The native love poetry is good evidence of the presence of romantic feeling in the islands; and many of the products of amorous native literature show a delicacy of sentiment hardly surpassed by our singers of the gentle passion. A Malay lyric, couched in the form of a poetic riddle, runs as follows:

*Apa guna pasang palita
Kalo tida dengan sumbunya?
Apa guna bermain mata
Djikalo tida dengan sunggunya?*

It means:

What is the use of trying to light a lamp
If there is no wick in it?
What is the use of flirting with the eyes
If there is no love behind the glances?

Another, in the same vein, says:

*Dari mana, adinda, datangnya linta?
Dari sawah, turun kakali.
Dari mana, adinda, datangnya tjinta?
Dari mata, turun kahati.*

It means:

Whence, little sister, cometh the leech?
From the rice field, down to the river.
Whence, little sister, cometh love?
From the eyes, down to the heart.

An amazing thing about this type of poem, called *pantun*, is that the natives compose them extemporaneously all the time. They hold contests, with one side giving the first two lines, containing the hidden meaning; whereupon the other side must quickly think up a suitable resolution in the last two lines. Long contests often end in a scoreless tie.

War and the Magical Lure of Human Heads

Native war is now a thing of the past in most parts of the Indies, but before the establishment of European rule—and even today in districts “beyond the jungle frontier”—intermittent feuds between villages, divisions of tribes, and whole tribal groups kept the islands in a state of continual internal strife. Aside from full-scale wars fought by rival sultanates for power and plunder, these petty combats were, and still are to some degree, a regular feature of native life. Boundary disputes, revenge for injuries inflicted by members of one group on those of another, and, in some cases, the pressing need for more land to support increasing population were among the causes of native warfare. But above all head-hunting was the principal impulse to raiding and counter-raiding in Indonesia. Even nowadays, in the deep interior sections of Borneo and Celebes, in the isolated islands off the west coast of Sumatra, and in several of the less civilized eastern parts of the archipelago, head-hunting goes on surreptitiously, despite the efforts of the government to stamp it out.

In ancient times it would appear that virtually all the tribes of the Indies were head-hunters. The reasons for this peculiar practice seem on the surface to be mainly desire for war prestige and revenge for previous raids. These are certainly important factors in keeping the custom alive; indeed, in many areas a youth is not considered a proper man and cannot present himself as an eligible bridegroom until he has captured at least one head. But underlying these superficial reasons are the ideas of the people concerning the magical power of human heads. Basically, this is the cause of head-hunting. A Borneo settlement, let us say, has been suffering from epidemics, crop failures, and infertility of women. Casting about for a reason to explain their ill-fortune, they arrive at the characteristically Indonesian notion that their group lacks magical power. Their spiritual "juice" is running low. What they need is a fresh influx of supernatural vigor, not only to strengthen themselves, their crops, and their women, but also to fight off evil spirits with greater effectiveness.

One of the most direct means of getting the magical power they need is to capture a new batch of heads from some other group. The spiritual energy of the other settlement is most richly concentrated in their heads, and by getting some of these the home village will divert a part of the current vitality into their own community. It is easy to see how the attacked group, after losing several heads—and with them some of their total stock of magical power—will at once begin planning a return raid in order to get back what they have lost; in other words, to restore the "balance of heads." Especially will they feel the need to do this if they begin to suffer misfortunes after the raid. A good stock of heads is the glory of a native Borneo settlement. In the early days of white contact, the people proudly displayed their skull collections to European officials, and were dumfounded when the reaction was not one of congratulation.

White men's heads have been taken on several occasions, but in general the Indonesians seem to have been puzzled as to precisely how the Europeans could be fitted into their complex of cult beliefs and spiritual reckonings. White people have therefore been left pretty much outside the native system of head-hunting magic. Also, few Europeans have penetrated the dangerous districts without adequate protection; and, finally, the tribes quickly learned that attacking white men was hardly worth the trouble bound to follow such forays. The government has always been scrupulous in inflicting sure punishment on tribes guilty of molesting Europeans, and so has virtually eliminated danger to whites in most districts.

Being such valuable objects, heads are also secured for the funeral feasts of chiefs and other prominent persons. They are the best of all offerings. Moreover, the ancestral ghosts, once doughty head-hunters themselves, are likely to scorn and withdraw their supernatural favors from their descendants if the latter do not perform the sacred duty of replenishing the magical stock of the group by capturing heads. It becomes not only the duty but also the pride of decent, ambitious young men to do their best for their people; and the greatest heroes are the best head-hunters. They are allowed to wear special insignia of glory, such as panther's teeth stuck through their ears, distinctive headcloth patterns, and certain kinds of tattoo marks on their chests.

The Iban, the most ferocious head-hunters of Borneo, used occasionally to operate in fifth-column fashion among the other tribes in order to secure heads. A group of them would go off to the land of a neighboring tribe, win their way into a village, apparently settle down there, and then, one day when most of the men of the settlement were away in the fields or hunting, fall upon the women, children, and remaining men, decapitate

them, and make off swiftly with their grisly booty. This tribe, incidentally, was used by the British in Sarawak in campaigns against other native groups, the white men luring them into participation by the promise of many heads. So long as the Iban were indispensable allies, they were allowed to indulge their head-hunting propensities against the enemies of the British; but as soon as a campaign was won the white men issued a stern interdict on any further snatching of heads. The bewildered protests of the faithful Iban have been of no avail. The white man's law must be enforced—unless it is to the white man's advantage that it be temporarily discontinued.

The idea that the head is a very sacred part of the body is widespread in Indonesia. The greatest breach of etiquette is to touch someone's head without good reason. Many a white man has lost his life because he did not know how natives regard their heads. To slap or punch an Indonesian in the face is highly dangerous, for he is quite apt to avenge this supreme insult by killing his attacker at the earliest opportunity. It is far better to kick him; that part of the body is not sacred.

The Meaning of Cannibalism

Head-hunting is linked with partial cannibalism in most areas where it occurs. The idea is that, since the warriors are contributing so much to the general community welfare by capturing these dynamos of magical power, they should rightly receive a little extra personal spiritual energy themselves. And so the head-snatchers eat bits of the flesh of the heads, especially the brains, which are the very nucleus of the head's power. Often the brains are not taken "straight," but beaten up in a bowl of rice beer or palm wine—similar, in a way, to a malted milk shake.

Aside from this form of cannibalism, which is actually more

like a spiritual communion service than a sumptuary feast, man-eating is not condoned by any Indonesian tribe except the Batak of Sumatra. In this particular the Indies differ from many of the South Sea Islands, notably the Solomons and New Hebrides, where the natives use human flesh like any other meat. One of the most grisly accounts of cannibalism I have ever met comes from these islands, where, on a long canoe trip a fresh meat supply is assured by taking along a few captives whose arms and legs are broken so that they cannot resist or escape. Thus they are kept alive—and the meat fresh—until ready for butchering and eating.

In the Indies such outright cannibalism is unknown. Even the Batak, the only true cannibals of the archipelago, seldom or never ate human beings except for specifically defined reasons. One was in order to inflict the utmost revenge on slain enemies, at the same time absorbing some of the magical "soul-stuff" of the bodies. Another occasion was the execution of a person guilty of a capital crime: here again the idea was to employ the most extreme kind of punishment and disgrace possible—that is, being digested by one's fellow tribesmen. One feature of such a judiciary cannibal feast was that all members of the group had to eat some of the criminal's body, and anyone who refused might be killed and eaten himself. The reason for this stipulation lies in the idea of the Batak—indeed, of all Indonesians—that the ghost of the dead person is very dangerous and likely to take revenge on his persecutors. Therefore, everyone had to share the ghostly blame and risk of eating a criminal.

Nowadays, and for the past thirty years, cannibalism has virtually disappeared from the Batak country. Occasionally in a back-country district a case comes to light; and there are probably more that are never discovered. While I was in Sumatra in 1930, a Batak was hanged by the government for cannibalism.

He had done it for supreme revenge; when caught with the gory evidence, he had just finished consuming the hands and a part of the arms.

Gods, Ghosts, and Spirits

It is appropriate that this chapter on native Indonesian culture should end on the subject of religion, for in this sphere the people of the islands show a tremendous resistance to new and imported ideas. They are conservative in the other parts of their social systems, but less markedly so. Particularly does this apply to material innovations, which they welcome quite freely. It is true that the great majority of the natives—about 90 per cent—are nominally Mohammedans; that about two and a half million of them outwardly profess Christianity; and that a million Balinese are technically followers of Hinduism, another imported religion. But the kind of Mohammedanism, Christianity, and Hinduism practiced in the Indies is hardly of the "pure" sort in any instance.

The vital religions of the islands are the old ghost, spirit, and ancestor cults that have persisted all through the centuries despite surface changes. The Javanese, for instance, are almost a hundred per cent Mohammedan, and are the ones who boost the Islamic representation in the archipelago to such a high percentage, for there are over 40,000,000 of them alone. They may go to the mosque on Fridays, listen to the Koran, observe the Islamic fasting period, and hold as their highest ambition a visit to Mecca before they die; but their fundamental beliefs about spirits, life after death, magic, and the like are really pagan. The Javanese or Balinese village has at the very basis of its religious system worship of the local spirits and of the ancestral ghosts of the community, for whom ancient altars serve as offering places.

The old saying in the Indies is: "Scratch a Mohammedan Javanese and you find a Hinduist; scratch the Hinduist and you find a pagan." The pagan substratum is the most important element in the whole superimposed system of religious beliefs and practices, and it gives the tone to the later layers; for the dogmas and rituals of Mohammedanism, Christianity, and Hinduism are all recast by the essentially pagan Indonesian into an ancient cult pattern that would hardly be recognized by a "true believer." The more highly educated ones comprehend and observe the orthodox tenets of the higher religions; but, as already remarked, fewer than 10 per cent of the people are even literate. The great masses are still pagan at heart, despite their superficial affiliation with the great world religions.

The true type of Indonesian religion, which still survives untouched by outside influence in the interior districts of Sumatra, Borneo, and Celebes, and in many of the isolated smaller islands, rests basically upon beliefs and practices concerned with magic, spirits, and the ghosts of the dead. We have already seen how the magical concepts emerge in the head-hunting complex. They imbue other aspects of religious life as well; for the people have the idea that a vast store of magical power permeates the universe, and that it can be "tapped" for human purposes by certain set methods. Some persons are specially adept in getting at supernatural energy, and they can be hired to do this delicate and dangerous work. Mostly the purpose is good—healing the sick, helping the crops, and the like; but black magic is available for use against enemies. Every tribe and village has its specialists in this field; but common folk also, by prescribed ritual incantations and actions, turn magic to their uses. Sometimes whole communities hold ceremonies calculated to get spiritual energy for the entire group. In central Celebes, among the Toradja people, for instance, an annual week-long ceremony is held for

this purpose. The high point of the solemnities comes when all the women of the village put themselves into a kind of trance, so that they can "send their souls" up to the sky, where the great spirits have a vast store of magical power, and draw upon this mighty storehouse for the benefit of the whole community.

The belief in spirits is different from that in generalized magical force, and the activities connected with the spirit cult are more specific in their intention and formalization. In this aspect of religion the people know with what they have to deal; they "point" their rituals at a certain spirit or spirits; and the ideas concerning these supernatural beings are more concrete than in the case of magic. Every tribe believes in the existence of hosts of spirits widely variable in kind and power. Some are good, others bad; and the main purpose of the spirit cult is to secure the favor of the former in combatting the malevolent influence of the latter. There are earth spirits, air spirits, water spirits, and a great number of celestial superior beings who appear as the leaders of the lesser ones. The tribes of central Borneo try to discover the will of the heavenly deities by observing the flight of birds, who are under the direction of the spirits of the air, the latter in turn following the orders of their superiors in the celestial realm. The Batak of Sumatra believe that they can imprison certain kinds of spirits in little figurines of wood or stone which they set outside their villages; these fetish objects will then protect the settlement against the hordes of evil creatures who prowl the earth, especially at night. There are all sorts of sickness spirits; and in eastern Indonesia particularly, when an epidemic is raging the people make a little boat, lure the evil spirits of illness aboard it, and tow it out to sea—a kind of "scape-boat" ritual. Many localities have their own special spirits. Climbing a high mountain, Indonesians will make offerings not only to the deities of the mountain itself, but also to the spirits of

rocks and streams on the way up. Passing a headland known to house a supernatural being, Malay sailors will lie flat in their vessel, perfectly quiet, while the helmsman gingerly steers a course by the dread spot, keeping his eyes rigidly forward.

Powerful though the beliefs in magic and spirits are, probably the most important cult in Indonesia has to do with the ghosts of the dead and the ancestors. In few other places in the world do funeral ceremonies involve so much time, energy, and sacrifice. In many areas the dead receive not only one, but two and even three successive funerals, at each of which the bones of the deceased are exhumed or removed from their tomb for cleaning, blessing, and redisposal. The ways of disposing of the dead are extremely varied. In Sumatra alone, for instance, the different tribes bury, cremate, entomb, abandon, conceal in caves, and seal in trees the corpses of their dead, depending upon the district. Even within the same tribe, different methods of disposal will be employed, depending upon the age, rank, sex, and manner of death of the deceased.

This elaborate concern with death and the dead reaches its culmination in the all-important ancestor cult. The ancestors have passed beyond, to the realm of the spirits, and, if kept satisfied, are in an excellent position to help the living. Therefore, they receive endless sacrifices, and the people dread doing anything which they believe might offend them. This is one great reason for the conservatism of the Indonesians: among them it is literally true that "what was good enough for our forefathers is good enough for us." Indeed, it had better be, for the ancestors are likely to be angered by any alteration in the ways they were used to on earth, and will therefore withdraw their favors from the living.

It is almost impossible for a European or American to comprehend the reality of the ghostly environment to the Indonesians.

Theirs is not a generalized, vague idea of the dead living on "up there somewhere," as among us. The ghosts of the dead are all around them. They cannot be seen, but they are there. Indeed, sometimes they are seen, especially in dreams. I remember my first experience with this vivid feeling of the presence of the dead. My Sumatran boy came in one morning and said calmly: "I saw my grandfather last night." I thought he was joking, for I knew his grandfather had long been dead; but I quickly realized that the boy's dream of the dead had been perfectly real to him. Another time a Javanese gardener told me that a *pontianak* had been out behind the house the night before. He had heard her wailing, and had a pretty good idea who she was. A woman had died in childbirth not long before; and her ghost, like those of all such unfortunate women, had become a *pontianak*. These ghosts are very dangerous to men, whom they emasculate, and also to babies, for they are jealous of the happiness of the mother, having been denied this pleasure themselves just as they were about to attain it.

The ancestor cult is universal throughout the Indies; if one were to select the most important single feature of Indonesian religion, it would be this. Linked with it is a widespread use of spiritualistic séances for the purpose of getting in contact with the ghosts of the dead and discovering their will. The shaman, or medium, who may be male or female, goes into a state of trance induced by such devices as incantations and wild dancing to the accompaniment of steady drum-beating, and gulping in great clouds of incense. While in the trance, the medium's body becomes the host of an ancestral ghost, who speaks through the mouth of the shaman. Since much of life's fortune depends upon the will of the unseen powers, the importance of making direct contact with the spirit world can be readily appreciated.

The native religions of the Indies, then, are varying mixtures

of paganism with later infusions of Mohammedanism, Christianity, and Hinduism. Always the base is paganism, the traditional beliefs and practices of the ancestors. "Conversion," it would appear, merely means taking on new names for old things; and Allah, Christ, the Saints, Mohammed, Vishnu, Shiva, and the other supernatural beings introduced from outside are simply added on and fitted in to the ancient cults. Purely pagan tribes still survive in the islands off the west coast of Sumatra, in certain remote sections of the latter island itself, in central Borneo, in interior Celebes, and in many of the scattered islands lying between Java and Celebes on the west and New Guinea on the east. Hinduism, strongly mixed with pre-Hindu beliefs, survives only in Bali, although six hundred years ago it was the nominal religion of all Java and most of Sumatra as well. Mohammedanism, again by no means "pure," has now spread over nearly all of Sumatra, Java, and the coastal lands of Borneo and Celebes. It is steadily making "converts" throughout the eastern islands, some of which—Lombok and Sumbawa, for instance—are nominally almost completely Islamized.

Christianity has never been able to make headway in Mohammedan areas. In Java, for instance, there are at most 200,000 Christians—probably not more than half of these natives; and this despite centuries of effort on the part of missionaries. The Christian religion has found its best field among the pagan tribes, and throughout the history of missionary enterprise in the Indies the zones of influence of Christianity and Islam have been mutually exclusive. The tribes which have best received Christianity—or, rather, have attached the most Christian items to their own traditional cults—are the Batak of Sumatra, the Toradja and Minahasa of Celebes, and the Ambonese of the little chain of islands lying south of Ceram in the Moluccas. The Minahasa and Ambonese, indeed, are almost entirely "Christian."

There is probably no other native area in the world, certainly none of such tremendous size, where primitive traditional culture has survived in such intact form as in the East Indies. There are many reasons for this. Most of the interior regions have only recently been opened up to outside access, and many large districts still remain virtually untouched by European influence. Again, the Dutch colonial administration has maintained a beneficent, paternalistic attitude toward its subject peoples, and has sincerely tried to aid them in preserving their ancient ways—to the extent, for instance, of rigidly controlling missionary activity by allowing it only under license from the government, revocable at any time. Perhaps the strongest single bulwark against cultural disintegration has been the enormous native population; sheer force of numbers has given strength in resisting alien influences and maintaining traditional ways. One can safely predict that many generations will yet pass before the Indonesian peoples abandon their ancestral beliefs and customs.

IV

THE DUTCH

THE DUTCH ARE NOT A HASTY PEOPLE. UNLIKE THE AMERICANS IN the Philippines, who moved in after driving out the Spanish and immediately started a general reform of government, education, and social life, the Netherlanders proceeded very slowly in their islands. They retained so far as possible the traditional forms of government, tried scrupulously to avoid interference in native life, and left the people of the Indies almost as uneducated as they were when the first white men appeared there.

The Dutch Policy of Gradualism

The old East India Company, technically a commercial body operating under the aegis of the Netherlands government, actually was the colonial administration until its dissolution in 1798. It kept the native sultans in power, and ruled through them, demanding only a monopoly of trading rights and exploitation of the natural resources. After the collapse of the Company, the government merely stepped into its place and operated in the time-honored manner, becoming virtually a commercial organization it-

self. As we have seen, natives were forced to deliver produce or labor in lieu of outright taxes until near the close of the nineteenth century. This was also a time of solidification of Dutch rule over the native states and tribal areas previously independent of all higher authority. Thus, while the government on the one hand continued the policy of merely doing business in the Indies—a policy taken over directly from the old Company—on the other hand it came more and more to involve itself in its proper sphere, administration, which the Company had always shirked as much as possible, preferring to leave political matters to the native rulers.

The consequence of this double, and contradictory, role of the government was that finally, around 1900, it gave up its business activities—with the exception of certain enterprises and monopolies to be discussed later—and opened the Indies to exploitation by private companies, turning itself completely to the task of colonial administration. Moreover, it pledged itself to a "liberal" policy of rule, involving a compromise scheme—that is, on the one hand to keep native customs and institutions intact so far as possible, and on the other to extend education and participation in government to the Indonesians as rapidly as possible. In the former aim the colonial administration succeeded admirably; indeed, it was always the policy of the Dutch to refrain from interference in native life except when absolutely necessary. In the latter aim the success was less marked, with the result that a very small proportion of the natives ever attended school and an even smaller part ever voted. The underlying philosophy was one of gradualism, with primary emphasis on maintaining the status quo and only slowly opening educational and political privileges to the natives. Nevertheless, the trend was all in the direction of greater liberalism on both points.

The Crown and the Councils

The Indies were not, technically, a colony. They formed a part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, just as did Holland itself, Surinam, and Curaçao. As an integral part of the Kingdom the Indies had their own governmental system to handle internal affairs, although they were under the "guidance" of the mother country, and the latter controlled their relations with foreign states. In international affairs the Crown and the ministers of the Netherlands "acted for" the Indies. In the internal administration of the islands, the Crown exercised "supreme administration," while the governor-general of the Indies exercised "general administration." This meant that legislation concerning matters of broad and fundamental import for the Indies went through the parliament in Holland, while more specific questions were handled by the governor-general and the Indian organs of government in Batavia.

The Council of the Indies was an advisory body for the governor-general. Its members were appointed by the Crown and the Netherlands cabinet. They were five in number, one place always being reserved for an Indonesian. It is difficult to understand what necessary function this Council served; apparently it was merely a traditional body not yet weeded out of the governmental structure of the Indies. My own impression is that it approximated what is called in America a "kitchen cabinet," a kind of confidential group in which the governor-general could discuss his problems unofficially.

In addition to the Council—and, so far as I can see, making it doubly unnecessary—the governor-general had a cabinet of eight members, six of whom he appointed himself. The other two, the

ministers of war and the navy, were at the same time the commanders of the Indies army and naval forces, and were appointed by the Netherlands Crown and cabinet. Each of the cabinet members was the director of a department. These departments were—in addition to War and Navy—Justice, Finance, Interior, Education and Religion, Economic Affairs, and Public Works.

The central government at Batavia had one other branch, potentially the most important of all. This was the Netherlands East Indies parliament, called the Volksraad or "People's Council." It was created in 1916 for the express purpose of meeting the criticism that up until that time the natives were not represented in the central administration. The powers of the Volksraad were rather vaguely defined even after twenty-five years of functioning. It started off as a purely advisory council, to be consulted by the governor-general whenever a shift in policy was contemplated. Since 1927, however, when its powers were extended, it functioned almost as a true legislative assembly. At the beginning it could not initiate legislation, but merely called upon officials for explanation and defense of their policies and activities. Later, however, members could introduce bills on their own initiative, and the Volksraad could amend bills presented to it by the governor-general. The fact that the latter had the power to initiate legislation shows that the Volksraad had not yet become the sole legislative organ; but the trend toward this was unmistakable, since the governor-general was required to present every bill he advocated to the Volksraad for a vote. If the Volksraad and the governor-general could not reach agreement on a budget bill, the Netherlands parliament decided the issue; if they were unable to agree on an ordinance not having to do with taxes or finances, the issue was resolved by a royal decree. If the governor-general felt that a matter was urgent, he might issue an executive order that had the

power of law immediately; but the Volksraad at its next meeting could question his action; and, if the members did not favor it, the Crown was called upon to arbitrate the disagreement.

The Volksraad was almost, but not quite, the true legislative body of the Indies. Very few cases of persistent disagreement arose between it and the governor-general, which apparently means that the latter was careful to sound out Volksraad sentiment before proposing legislation, and also seldom opposed legislation passed by the Volksraad.

The partially democratic nature of this interesting near-parliamentary body is further demonstrated by the way in which its members were chosen. There were sixty-one delegates, the number having grown from only thirty-nine at the time of the first meeting in 1918. A chairman was appointed by the Crown and cabinet of the Netherlands. The remaining sixty members were partly elected and partly appointed by the governor-general in the following manner: of the thirty Indonesian delegates, twenty were elected and ten appointed; of the twenty-five European members, fifteen were elected and ten appointed; and of the five "alien Asiatic"—usually Chinese and Arab—deputies, three were elected and two appointed. Thus, the elected members totaled thirty-eight; the appointed ones, twenty-two. The term of office was four years.

In order to get as much sectional representation as possible among the native members, the islands were divided into twelve electoral areas. If this had not been done, the Javanese, numbering over two-thirds of the total Indies population, would have held nearly all the native seats in the Volksraad. The method of election was indirect, for only members of the various local councils—provincial, regency, and municipal—voted for delegates. These local council members in turn were partly chosen by the people

themselves, in most places voting by village units. The whole process was amazingly complex and cumbersome. One is tempted to pass the judgment that the Dutch moved so slowly and deviously in the whole matter of native representation that they had tangled up the natives—and themselves—in a needless mess of red tape. The Volksraad met twice a year, one session lasting three months, the other one month. In the interim between meetings, a "College of Delegates," consisting of fifteen deputies chosen by the Volksraad from among its own members, carried on routine business, but could not pass on important matters, leaving these for decision at the next full meeting of the assembly.

Contours of Administration

This sums up the structure of the central government of the Indies in Batavia. Moving out beyond the capital to the government of the various regions of Indonesia, one runs up against a system which in its complexity and heterogeneity might well make an expert in colonial administration give up in despair. The Dutch gave as the reason for this that conditions varied so widely in different sections of the islands that it would have been impossible to operate a uniform scheme over the entire archipelago. There were three main kinds of administration in the Indies outside the central government. The Civil Service, consisting of Dutch and native officials, might be regarded as the representatives of the central government in the various districts. The native rulers, mostly hereditary, were retained from the feudalistic system traditional in the Indies before the Europeans arrived. And, thirdly, there were the councils of different kinds of districts—provinces, regencies, municipalities, and recently so-called "communities."

Experts and Their Education

The Civil Service consisted of several grades of officials. The highest were the governors, of whom there were eight, ruling over the eight main divisions of the Indies. Five of these were in west, central, and east Java, and the two native states of Surakarta and Djokjakarta. The other three were Sumatra, Borneo, and the Great East (in Dutch, *de Groote Oost*), the latter including all the islands to the east of Java and Borneo, with its capital at Macassar in Celebes. Each of these provinces, or "governments," was split up into residencies, with an official called the resident in charge, and these were subdivided into assistant residencies. The smaller districts were in charge of officials called "controleurs," similar in function to the "district officers" of British possessions.

Most of the civil officers thus far down the list were Dutchmen, although a minority were half-castes who had gone to school in Holland. Candidates for all posts from controleur upward were selected by a committee from graduates of high schools in the Netherlands. Successful applicants were sent to either of two universities, Leiden or Utrecht, where they were partially supported by government scholarships. The course took five years, and was very comprehensive. By the time the young "aspirant controleurs" were ready to leave for the Indies, they had acquired a thorough knowledge of Indonesian history and law, the ethnology of the native peoples, and the languages of the archipelago. When they stepped off the ship in Batavia, even though they might never have been in the Indies before, they could converse fluently in Malay, and in general knew their way around. There is no doubt that the Dutch civil officers in the East Indies were the best colonial administrators in the world, and the reason lay

in the rigid standards of selection of candidates and in the admirable course of training at Leiden and Utrecht universities.

I remember sitting in a government resthouse in north Sumatra with a group of old-timers who, like myself, had all been in the islands for some years. A car drove up to the gate and a young white man got out and came into the resthouse. He spoke fluent and perfect Malay to the chauffeur and the boy in charge of the house, and knew just the proper way to act toward the natives. We put him down as an experienced hand in Indonesia, until he appeared at dinner dressed in his uniform of "aspirant controleur," and told us that he was fresh off the boat, never having been in the islands before.

The Netherlands East Indies Civil Service was thus actually composed, in its higher brackets at least, of expert scholars. The ethnological and sociological literature on the archipelago consists in large part of the writings of these officials, who from the start of their service had a deep and extensive knowledge of native laws and customs, and of the languages and history of the islands. Unfortunately, this great store of information is published almost entirely in Dutch, a language understood by very few scholars of other nationalities.

The Dutch civil officers received salaries graduated according to their rank, and were granted periodic furloughs in Europe. This made the cost of administration very high, and one way out would seem to have been to open the ranks to promising natives, who could have been trained in the Indies, would have demanded much lower salaries, and would not have needed to be sent off on long vacations halfway around the world, a necessity for white men if they are to retain their health in the tropics. The Batavia Law College, established in 1924, could have been, and may yet be, used to train an increasing number of native candidates for the higher positions in the government service.

By 1941 the lower grades of the Indonesian government included hundreds of native officials. Indeed, the entire civil service staff had about 180,000 native as against approximately 30,000 European employees. These figures included a vast number of post office clerks, messengers, and other minor workers. The European total may seem high, but most of these were half-castes who occupied inferior posts. There was some "Indos," as they are called, in the higher branches, and a great number in positions just below that of controleur. The latter were called *gezaghebbers*, which means "commandant," in charge of small districts. But the native civil officers, continually increasing, filled most of the posts beneath the rank of controleur. There were eight secondary schools which specialized in training Indonesians for these lower jobs.

Method and Meaning of Indirect Rule

The second type of regional administration was that of the native rulers, mostly hereditary in the higher ranks. The system of retaining the traditional governmental organization to the greatest possible degree had been characteristic of the Dutch in the Indies ever since the early days of the old East India Company. This method of colonial administration is called "indirect rule," and in the case of the Indies it was a precise term, since every one of the more prominent native potentates had at his side a Dutch civil officer, who "advised" him—in other words, actually "ruled through" him. About 7 per cent of the area of Java was under four native sultans, while fully 60 per cent of the dominions outside Java were still technically controlled by local rulers, mostly hereditary. These native states outside Java totaled 266, and ranged

other officials, again varying with traditions, but usually including a secretary, a messenger, a bailiff, and a priest. Typically, also, there was a village assembly, to which all adult males in good standing were eligible, and a council of elders, a kind of senate drawn from the assembly. These village communities were the real centers of Indonesian native government. Only a very small proportion of the common folk ever had anything to do with either the higher native officials or the Dutch administrators. The village governments ran in traditional grooves sanctified by usage extending back beyond memory. They have not changed much in all the stormy history of the archipelago. The various conquerors of the Indies have been satisfied to leave them alone, going on generation after generation in accordance with ancient traditions and laws.

One of the avowed purposes of the Dutch government in retaining native rulers and administrative organization was to preserve a potential framework for general native government in the future. It was felt that, when the time came to turn over most of the administration to the people, the best course would be to let the new grow out of the old, rather than sweep all tradition away and start afresh on some imported plan. Moreover, although hereditary monarchy, which the Dutch preserved in the native states, might be uncongenial to Americans, it was not so to the people of the Netherlands, whose home government was a monarchy. The British, likewise, having a hereditary kingship themselves, see much less objection to potentates than Americans would. The pomp and splendor, and even the economic waste, of royalty fit the customary conceptions of both British and Dutch. Since the Dutch have a queen themselves, the native sultans and radjas did not appear strange or obnoxious to them, as they might to a people reared in the republican form of government.

Decentralization for Future Democracy

The third type of regional administration in the East Indies was a new departure, although the groundwork for it had been laid as far back as 1903, with the first so-called "decentralization" law. The idea was to develop in every section of the Indies a complete local government to handle internal affairs. Each of the major administrative divisions—provinces, regencies, and municipalities—was to have not only its executive civil service staff and its native rulers, but also a council, partly appointed and partly elected. Tribal divisions were to be given a controlling voice in their own affairs by setting up tribal or, as they were called, "community" councils. The system would eventually have worked out into a scheme similar to the American federal type of government, with its state legislatures and city councils.

In 1941 the new decentralized plan was already in partial operation. Each major province or "government"—with the exception of the central Javanese native states—had its provincial council. These high regional councils numbered three in Java and three in the outer islands—namely, those of Sumatra, Borneo, and the Great East. The next lower councils were those of the regencies of Java, seventy in number. In the outer possessions, this type of council had just begun to be organized. Here they were to have been called "community councils," each one corresponding to a major tribal or cultural division. Two were already in existence, that of the Minangkabau people in Sumatra, with its capital at Padang on the west coast, and that of the Bandjar people—a mixed Malay, Javanese, and Buginese coastal group of southern Borneo—with its capital at Bandjarmasin on the southeastern coast of Borneo. The outbreak of war in 1941 interrupted the establishment of two more "community councils" for which plans

were complete, in the Minahasa territory of northeastern Celebes and the Ambonese island area of the central Moluccas. These were to have had their capitals at Menado and Amboina, respectively. Finally, the program of decentralization called for the setting up of municipal councils in the large centers of population. In 1941 fifteen of these city assemblies had already been established, eight in Java and seven in the other islands; and plans were in readiness to inaugurate five more in the outer provinces.

This whole plan is another evidence of the Dutch intention to extend the system of true native government throughout the Indies. The councils were only partly elective, like the *Volksraad*; in most of them about half of the members were appointed by the executive of the region. Moreover, again like the *Volksraad*, the membership was planned to represent each of the racial and nationality groups in the district, but in nearly every instance the European representation far exceeded the proportion of resident whites. The voting system varied considerably in the different regions and for the several kinds of councils. In general, only taxpayers were allowed to vote. The franchise extended to only a minute proportion of the natives, but as the plan developed and as educational standards rose, more and more of the Indonesians were to have been brought into the voting group. Legislation passed by the various councils was subject to veto by the Dutch governor or other official in charge of the district; but in cases of disagreement an appeal from the veto could be carried to the governor-general, who made the final decision. All tax bills, with the exception of very minor ones—e.g., those relating to taxes on dogs, fireworks, and amusements—had to be approved by the governor-general. The same applied to legislation involving penal provisions.

The entire picture of Dutch rule in the Indies was thus one of cautious and very gradual liberalization of the governmental sys-

tem, slowly but surely tending toward the goal of native self-government under European supervision. It is doubtful that the Dutch colonial administrators and the Netherlands government envisioned carrying this policy to the point of dominion status for the islands on the British Empire model. The plans so far made would seem to have aimed at carrying the liberalization program to a point considerably short of dominion government; and this conservatism was, in my opinion, justified, for the present at least. Any further designs for extension of political autonomy would have had to await a rise in the educational qualifications of the natives.

The High Tide of Nationalism

Nevertheless, the Dutch were intermittently plagued by nationalistic agitation on the part of the educated natives. This gave rise to a succession of nativist political parties, whose leadership was predominantly Javanese. The first of these was founded in 1908. It was called Budi Utomo, Javanese for "high endeavor," and began as a partly intellectual and partly "economic uplift" movement, aiming at preservation of ancient Javanese culture and at improvement of the economic status of the people. In later years it entered the political sphere, and was partly responsible for the founding of the Volksraad. Another party, Sarikat Islam, was established soon after Budi Utomo. It was a frankly political organization, emphasized the bond of Mohammedanism, and had as its ultimate goal Indonesian independence. A companion movement, Mohammidiah, started off with a purely educational and social improvement program; but it also soon became a political party.

Shortly after the founding of the Volksraad in 1916, the Dutch began to be alarmed at the growing radicalism of the Indonesian

nationalists. There is no doubt that during the 1920's some of the Indonesian leaders looked to Moscow for ideological guidance, and identified the cause of Indies independence with the broad program of proletarian world revolution then being preached by the Soviet government. But there is little evidence of a direct connection, although some of the Indonesian agitators did make trips to the Russian capital. The record of the revolutionary activities of the nationalists during the 1920's is very confused, and it is difficult to discover to what extent the movement was Communist-inspired. Undoubtedly this aspect was exaggerated by the prevalent habit, which persists in the United States even today, of tagging every radical movement with the communist label.

However this may be, at certain times Indonesian nationalistic agitation culminated in really dangerous revolts, particularly in 1926 and 1927, when a series of armed outbreaks occurred in Java and Sumatra. During one of these disturbances the revolutionists captured the central post and telegraph offices in Batavia, and the army had to be called out to aid the police in quelling riots. Rumors kept the European population in a state of tense anxiety, especially the report that there was a general plot to wipe out the entire white population by having the native servants in each household poison the food at dinner on a certain evening. Another outbreak in the western part of Java required a small-scale military campaign against the rebels. This section was fairly isolated, and few Europeans lived there. The scanty news reports played down the seriousness of the revolt, mentioning only a few casualties. In 1930 I was told by an Englishman who had witnessed the occurrence that hundreds of natives were killed during the height of the disturbances. Another district where nationalist sentiment attained revolutionary proportions was the Minangkabau country of western Sumatra. Here again the full gravity of the

revolt was not publicized, but marks of violent battle could still be seen in the charred remains of villages all through a large section of the territory in 1931, four years later.

These were the most serious troubles of the 1920's. After 1930 nationalist agitation subsided, especially following the Japanese attack on Manchuria in 1931. There had been some Japanese anti-Dutch activity in the Indies during the previous decade, and a few of the revolutionary leaders had taken over the Pan-Asiatic ideas then growing in Japan. This propaganda was never very successful, however; and after the Indonesian nationalists had watched Japanese behavior in China for a while they rapidly changed their attitudes toward the Dutch. They, like the proponents of Philippine independence, quickly came to see that they had more to hope for from the white man's government than from Japanese domination, and that the withdrawal of Dutch control would lay them open to the same sort of ruthless conquest and tyranny as the Japanese were imposing on their fellow Asiatics, the Chinese. In 1938 I became acquainted with a Javanese prince who was studying at Leiden in Holland. He had been an ardent nationalist a few years before. One evening we were discussing the Indies with some Dutch students, and the question of nationalism came up. One of the Dutchmen turned to the Javanese and said: "You used to be a nationalist, didn't you?" The prince smiled and answered: "No more. Most of us have changed our ideas on that subject since 1931. We haven't given up our campaign for more self-government, but independence just doesn't appeal any more."

One final outbreak of revolutionary activity occurred in 1933, when the crew of the cruiser *De Zeven Provinciën* mutinied off the coast of Sumatra. The true circumstances of this mutiny have never been revealed—only vague statements of "communistic" agitation and disloyalty on the part of Dutch and half-caste petty

officers. The changed sentiment of the Indonesians appeared in the almost unanimous condemnation of the mutineers by the native press and by the formerly nationalist leaders in the Volksraad.

The Dutch shrewdly avoided making potential martyrs of convicted revolutionists. Instead of executing them, as the law certainly would have allowed, they exiled them to a kind of prison colony far up the Digul River in the wild interior of New Guinea. There, in the little town of Boven Digul, radicals from all over the Indies lived a tranquil existence, with their own families, houses, and gardens, far removed from the world they found so wicked and corrupt. They did not even have to be guarded, as escape would have meant almost certain death in the wilderness or at the hands of the savage Papuans, who, as many leaders of exploration parties in the interior of New Guinea can testify, promptly try to kill all intruders in their territory.

Retreat from Independence

Recent years witnessed a trend toward unification of the native political parties and toward a moderate program of reform. In 1928 an organization of Indonesian students in Holland and the Indies was formed for the purpose of uniting the several independent groups in one native party; and out of this emerged the National Party of Indonesia. After a brief career this broke up, and during the early 1930's a heterogeneous assemblage of parties competed for political dominance in the Indies government. Finally, in 1938, the full circle was completed in the formation of a single combined party called Gapi, or the "Indonesian Unity Movement." It advocated an anti-Japanese, pro-Dutch policy, at the same time continuing pressure for a greater native share in the government of the Indies and a progressive economic

and educational program. Its ultimate goal was dominion status for Indonesia.

Sutomo, a great Javanese political leader, recently issued a deathbed message to the people of the Indies which epitomized the sentiment of the majority of native intellectuals in 1941: "Beware of the Japanese! Fight for a better existence, for your rights, and for a higher standard of living. But do this within the framework of the Dutch Empire."

Aside from international political and military complications, the nationalist movement in Indonesia was premature on two main grounds: first, the extremely low economic and educational status of the great majority of the natives; and, second, the lack of any feeling of cultural or political unity on the part of the Indonesians. Probably not more than 200,000 natives in the entire Indies were sufficiently educated to have any conception of what state government means. Independence would have introduced merely an oligarchic domination by the small minority of educated leaders. In short, since there was no middle class at all in native society, not even a pretence of democratic government could have been maintained.

The other obstacle to nationalism was inherent in the heterogeneity of the Indies population. The natives ranged on the scale of civilization all the way from the most primitive stage found anywhere in the world to the fairly high culture of such groups as the Malays and Javanese. Even on the uppermost levels there was little feeling of common relationship across tribal and national lines. There was no sentiment of Indonesian nationality. The Javanese had a rudimentary sense of unity among themselves, and so did the Sumatran Malays; but between the two groups there was hardly a trace of a common bond. Even within Java itself, the Sundanese of the western districts consid-

ered themselves quite separate from the true Javanese of the center and east. The Indonesian population was split up by a great number of these divisions, with a wide variety of mutually unintelligible languages and an extensive range of cultural differences. Interestingly enough, the Dutch policy of preserving and encouraging local peculiarities of custom had, consciously or not, functioned to maintain the disunity of the various peoples. In this instance we see a conspicuously successful, even though unintentional, application of the divide and rule policy.

Dutch Regard for the Adat

This sympathetic attitude toward native ways, which most modern authorities on colonization would call enlightened, appeared strikingly in the Dutch treatment of traditional Indonesian law, or *adat*. A consistent attempt was made to preserve as much of the old legal system as possible in each district. Where the native law ran counter to European concepts, the two schemes were adjusted to each other, and only the absolutely intolerable rules—from the European viewpoint—were abolished. Thus, all of the strange traditional intricacies of social organization, property regulations, and marriage customs were incorporated into the written *adat* law of each of the tribal territories, and only such completely savage ways as head-hunting, blood vengeance, trial by ordeal, and death punishment for minor offenses were extirpated. The whole effort was to adapt Western law to native law, not to replace the latter with imported legal rules.

I believe I am perfectly safe in stating unreservedly that the Dutch were the foremost scholars of primitive law in the world. The University of Leiden stood pre-eminent in this field, and Utrecht was only a little behind it. Every candidate for higher civil service positions in the Indies had to go through the *adat*

law course at one of these institutions. The training was so thorough that a controleur or resident could easily preside over the native courts in his district and administer justice in a way that did not clash with local concepts. To make sure, at every court session the Dutch administrator was flanked by a native legal expert, and, in Mohammedan areas, by an adviser in the canon law of Islam.

It is no easy task to master the *adat* law of Indonesia, for it varies widely from district to district and from tribe to tribe. The Dutch mapped out broad areas of the archipelago within which the native legal systems are of the same general type, but these *adat* regions, because of numerous minor local variations, had to be further divided in order that the code might be properly applied. Much of the native law is unwritten and passed down orally from generation to generation. The Dutch scholars painstakingly recorded the customary law of every section of Indonesia, writing it down as it was recited to them by the elders of each tribe and district. The literature on this subject runs to hundreds of weighty volumes and thousands of periodical articles—all written in Dutch. In my research I have often been struck with a feeling of scholarly awe on contemplating the enormous mass of absolutely first-class work the Netherlands have done in the sphere of Indonesian native law. In each region they have paid scrupulous attention to all aspects. This involved, in Islamic areas, study not only of the purely native rules, but also of the recondite points of Mohammedanism. In such a place as Bali, moreover, the Hindu canons, as well as the Balinese customary law, had to be taken into consideration.

The work of legal research went on continuously, for as the several parts of the archipelago became more westernized, the native legal concepts themselves changed, in varying ways in different regions. Finally, in addition to all the local variations in

native law, the Dutch had to set up suitable codes for the Europeans and the "alien Asiatics"—Chinese, Hindus, and Arabs—in the Indies. In characteristically thorough fashion, they developed a separate legal system for each of these alien groups. The Bureau of Native Affairs included a division for research in Mohammedan religion and law, and a Bureau of Chinese Affairs carried on continuous investigation into the laws and traditions of this important group in the Indies. Even with all these elaborate devices, the troubles of legal administration were not over, for sometimes the formidable problem arose of deciding cases involving both Europeans and natives, or natives and "alien Asiatics," or Asiatics and Europeans. One other big difficulty was that appeal cases converged on the higher courts, which operated on the European plan of procedure. Taking all these complications into consideration, it is no wonder that the course of training for the Indies civil service took five years of hard study, and that the publications on Indonesian law would fill a fair-sized library.

The Balance-Sheet Mind

The government of the Indies had been financially sound for a hundred years. Within recent times budget deficits were avoided or kept to a minimum by carefully adjusting expenses to income, for the Dutch have balance-sheet minds, and can hardly stand the sight of red ink. During the dark years of the depression, between 1932 and 1936, however, they were unable to balance the budget, even though they ruthlessly slashed government expenditures, cutting the educational funds, for instance, by 50 per cent. In 1937 and 1938 there was a slight surplus, but in 1939 the deficit totaled \$12,000,000, mostly because of armament expenses. The

latest budget figures, for 1941, showed a deficit of over \$60,000,000. The balance sheet had been forgotten.

Over half the total income of the Indies government was received from Europeans or from European companies by taxation. Since 1935 the annual income averaged about \$200,000,000. This represented a drop of approximately \$50,000,000 from the average for the boom years of the 1920's, but a rise of the same amount since the depth of the depression in 1932-1935. During the worst period the Netherlands government felt it necessary to make an outright gift of \$12,000,000 to the Indies budget, in order to avoid further curtailment of public services.

Examining the budget figures for the years 1937-1939, we find that considerably more than 50 per cent of the annual average income was derived from taxes, while one-fourth was earned by government industries and monopolies. The former—including quinine, rubber, timber, gold, tin, and coal production, and such state services as railroads, post and telegraph, and public utilities—accounted for most of this kind of revenue. The latter—comprising the monopoly sales of opium and salt, and the profits from the exclusive government pawnshop system—added the rest.

The opium monopoly operated shops for the sale of the narcotic, but only in places where the natives had acquired the habit. The Chinese were the original importers of this vice into the Indies. Opium was rigidly excluded from areas where its use had not yet become prevalent. Although the profits from this doubtful business were considerable, the government's main purpose in establishing the monopoly was to control the drug and gradually abolish its consumption. All addicts were registered and given only a certain ration per month. The pawnshop system also had a protective purpose—that is, to enable the natives,

who are chronic borrowers, to avoid the phenomenally usurious rates charged by Chinese and Arab moneylenders. The Dutch recognized the fact that the Indonesians from ancient times have had the custom of pawning. In many tribes men will pawn themselves and their families to work as temporary slaves for the sake of getting immediate advances of goods for such things as funeral feasts, sacrificial rituals, and the payment of gambling debts. The modern government pawnshops, therefore, fitted well into the pattern of traditional custom.

The expenditures of the government, as noted above, in normal times just about equaled income, and all of the money was spent within the Indies. That is, the budget of the Indies government was separate from that of the Netherlands. The great bulk of expenditure went regularly into administrative salaries, although recently military outlays surpassed this item. Public works, principally roads and irrigation systems, public-health services, and education were the principal other types of expenditure. Education received a surprisingly small share of the total funds: about 10 per cent in normal times, but during the recent depression only 5 per cent. This compared very unfavorably with the Philippines, where 25 per cent of the budget was allocated to the school system.

Defense Deficiency and Defeat

Unfortunately, military expenses were also cut drastically during the lean years of 1932-1935; but starting in 1936 the Dutch turned with a will to building up the Indies defenses. The 1937 budget included a military item of \$25,000,000; and by 1940 this figure had increased to \$60,000,000. In 1939 an extensive naval construction program, calling for \$150,000,000 in five years, was inaugurated, but the Japanese war interrupted it. The strength of the Indies army in 1941 was around 50,000 trained officers and

men, and about the same number of reserves. Between 10 and 15 per cent were Europeans, including most of the subordinate officers and nearly all of the higher ones. Javanese, Minahasa (from northern Celebes), and Ambonese (from the Moluccas) formed the bulk of the native troops. The latter two groups especially traditionally supplied a large proportion of the standing army of the Indies. Both tribes had long been Christianized, and were extremely loyal to the Dutch.

The principal reason for the lack of trained soldiers, aside from the expense of a large standing army, was the reluctance of the Netherlands to call upon natives for military service. Whether this policy was owing to the fear of giving the Indonesians access to arms or to a disinclination to force training upon them, I cannot say. Probably both motives were present; but the latter, combined with the factor of heavy costs, would seem to have been the stronger. Most Dutchmen in the Indies between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, however, were subject to armed service, being organized in a militia, with annual training periods. I can remember seeing my Dutch friends toiling along the roads of Java, laden with guns and knapsacks, and soaked from head to foot with perspiration. They were going through their annual "refresher" course; but, considering their complete lack of training during the rest of the year, it was a marvel to me that they did not collapse immediately in the steaming atmosphere. I used to reflect then upon the blessings of American citizenship.

Another obvious weakness was the inadequacy of equipment. There were few tanks, antitank guns, and new types of field artillery. The fleet also was hardly formidable, even though most of Holland's ships were stationed in the archipelago. These consisted, in 1941, of 5 cruisers, 7 destroyers, 8 torpedo boats, 5 minelayers, 13 minesweepers, 22 submarines, and 40 auxiliary vessels. Excellent sailors though the Dutch are, and with all their intimate

knowledge of the narrow seas of the Indies, such a force could hardly have been expected to withstand the attack of a really heavy navy.

Estimates of the air fleet of the Indies at the start of hostilities in 1941 range from 400 to 1,000, half bombers and half fighters and miscellaneous craft. The Dutch have demonstrated throughout their history a very high degree of naval ability, and they took to the airplane with equal skill. Their commercial air record was unsurpassed by any other nation, and Dutch pilots impressed the world with their remarkable exploits during the early weeks of the war in 1941 and 1942. Here again, however, the decisive element was not men or spirit or skill, but equipment. Whatever was lost could be replaced only by importation over long and dangerous sea routes, for the Indies had almost no heavy industries to produce the machinery of modern warfare.

There were two naval bases in the archipelago, a big one at Surabaya and a smaller one at Amboina. Sumatra had three air bases: in the north (Medan), center (Padang), and south (Palembang). Java had four, also spread out along the length of the island; Borneo had five, two in the British area and three in the Dutch section; and Celebes had four, one in the northern part, at Manado, and three in the southern peninsulas. There were three in the Lesser Sundas—in Bali, Sumbawa, and Timor; and three in the Moluccas—in Ternate, Buru, and Ambon. Obviously, the supply of planes had to be pretty thinly spread over these twenty-two bases. Shrewdly, the Dutch had also developed a whole system of secret airfields hidden in jungle country; and these concealed bases offered considerable opposition to the Japanese advance. The great bulk of the Indonesian army was concentrated in Java, while the Ambon islands and Sumatra were also fairly strongly garrisoned. This left little over for the defense of Borneo, Celebes, and the other islands.

One might wonder why an area with such difficult terrain should not have been easy to defend. It would have been if the purpose of the attackers had been to campaign overland in such islands as Borneo and Celebes. It took the Dutch thirty years to defeat the Atjehnese in Sumatra, and the conquest of other recalcitrant native districts involved long and expensive operations. But the goal of these past campaigns was control over all of the islands, including the interior regions. The Japanese aim was to capture the key areas of production, trade, and military concentration, mainly situated along the coasts, leaving the interiors of all islands except Java and parts of Sumatra untouched. In this way they could drive the Dutch out of their strongholds and shut off access by sea. Guerrilla warfare in the interior districts might go on for years, or for as long as munitions held out; but the escaped bands of the Indies army could do little serious damage, especially because, since Indonesia is an insular area, the fragments could never join forces. The back country of most of the Indies has been so little touched by the war that undoubtedly there are many native tribes in the central parts of Borneo and Celebes who will not hear of the Japanese conflict until years after it has ended. The purpose was conquest of the Dutch, not the natives.

Stingy Education

Even in relatively advanced areas like Java and most of Sumatra, very few natives understand the issues of such a war. Their villages, or at most their local districts, are to them the entire world. And the Dutch have done little to open their minds to broader perspectives. As noted above, only 5 to 10 per cent of government expenditures have gone for education, as against 25 per cent in the Philippines. The Dutch policy was one of extreme gradualism. The underlying philosophy seems to have been

that rapid education among the natives would have produced discontent. It was not an exact application of the theory that "where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise," but rather "'tis folly to make ignorant people wise too fast."

Both British and Dutch were fond of poking fun at Americans for the elaborate and expensive educational system sponsored in the Philippines during the short forty years since the expulsion of the Spanish. They pointed to the thousands of Filipino lawyers, dentists, and doctors competing desperately for clients and patients in Manila, and to the tens of thousands of Filipino college graduates who had lost interest in going back to the rice fields of their parents and wanted white-collar jobs. "You have over-educated the Filipinos," they used to say to me, "and have given them too high-flown ideas for their own good." Maybe so—but we also gave them ideas about democracy and what it means for all men, white and brown alike. The vast masses of natives in the Netherlands Indies had no conception of such things.

The system of education in the Indies in 1941 was organized on a dual basis, depending upon whether the Dutch or native language was used in teaching. Standard Malay was the language in most of the latter type of schools; but where knowledge of Malay had never penetrated, the local vernacular was the medium of instruction, and Malay was taught as a subject. The great bulk of the native pupils, about 1,700,000 out of 2,000,000, never got beyond the lowest unit, the so-called *desa*, or village school, whose course covered three grades. Here, as throughout the archipelago, education was not free. While the government supplied the teachers and paid their salaries, each community had to provide the school building and defray upkeep. Above the village schools there were native continuation schools, running up to the sixth grade. These were in the larger villages only, which meant that children in isolated small places could not attend. The govern-

ment maintained the continuation schools, but every pupil had to pay a fee, although in cases of dire poverty this might be waived. The same financial arrangement prevailed in the so-called "standard schools," which covered the first six grades, but were located only in larger towns. They were the equivalent of urban primary schools for natives.

Above the primary level, Indonesian students had two choices. They could go on in the native-language system to trade, agricultural, and normal secondary schools, ending their education at graduation from these. Or they could pass over into the white secondary school system by attending the so-called "link schools," where they learned the Dutch language and prepared for the European-type subjects taught in the higher institutions. Those few who rose this far then entered the secondary or high schools on a level with white children.

This sounds as though the Dutch segregated children by race in primary, though not in secondary, schools. This is not, strictly speaking, the case; for Indonesian and Chinese children who spoke Dutch could enter the "Dutch-European" primary schools along with the whites. The criterion of separation was not race but language. In the "Dutch-Native" schools Malay was the teaching language for the first two years, during which the pupils learned to speak Dutch, and the remaining five grades were taught in the latter tongue. In the "Dutch-Chinese" schools, the language of beginning instruction was Dutch; but, since relatively few of the new pupils could speak it at the start, Malay, which nearly all Chinese in the Indies know at least partially, had to be employed at first to ease them into Dutch. All three kinds of "Dutch" primary schools had seven grades.

Indonesian and Chinese, as well as white, graduates of primary schools were offered a choice of several alternatives in addition to the regular secondary or high-school curriculum. These included

technical trade schools, agricultural training institutions, and normal schools; and, for Indonesians, schools for those aspiring to become officials in the civil service.

Verdict on the School System

The entire educational system lacked two features generally found in European and American schools. It was not free, except for the village primary schools, and even here each community had to raise the funds necessary for building, upkeep, and supplies. For all other schools, every pupil had to pay a tuition fee on a sliding scale, depending upon the level of education and the family income. Some scholarships were provided for able but poor students. The second lack in the educational system was compulsion. Attendance at school was entirely voluntary. This goes far to explain the fact that only between 30 and 40 per cent of the native pupils ever completed their course, even in the lowest level of schools.

Another feature of the system is in keeping with the characteristic tendency of the Dutch in the Indies to provide meticulously for every class of population. We have already seen how this attention to local peculiarities and tolerant reluctance to force all the various kinds of people to fit into a uniform plan operated in the spheres of government and law. A wide variety of alternative types of schools were offered, calculated to suit every region and group. Even in the lowest primary schools no attempt was made to force either Malay, the most widespread Indonesian language, or Dutch on the pupils. They were taught in their local languages or dialects by local teachers.

This extreme tolerance appeared also in private and mission schools. In the Indies, as in Holland itself, all such institutions which met certain minimum standards were subsidized by the

government. At last report, about 20 per cent of all pupils in the Indies attended these schools, which included nonsectarian private, Chinese private, Christian mission—both Catholic and Protestant—and Mohammedan parochial institutions. The last, particularly, suffered much from disqualification on the ground of substandard education. Some private schools, for political reasons, refused government aid. Among these the most prominent were the so-called Taman Siswo institutions of Java, which were devoted to revival of native Javanese culture. A large part of the curriculum of these schools was given over to the study of Javanese history and art, especially the dance and drama.

The highest education offered was that of the four colleges of Java: the technical institute at Bandung, the law school at Batavia, and the two medical colleges at Batavia and Surabaya. The Japanese war interrupted plans for uniting these four institutions in a University of the Netherlands East Indies. A striking evidence of the infrequency with which natives have reached such elevated levels of education is seen in the fact that only about 200 natives, at last report, were enrolled in the Batavia Law School. This handful of college students represented the survivors of over a million and a half natives who started in the primary schools.

The Bureau for Popular Literature operated a system of libraries, some housed in school buildings and some carried through the towns and villages in specially equipped trucks. To supply reading material in the native languages, for sale or lending, the Bureau issued a steady stream of publications in book and magazine form. Many were translations of European works, but a goodly number were either printings of traditional folklore and history or original writings of native authors. All were sold at cost.

Aside from the restricted funds for educational expansion, the lack of compulsory schooling, and the required attendance fees,

three other criticisms have been leveled at the Indonesian school system. The first is peculiar and would seem scarcely justified. It is that the use of the Dutch language as the medium of instruction in higher schools for natives striving for "European" education was ill-advised, since only about ten million people in the entire world, nearly all of them living in little Holland, are able to understand or speak it. But most of the Indonesians expected and planned to continue living in Netherlands territory. Moreover, one could hardly expect the Dutch to replace their own tongue with, say, English, as the official school language of their islands.

The other two criticisms are better taken. One is that, if the authorities had pushed teacher-training for natives harder, they could have expanded the educational system much faster, for native instructors would have been far cheaper. A large proportion of the teachers were Dutch, even in some of the lower schools; and they had to be paid "white" salaries, given periodic furloughs to Holland, and granted liberal retirement pensions. "Jobs for Dutchmen" have meant higher taxes and greater government expenditures for services which well-trained natives could have performed adequately.

The final fault found in the educational scheme was that not enough of the curriculum was devoted to native Indonesian culture and history. Rather than trying to teach more or less the standard courses Europeans are taught, and thus making of the Indonesians "brown Europeans" in their educational training, it might have been better to lay main stress on their own country, its past and its culture, thus giving them a consciousness of their Indonesian nationality. It may be that the government feared emphasis on nationality because it might have increased agitation for independence. My own feeling is that the Dutch were already making a good start toward Indonesianizing native educa-

tion; certainly they were publishing a goodly number of textbooks about the islands for use in the native schools. An approach to solution of this problem might have been to increase the number of native instructors, who, being Indonesians themselves, would have had a special incentive to learn and teach about their country.

Dutch Tolerance and Missionary Zeal

One of the most remarkable evidences of Dutch toleration of native culture appears in the sphere of religion. It is indeed surprising that a nation so deeply religious as the Christian Hollanders should have protected the pagan and Mohammedan religions of their subject peoples more than any other colonial power. Nowhere in Europe is Christianity, whether Protestant or Catholic, taken more seriously than in the Netherlands. One would have expected, therefore, that wherever Dutchmen went they would have tried with all their might to convert the natives. But the people of Holland have displayed throughout their three centuries of independence a strong regard for religious liberty. They have shown it at home in their treatment of Jews and other minority groups. Holland has been rightly honored as a sanctuary of religious tolerance, never once violated by persecution of minority faiths, even when all the other European countries were torn by church conflicts. This spirit the Dutch carried over to their Oriental possessions; and, almost alone among colonial powers, they went out of their way to safeguard the traditional beliefs of their native subjects. They never showed any favoritism among the various Indonesian faiths; they took great pains to investigate the religious beliefs of every native group, so as not to offend any unwittingly; and they carefully controlled the well-meaning but sometimes overzealous missionaries.

The only concession the Dutch made to their own religious convictions was to grant subsidies to the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches in the Indies; but these aids were never large, and always the intention was to reduce them gradually as the Christian denominations became self-supporting. To offset this apparent favoritism, the government sternly set its face against unrestricted missionizing. Every mission group operated under a license in which the area of activity was strictly delimited and the procedure minutely prescribed. These licenses were subject to immediate cancellation if the missionaries overstepped the bounds of their privileges, or even if the government found that the natives were opposed to their presence. Some districts were virtually closed to missionaries, notably the strongly Mohammedan areas of Atjeh in Sumatra and Bantam in west Java, and the Hinduist island of Bali. Even where missionaries had been active for centuries, however, their efforts to convert the natives were largely unsuccessful. Undoubtedly the attitude of the government was partly responsible for this, but the religious situation in Indonesia would have been unfavorable to Christianity in any case.

The Unconvertible Mohammedans

It is common knowledge that Mohammedans are extremely hard to convert. In this respect they are similar to the Jews, who maintain their faith stubbornly in the face of discrimination and persecution, and despite centuries of dispersion over the face of the earth. One great reason for the success of Islam is its adaptability to differing local conditions. There is no "central office" of dogma in Mohammedanism, no rigid set of rules that must be applied universally. Aside from the Koran and a few general prescriptions as to conduct, every Moslem group can fit the general scheme of belief to its own circumstances. In the case of the

Koran itself, a wide variation of interpretation is possible. But each of the Christian churches operating in the mission field has a home office back in Europe or America, and every missionary must follow the precepts of his controlling body or run the risk of losing his job. This absentee control is most marked in the case of the Catholic church, but it characterizes the other Christian sects as well, particularly in the field of missionary enterprise. A Mohammedanized tribe may retain many of its old pagan deities and beliefs, fitting them into the general plan of Islam, and no central office will protest against such heresy. But if a Christian missionary finds such compromise conversion occurring in his native flock, he must insist on nothing less than complete acceptance of his particular dogma, as interpreted by the controlling body of his church.

Whatever the reason, Christianity has never succeeded in "breaking" Mohammedanism in the Islamized areas of the Indies. Converts from the religion of Allah are rarities in the islands. Since 90 per cent of all the Indonesians are Mohammedans, and have been since before the advent of Christianity in the archipelago, the poor showing of the missionaries would be explainable even though the government had strongly encouraged them. Whether they will admit it or not, the Christian clergy in Indonesia have shown by their concentration of effort in certain areas that they realize the truth of the statement: "Once a Mohammedan, always a Mohammedan." They have operated mainly in regions not yet Islamized, and there they have secured most of their converts.

The three places where best results have been obtained are the Batak country of central Sumatra, the Toradja highlands of interior Celebes, Minahasa in northeastern Celebes, and Ambon in the Moluccas—all territories which were still pagan when the missionaries began their labors. Of approximately 2,000,000 native

Christians in the Indies (only 3 per cent of the total population), 500,000 were in Sumatra and an equal number in Celebes. By contrast, in Mohammedan Java, after three centuries of steady work and the expenditure of vast sums of money, the Christian churches mustered only about 190,000 members (of a total population of over 40,000,000), and certainly more than half of these were Europeans or Chinese. Five per cent of the Indonesians were still pagan in 1941, and the missionaries were racing with Islam—which spreads automatically, largely by way of inter-marriage between Mohammedan traders and pagan women—to get control of these virgin fields before they were irretrievably lost to the religion of Allah. It would thus appear that the best the Christian churches could have hoped for, even if they won most of the yet unexploited districts, was conversion of less than 10 per cent of the native population of the Indies.

The Battle for the Souls of Bali

The desperation of the missionaries was strikingly demonstrated by a recent violent controversy over the fate of the last Hinduist stronghold in Indonesia, the island of Bali. Here live about 1,200,000 natives—2 per cent of the total population of the archipelago—most of them serenely unaware that great verbal battles have been fought over their souls in the last decade. The missionary societies launched a determined campaign, starting in the 1920's, against the government's exclusion of them from this island. They argued that Bali, open to traders, artists, and increasing throngs of tourists, was becoming westernized anyway, and not by the best elements of European and native society. Why not allow the spiritual gifts of the white world to enter also? Why let opium-smoking Chinese, Mohammedan Malays and Javanese, amoral

escapist artists, and prostitute-hunting tourists into "the last Paradise," and at the same time keep Christ's messengers out? Opposition to the missionary campaign came mainly from Balinese native leaders, supported by the majority of the colonial officials. Their argument, more subtle but probably more telling to those who know the Balinese people, was that, whereas traders and tourists might indeed cause some marginal dislocation of Balinese culture, they did not attack the very core of the entire Balinese way of life, the religion. Admitting that the missionaries might have had better intentions than alien laymen, actually their activities would have caused more widespread disturbance; for Balinese culture, more than almost any other on earth, is vitally linked with the island's religion. To attack this, as missionaries surely must, would have been to cause complete disorganization.

The battle over Balinese missions was much more bitterly waged by the missionary societies than would seem justified by the number of souls involved—were it not for the fact that the Christian clergy had had very lean pickings in the Indies and were hungry for converts. The issue was still undecided when the Japanese invasion cut short the debate. In addition to revealing the state of mind of the missionaries, this controversy also showed again the protective attitude of the government toward native religions. In line with this, an important branch of the administration was the Bureau of Native Affairs, a division manned by experts in Indonesian culture whose function was to carry on research in all branches of native life so as to advise the government in its dealings with the heterogeneous population of the islands. It had subdivisions specializing in Mohammedan, Chinese, Hinduist, and pagan religions. With such an organization constantly functioning inside the administrative system, there was assurance that in every controversial question the natives' side

received proper consideration. And, as already stated, the Dutch civil officers themselves had all gone through an exhaustive preparation in native law and custom during their student years.

Strangely enough, the Dutch missionaries in the Indies absorbed a good share of this interest in native ways and contributed many of the best ethnological reports on the peoples of the area. Indeed, one of the very top-ranking authorities on Indonesia—and by far the foremost student of the native tribes of Celebes—is A. C. Kruijt, a missionary for fifty years in the islands. In reading the scholarly publications of the Dutch missionaries, one gets the peculiar impression that many of these men could easily have qualified as high priests of the native religions, so deep was their comprehension of the cults; just as, in the ranks of the Dutch civil officers, plenty of expert candidates for the positions of native chieftains and radjas could have been found. The Dutch in Europe have often been accused of narrow provincialism, but this charge could hardly be laid against them in their colonial possessions.

The Thin White Line

In 1940 there were about 250,000 people classed as Europeans living in the Netherlands East Indies. A sizable proportion of these were persons with varying degrees of native blood, but sufficiently white to be included in the general category of Europeans. Dutch citizens composed the vast majority of the whites, totaling around 220,000. Germans numbered about 7,000; Japanese (for legal reasons classed as Europeans), 7,000; British, 2,500; Swiss, 800; Americans, 650; and Belgians, 625. Fully 200,000, or 80 per cent, of the whites lived in Java; and of the 50,000 in the outer islands, some 30,000 were concentrated in Sumatra. The Europeans have tended to cluster in urban centers, and almost a

half of them in 1940 were found in seven cities. In Java these were: Batavia (40,000), Surabaya (30,000), Bandung (20,000), and Semarang (15,000); in Sumatra: Medan (4,000) and Padang (3,500); and in Celebes: Macassar (3,500).

Although the Europeans composed only a fraction of one per cent of the total Indies population, they represented a much higher proportion of whites than is usual in large tropical colonies. British India had about the same number of Europeans as the Indies, but its total population was six times as great. This relatively large representation of Europeans in Indonesia was a recent development. During East India Company control and throughout most of the nineteenth century, private businesses were not welcomed by the government, which monopolized nearly all of the commercial enterprises. In 1870 there were only 35,000 Europeans in the Indies; but by 1900, after the government had relaxed its restrictions, the total had risen to over 90,000; and the last forty years increased this figure by almost 300 per cent.

The Homes of the Masters

The white population fell into three main categories: the plantation operators and employees; the urban business and professional class; and the government workers, including administrative and military personnel and teachers. The latter two were almost 80 per cent of the total, and lived principally in the larger communities. Consequently, the cities of the Indies had a decidedly Western atmosphere. Big centers like Batavia and Surabaya had wide paved avenues, shaded with majestic trees. The main business sections were lined with high office buildings and stores, while the residential areas of the Europeans presented a luxurious appearance, with each widely spaced dwelling set back on beautifully landscaped grounds.

The houses, like the business buildings, were mostly of gleaming white stucco, with tile roofs. Almost no wood was used because of the menace of termites, ants, and the other swarming vermin. Even the floors were tiled; while refrigerators, cupboards, and stoves rested on kerosene-filled ant-catchers. The dwellings were open and airy, with wide windows and doorways, so that in fair weather they had a pavilionlike appearance. The front porch was generally very large, and here the whole family sat in the late afternoon and evening until the nocturnal insects drove them inside. Every bed had to be covered with a mosquito net. One of the great reliefs one felt in getting out of the Indies was deliverance from the pest of mosquitoes; but it was a little hard to become used to going to sleep without the high-pitched hum of the insects outside the netting. Two recent innovations which did much toward making life more bearable were metal screens and electric fans. With the former, one was not forced to seek shelter from the insects by going to bed; but even without screens it was possible to sit comfortably on a porch provided an electric fan was kept going to blow away the mosquitoes. Very seldom, except on stormy nights, was there any breeze to perform this welcome service. Remarkably enough, the Indonesians seemed to be very little annoyed by mosquitoes, despite the fact that few of them slept under nets. Certainly they were bitten, for plenty of them got malaria; but apparently they were either bitten less than whites or were so used to the sensation that it did not bother them.

Every house had its lizards. Out in the rear, where the bathrooms, kitchen, and servants' quarters were located, one encountered the large *gekḡkos*, which grow about a foot long. Their name is derived from the noise they make. They are harmless unless accidentally grasped or stepped upon, when they are likely to bite, though not dangerously. Far worse were the scorpions,

which seem to have a special fondness for bath chambers. Their bite, though not fatal as a rule, is poisonous and painful. The pleasantest domestic vermin were the little *cheechuks*, who sound like their name. They are semitransparent greenish lizards, from four to six inches long, which swarm over the walls and ceilings of every house. They are man's friends, for their occupation is hunting insects, and they do not harm humans. It was pleasant to watch a *cheechuk* edging along the ceiling, upside down, toward a mosquito, and suddenly darting in for the kill. Once in a while, for some mysterious reason, vast swarms of winged bugs, looking like flying black ants, would sweep in upon the lights of a neighborhood and collapse by the thousands on floors and tables. Then the *cheechuks* went wild. Their appetites are stupendous, and I have never seen them stop eating on such a grand occasion, even though they looked as though they might burst. The only annoyances they ever caused were in sometimes losing their foot-suction on the ceiling and dropping on one's head, or in bedding down in one's shoe. They are very agile, however, and although I have many times lifted a shoe and roused a *cheechuk* out of it, I never did have the bad experience of crushing one inside with my foot. On a few occasions I have just caught the tail with my heel, but the lizard would then scurry off, leaving his tail, and none the worse for it. The tails are loosely attached, and are quickly replaced with a new growth. There was something eerie, however, about the detached tail. It squirmed for several hours before dying.

The Cheap Luxury of Servants

There was no servant problem in the Indies. The Indonesians liked to secure household jobs with whites, as the work was easy and steady and the pay somewhat higher than they would have received in other occupations. The newcomer was likely to be-

come a bit panicky when he was told that for a medium-sized house he would need to have at least four servants: a cook, a maid, a houseboy, and a gardener. But his dismay quickly changed to astonished relief when he heard that all four would cost him less than forty dollars a month. If the family had a car, two more retainers had to be added: a chauffeur and a car-washer. Chauffeurs ran high, around thirty dollars a month; but the washer, usually an apprentice chauffeur, cost only between five and ten dollars. In case a nursemaid was needed, the servant budget had to be increased by about six dollars a month. The reason for so many servants was that each one was a thorough specialist, who would have refused to perform tasks outside his set sphere of duty. But all of them together demanded a combined salary much lower than that of one good man-of-all-work in America; so the arrangement was very satisfactory to all concerned.

Indonesian servants could not be recommended for speed or excess energy, but they were generally trustworthy, very quiet, and extremely polite. One item of etiquette disturbed newcomers. In Western society, when one wishes to show deference to a superior, he removes his hat and stands up. According to the Indonesian code, the opposite procedure is proper, so that when a houseboy came in to speak with his master, he carefully put on his headcloth or fez and squatted down. Since hardly a native can speak any language except his own local dialect and Malay, every European or American in the Indies had to learn the latter vernacular. It was astonishing to observe how quickly, under necessity, Americans who had never expected to speak any other language except English learned Malay. European children born in the Indies presented a distressing linguistic problem, as they learned Malay from their nursemaids faster than they acquired their parents' language, and tried to use the native tongue all the time.

Daily Routine in the Tropics

City life for the white people was not much different, except for details, from that of the upper class in Europe and America. The day began earlier, however, about six in the morning, for this was the pleasantest and coolest part of the day. After breakfast the man of the house, in a fresh white duck suit and sun helmet, was driven to his business by the chauffeur, along the wide streets with canals down the middle. These canals were typically Dutch features of the larger cities, just as in Holland. From early morning until nightfall their banks were lined with natives bathing and laundering their clothes. They also used them as toilets; and this custom, since the canals were slow-flowing, made them very unsanitary in the European sense. Within their definition of cleanliness, however, most of the Indonesians were extremely tidy. They bathed and changed their clothes every day; and I may say that almost never in all the time I spent in the Indies did I detect any unpleasant body odors. This may be partly attributable to the fact that they sweat very scantily, even with heavy exertion.

After a morning of work, the white city dweller had lunch, at home or at one of the many clubs. Every city had a wide variety of these lounging, dining, card-playing, and drinking establishments, with amazingly cheap dues despite their luxurious buildings. No one ever paid cash. Each bill was signed with the member's name and business address; and at the end of the month the club messengers came to the offices with their sheaves of bills to collect payment. The Dutch ate more heavily at noon than the other whites, many of them regularly consuming vast quantities of the famous *rijsttafel*—a heaping plate of rice with anywhere from ten to thirty sauces and several side-plates of meat and fish

—every day. Perforce the lunch hour in Dutch firms was longer than in the offices of other nationalities, in order to allow a digestive nap after the gorging. Anyone who has lived in the islands would gladly lay a bet at high odds that the Dutch are the champion eaters of all the world. As an additional proof of this, if the *rijsttafel* lunch is not sufficiently convincing, after consuming a hearty breakfast they regularly took with them every morning a package of sandwiches, to be eaten at their desks around ten o'clock—to still the pangs of hunger until lunchtime.

Days are long in the tropics; and in the afternoon, after business hours, the whites of each nationality went to their various sport clubs. The Dutch and Germans favored tennis and swimming; the British and Americans, golf. After the games, and while evening was falling, the porches and lawns of the clubs were thronged with convivial parties sitting at tables and relaxing under the soothing influence of assorted drinks—whisky and soda for the British and Americans, gin and bitters for the Dutch, and beer for the Germans. At sundown the club servants hauled down the flags on the lawn—the Dutch tricolor and the flags of the club's predominant nationalities—and the members dispersed to their homes.

After dinner, in the larger cities, there was a wide choice of entertainment. Every sizable hotel had a dancing pavilion with orchestra, but there were also open-air beer gardens, night clubs in the American manner, occasionally a concert or opera, and always the movies. On the seashore, in coastal places, the yachting and swimming clubs offered drinking and dancing. The views of the Indonesians on the dancing customs of white people were interesting. Every evening hundreds of them used to gather in the darkness outside the open-air dancing pavilions of the Europeans, silently staring at the white couples solemnly moving around the floor clutched in close embrace. The natives dance

too, but never in intimate sexual contact. My boy came to me once and asked: "What is this, *tuan*? It looks very indecent in public. It is strange. And you tell me they don't sleep with each other afterward." Later I read Peter Freuchen's *Eskimo*, in which he tells of two Eskimos from the back country who attended a dance in a Greenland settlement. They watched the proceedings with fascination, and soon decided that the whole thing must be a ritual for selecting sex partners for the night. They were sizing up the Danish ladies to decide which ones they would choose, and had just selected two nice fat ones, when the dance ended and nothing more happened. Their disappointment was exceeded only by their bewilderment. Which are the "peculiar customs," the natives' or ours?

Sleeping in the breathless tropical night required a special technique. There was seldom a breeze and only a slight drop in temperature. What little air stirred was effectively intercepted by the close-meshed mosquito netting. Most whites in the Indies slept without covering, many completely naked. This was not enough, however, so that in order to keep arms, legs, and body apart and thus reduce perspiration, a so-called "Dutch wife" was used. This invariable sleeping companion of the Indies was a long bolster about a foot in diameter, which was held against the body and embraced with arms and legs. For some time after leaving the islands, one found it difficult to go to sleep without his "Dutch wife."

Trams and Trains

For those who did not have private cars, every Indonesian city offered not only a swarm of open taxicabs and little two-wheeled carriages, but also numerous bus lines, and, in Batavia and Surabaya, electric tram cars. The strangest of all tram lines operated

in Batavia, running from the lower harbor town to the suburb of Meester Cornelis ten miles inland. It used to be called *de Moordenaar*, "the murderer," because so many Javanese fell sacrifice beneath its juggernaut wheels. It looked like a large toy train, with a steam engine pulling a long string of wooden cars. The cars were first and second class, and the fare varied accordingly. But the most remarkable feature was the way it got its running power. At either end of the line was a big boiler kept full of steam, and each time a train pulled in enough of this steam was blown into the engine to carry it back to the other boiler on the return trip.

There were no railroads, aside from private narrow-gauge work lines on plantations and in mining locations, in any of the islands excepting Java and Sumatra and the British part of Borneo. The Borneo line ran from the port of Jesselton, on the northwestern coast, about 100 miles southward to Weston, also on the coast, and inland for a short distance. It was owned by the British North Borneo Company, the governing body of this whole section of the island. Java had an extensive network of railways, connecting all main points, and even a luxurious crack train that made the Batavia-Surabaya run of some five hundred miles in about twelve hours. Sumatra had three lines, but no connections between them. One ran from Telok Betong, at the southern tip, to Palembang; another, from Padang, on the west coast, up over the mountains by a "rack" or cog track to Fort de Kock and the coal mines of Sawahlunto; and the third, from Tandjong Balei along the northeast coast to Kota Radja at the northernmost point of the island. The northern half of the latter line, the so-called "Atjeh Tram," was a narrow-gauge affair with considerable resemblance to the "Batavia Murderer." It, too, looked like a big toy train, with a wood-burning engine and rickety wooden cars. The Atjehnese natives along the track

hated it, because its sparks left a trail of destruction in the villages of thatched houses. When they were not riding on it, they spent a good deal of time trying to wreck it, and succeeded on a few occasions in derailing it. The speed was so low, however, that the accidents were never serious.

Life in the Outposts

Inside the big cities one might well imagine that he was in a well-planned, modern European or American community. But looking closer he would see that these urban centers were white oases in the vast hinterland of native life, and that the latter penetrated at many points even into the heart of European settlement. Behind the façade of high white buildings clustered the native quarters, with their tumbledown thatch huts and narrow muddy streets, bordered by open sewers. Inside the blocks of fine residences bamboo-shaded lanes wound among the little houses of the brown people. In the evening subdued laughter and songs and the tinkling of the *gamelan* were faintly heard by the white masters sitting on their porches. The Indonesians were all around, filling every nook which the Europeans had not set aside for their own luxurious occupancy.

Passing out of the cities, one would suddenly find the whole scene changed. The endless rice fields began, dotted with native settlements, and stretched on across the land and high up into the hills as far as the eye could see. It might be hours before the road reached another Europeanized town. This countryside was the real Indonesia. It pressed in on all sides of the foreign cities, and was never far away. Out here, however, many white people lived. They even lived in the jungle country of the outer islands, wherever there was a plantation, a mine, an oil field, or a government post. Life was generally pretty dull for Europeans in the

back country; and the comforts of the cities—electricity, good roads, modern stores, and the rest—were lacking. The days ran on routine, with little to do but work; and the people lived for the weekly or monthly or, in the case of very remote districts, even annual trips to the big cities, such as Batavia, Surabaya, Medan, and Macassar. And then, as the greatest treat of all, there was the six-months' furlough to Europe or America, coming every three to six years, guaranteed to all white workers above the lowest grade. The interim between these longed-for vacations was spent in a considerable degree of boredom, especially by the women, who did not have regular work hours. There might be a few other white families on the plantation or at the post, but most of the human contacts outside the family were with the hundreds of native coolies who lived in the long barracks that marked every plantation and mine.

In Sumatra the country around Medan was a vast complex of rubber, tea, tobacco, and oil-palm plantations. Twice a month, on *hari besar*, "the big day," the coolies were paid off and the plantation shut down for a day of rest. From all quarters, cavalcades of cars converged on Medan, bringing the plantation people to town for their brief day of pleasure. Music played far into the night at the De Boer and Grand hotels and at the clubs; and the dance floors and bars were packed with uproarious crowds, as intoxicated with the unwonted human company and the noise as with the free-flowing liquor. Back in the 1920's, when bonuses were so high that a young overseer of coolies might get twenty thousand dollars in a single year, the *hari besar* was "besar" indeed. The De Boer Hotel had a standing order in Europe for bales of glassware, for each "big day" witnessed wild breakage by the planters—not from meanness or even drunkenness, but from sheer ebullience of spirits at being let loose in town. On one occasion that has passed into the saga of the plantation country, a

great hero covered himself with glory and blood by driving his motorcycle through the grand dining room and smash into the enormous mirror at the end. He then good-naturedly signed a bill for damages, to the wild applause of everyone present.

The Indonesians, though mostly Mohammedan and therefore teetotallers, never showed the slightest disgust with such exhibitions. To them, this was merely a way of the white men, queer, like other things they did. The Chinese, apparently concerned at the loss of one kind of business, have tried to get around the native taboo on liquor by putting up cheap wine in bottles labeled not *anggur* ("wine"), but *anggur obat* ("wine medicine"). Also, some clever salesman must once have started the widespread belief among Indonesians that Guinness' Stout is good for "female complaints." Except for such compromises with the word of Allah, however, Mohammedan natives never drink; and one never saw a follower of the Prophet intoxicated.

The Ubiquitous Chinese

Much more numerous than the Dutch, totaling about 1,200,000, or almost 2 per cent of the Indies population, were the Chinese. Approximately one-third of them in 1940 had been born in China; but among the remainder a large proportion were descendants of immigrants to the islands many generations ago. In every respect they occupied an intermediate status between Indonesians and whites. They were much more literate than the natives, over 50 per cent of the men and about 15 per cent of the women being able to read and write. Most of them were middle-class merchants, operating nearly all of the retail businesses and a fair number of the small wholesale houses. The others were concentrated principally in the tobacco districts of northeastern Sumatra and the tin-mining islands of Banka and Billiton; in both

areas they worked mostly as coolies. Half of the Chinese, 600,000, lived in Java; 500,000 in Sumatra; a little less than 100,000 in Borneo; and around 30,000 scattered over the other islands. Thus they were much more evenly distributed than the European population.

A surprising fact about the Chinese is that, no matter how long their families have lived in the islands, they have kept themselves a separate group, retaining their Chinese customs and preserving a lively interest in the home country. They do the same thing in the United States, but here they seldom intermarry with Americans. In the Indies, since there have been very few Chinese women, intermarriage with natives has been common. But the families, no matter how much native blood they may have absorbed, have remained Chinese in customs and sentiments. They have had their own temples, associations, and even schools; and have kept up the family and clan ancestor cult of China even though they were many generations separated from the ancient soil of the motherland.

The Dutch in the past clashed continually with the Indonesian Chinese, for both peoples were in the islands mainly for trade, and therefore were competitors from the very start. Open battles occurred, especially when the Dutch, in the 1850's, were extending their power over western Borneo, where long-established Chinese "republics" resisted what they considered unjustified invasion of their territory. The worst single outbreak was the Batavia massacre of 10,000 Chinese in 1740. Anti-Chinese feeling persisted until the present century, however, and was manifested in numerous discriminatory laws. The Chinese were restricted to certain "ghetto" sections, for instance, and in order to travel outside they had to secure passes.

Hardly a trace of these legal disabilities survived in 1940. The era of discrimination was succeeded by a rapid series of liberaliz-

ing actions. The Chinese were given freedom of movement and residence; their legal status was carefully defined, with full consideration for their special requirements; Dutch-Chinese schools were established; and subsidies were granted to Chinese private schools. Where sufficient Chinese lived, they were given proportional representation in local and provincial councils; in the Volksraad three to five seats were reserved for them. The government set up a Bureau of Chinese Affairs to conduct research and advise the administration in all matters dealing with the Chinese. Most of them were loyal to the Dutch regime, although the bond with China was never forgotten, and they followed events in the home country with avid interest, contributing generously to all campaigns for funds to aid the Chinese government. Since the Netherlands and China have been on the same side in the conflict of 1940-1942, the loyalty of the Indonesian Chinese has suffered no split. They, with the half-castes, are bound to constitute an important middle-class element in the future reconstruction and reorganization of the Indies.

The Excellent Half-Castes

One of the most striking differences between British and Dutch colonies appeared in the treatment of half-castes. To the British, these people were beyond the social pale. They seldom rose high in governmental or business positions, and were excluded from white clubs and social circles. In the Indies, however, they were classed as Europeans, encountered little discrimination in jobs, and were accepted everywhere as equals. Some of the highest posts in government were held by persons of mixed blood, and no legal or social impediment stood in the way of a Dutchman wishing to marry one of them. Most of them, however, occupied a middle-class status, working as minor officials, as schoolteachers, or in

clerical positions. This fact in itself shows that some discrimination did exist, but their lot in the Dutch islands was better than in any other colonial area in the world.

As good an instance as I can remember of the contrast between Dutch tolerance and British race snobbery has been witnessed innumerable times in Singapore. It was customary, when the Dutch liners on the way from Batavia to Holland docked at Singapore, for the passengers to escape the night loading by going uptown to the Raffles Hotel for dinner and dancing. On every ship there would be several half-caste families of high status going to visit the mother country, usually government officials on furlough. In the Indies they were accepted everywhere, and therefore thought nothing of going along with their friends to the Raffles. Here they would order dinner, and get it. But if any of them started dancing, the manager would slip over, tap them on the shoulder, and quietly explain that Eurasians might dine, but not dance, in the hotel. This, perhaps, to the governor of one of the Indies provinces!

The Americans, with their unfortunate tendency to ape the British, took over the same attitude, although not to such an extreme degree, in the Philippines. While the Manila Hotel, for instance, would not indulge in the shocking Singapore gesture just described, and while *mestizos* were allowed in all public places, clubs and social circles drew strict lines around the sacred white caste. I remember undergoing a period of mild ostracism in a Luzon town because I once took a *mestizo* schoolteacher, a very fine girl by any standards, to a dance. One of the "grand old lady" social leaders of the community warned me never to repeat this performance if I wished to get on in white Philippine high society.

Most of the half-castes of the Indies spoke Dutch, but those of lower class and poorer education carried an accent over from

Malay. It came out principally in their intonation of sentences and in a very strongly trilled *r*. Aside from this, they talked, dressed, and acted like Dutch people. Some of the mixed-blood families were very ancient in the Indies; and certain old towns, notably Padang on the west coast of Sumatra, had great numbers of them, who intermarried among themselves or with Dutch people whom they met in the islands or when they went to Holland. On the whole they were very handsome and healthy people, the Dutch heavy physique and blondness mixing nicely with the slender, dark-skinned native type. Some remarkable cases of Mendelian heredity occur among them. I once met a beautiful blond girl at the swimming club in Padang, the daughter of a high official. She looked like a Dutch doll. Later, when I was invited to dinner at her home, I met her family. The father was light, the mother olive-skinned, but her sister was physically a complete native type. They were all half-castes with equal amounts of white and Indonesian blood.

Temperamentally, the mixed-blood people of the Indies are much better balanced than their fellow Eurasians in other colonies. They do not display the combination of servility and aggressiveness generally attributed to British half-castes, for instance, because their personalities are not warped by galling discriminations. They are a living disproof of the outmoded theory that mixed-bloods inherit the worst characteristics of both parental groups; rather do they demonstrate the truth that the bad reputation of half-castes in other parts of the world is owing to their treatment, not to their heredity.

The Happy Concubines and Their Children

This all had a beginning, of course; and the beginning lies far back in colonial history. In the early days of colonization, Dutch

officials, traders, and soldiers seldom brought white women to the islands. Conditions were rougher then, and tropical medicine in its infancy. The inevitable happened, but it happened openly and even with encouragement from the authorities. The Dutch, realists to the core, saw in miscegenation a good means of cementing friendly relations between themselves and the island people through the creation of a mixed-blood intermediary group. Business with pleasure, one might call it; and concubinage with Indonesian mistresses became part of the folkways of the islands. Fortunately, the native ideas of sex in this part of the world are quite liberal. Premarital chastity, among most groups, is much more lightly regarded than in Western society. A girl is not condemned by her people for living with a white man; indeed, the native men are likely to be impressed with her evident desirability, and later on, when she is free, seek her hand themselves. The attitudes of the Dutch and the Indonesians were well suited, therefore, and the production of half-castes went on smoothly generation after generation.

Within the past thirty or forty years, the situation altered considerably, as more and more white women came to live in the Indies. The unattached young men could now find sweethearts and brides within their own race, and were therefore less drawn to Indonesian mistresses. Also, the wives of the older men began to spoil things for the young bloods. Some say it was jealousy of the dusky sirens; others insist it was fear of competition against their marriageable daughters; but more likely it was plain feminine scandalization at free and easy sex relations. The psychologists might interpret it as an unconscious reaction to the white women's frustration at being denied sex privileges with native boys while the white men had access to the brown girls. In any case, the lines began to tighten. Young men did not talk so freely

of their interracial romances. Indignant letters from dowagers appeared in Dutch journals and newspapers. Some plantation managers, perhaps nagged on by their wives—who would have been left back in Holland in the old days—even made feeble attempts to forbid their employees to hire native “housekeepers.”

Despite this noticeable change in attitudes toward native concubinage, it persisted as a regular feature of white colonial life. Its two main centers were the army barracks and the plantations. Although subjected to a constant barrage of howling condemnation, the army continued to allow Dutch soldiers in the islands to have their mistresses, mostly on the ground that this temporary monogamous system reduced venereal infection. Children born of such unions, if not wanted by either of the parents, were sent to an orphanage at Semarang in Java, and many of them later followed their fathers into the army. Twice a year a great Indonesian lottery was held, the profits going for the support of this remarkable institution. Everybody played it, and thus, along with having a chance at money prizes, “helped the soldiers.”

The plantation type of concubinage was a more delicate affair than the barrack-room mating. It is impossible to say what proportion of the unmarried overseers indulged in the practice. Nearly all of them had Indonesian housekeepers, but how many of these were also mistresses cannot be fairly reckoned. Generally, if the housekeeper was good-looking, young, and not married, the presumption was that she did more than just take care of the house. I am sure I am not exaggerating in stating that concubinage was a very common practice on plantations among the unattached white men. Certainly most of the overseers I met admitted it, generally for themselves as well as for their friends. Whatever we may think of the custom on moral grounds, there is no question that it made the isolated life in the back country

more bearable for the lonely men, not only because of the companionship involved, but also because most of the girls tried hard to run their masters' households efficiently and economically.

The concubines were usually selected from among the Javanese or Malay girls in the coolie contingents. One inflexible rule was that no Indonesian's wife might be taken by a white man. Occasionally a foolhardy overseer might try this, but there was a good chance that he would soon be found with a dagger in his back. Generally, the girls liked to be selected. They were flattered, and preferred housekeeping to labor on the plantations; to say nothing of the better living conditions, the pretty clothes, and the gifts which every decent *tuan* gave his mistress. Children born of such unions almost invariably were brought up by their mother's people back in the native villages. On one occasion when I called upon a delinquent bill-payer in his home, I found there a new baby, quite light. The mother of the family told me proudly that it was her daughter's child, that her daughter lived with a white man on a plantation, and that the excellent master was very generous in his support of the infant. She appeared very fond of the baby, and praised its beautiful olive skin.

When the time came for a white man to give up his mistress—because he was going to another plantation far off, or returning to Holland, or preparing to marry a white girl—it was quite customary for him to present her with a good sum of money, a kind of "terminal wage," to take care of herself and her children, if any. According to the native way of looking at such matters, in most Indonesian groups, her period of concubinage would be no impediment to her making a satisfactory marriage with a man of her people. Indeed, her interesting past and her bit of capital would probably appear very attractive.

Occasionally this serene arrangement might end in tragedy, for jealousy is a universal human trait, however it may vary in its

manifestations. In the Indies many tales are told of *guna-guna*, black magic, practiced on white men or their white wives by cast-off mistresses. One case I know of personally. In a Sumatra town where I once lived a young Dutchman returned from Holland with his bride. He had been living with a Javanese girl, who apparently had taken the inevitable parting easily. Soon the Dutch woman began to suffer from something the doctors could not diagnose, except that it appeared to be a severe inflammation of the intestines. They examined her carefully and analyzed the digestive wastes, but could discover nothing wrong. Fortunately, one of them, wise in the ways of the islands, obtained some food from her plate and found mixed in it a mass of the minute hairs that grow on the surface of bamboo. These sharp, microscopic bristles acted on the digestive canal like ground glass, but were then digested, so that they could not be detected in the excretions. It was then revealed that the house-boy had been bribed by the jilted girl to put this deadly material in the bride's food.

The Wages of Tolerance

The Dutch have done well to treat the children of mixed matings fairly. In them they have had a generally loyal intermediary group, appreciative of the consideration shown them, especially when they have heard of the status of Eurasians in British possessions. Except for the Chinese, the half-castes were the only middle-class element in the whole Indies. In this intermediate position they had an intimate knowledge of both Dutch and native society. They became very active in politics and in government service; and they made up a large part of the schoolteaching force in the islands. If the Indies ever arise from the desolation of the dark days of 1942, the intelligent, well-educated, temperamentally sound Eurasians will surely take their place among the

leaders of the reconstruction. And the Dutch, with this living proof of their tolerance and liberalism in the vital question of race relations, will have earned the right to a major voice in future plans for the Orient. When East and West meet on equal terms, as all the democratic peoples of the world now bitterly realize they must, the Dutch will have done their part in showing the way to the new era of tolerance and the brotherhood of man.

V

THE WEALTH

THE INDIES HAVE BEEN THE MOST PROFITABLE COLONIAL POSSESSION of their size in the world. In an average recent year, 1938, British India, generally considered the greatest imperial prize of all, two and one-half times the size of the Indies and with a population six times as large, had only twice as much export and import trade. Indonesia's closest competitor in the colonial field therefore fell considerably short of equaling her, size for size. The amazing wealth of the archipelago can be attributed to: (1) the fertility of the soil, augmented by little seasonal change and a wide range of crop possibilities; (2) the mineral deposits in the subsoil; and (3) the cheapness and tractability of the native labor supply.

Riches from the Soil

The soil of the Indies varies, but a large proportion is exceedingly productive, particularly in the volcanic areas. The volcanic ash is an excellent fertilizing agent, provided that it is seeped into the earth by sufficient rain, and Indonesia certainly has the rain. Crops can be grown twelve months in the year in most regions, for seasonal variations are relatively slight. The islands are a natural hothouse, continually putting forth plant life in great abundance. Nearly every island includes land ranging from steaming

coastal plains to very high mountains, while between are hills and valleys of all intermediate elevations. Consequently the variety of crops is phenomenal.

The greatest staple is rice, which flourishes at all levels, and furnishes the principal food supply. Each year the production of rice has increased, as more and more land has been turned to cultivation and irrigation has been extended. The abundant rain and the numerous streams make irrigation possible in most of the archipelago. Maize, vegetables, and fruits are raised in considerable variety. Despite the large population, therefore, Indonesia can feed itself. No greater testimony to the richness of the soil could be presented than the fact that the Javanese, packed more than eight hundred to the square mile, live almost entirely on the products of their own land.

In addition to the bountiful and continuous harvest of rice and other grains, vegetables, and fruits, the islands produced a vast store of crops for export. These exports made Holland one of the richest countries in the world. The principal commercial crop during recent times was rubber; for many years it was the leading export commodity. Until 1940 the Indies were the second largest rubber-producing area in the world, being slightly surpassed by British Malaya; but in that year the islands forged ahead, with 49 per cent of the total world yield, as against 41 per cent for Malaya. The latter country, however, still held the lead in rubber exports, with 540,000 tons to Indonesia's 537,000 tons. Evidently the Dutch were holding a large share of the production in the islands. During normal years the Indies supplied between 35 and 40 per cent of all the rubber used in the world. Although almost the entire production was exported, the United States took a disproportionate share of its rubber from Malaya. In 1941 the latter region supplied 56 per cent of all the rubber used in the United States; the Indies only 29 per cent. The remainder came from

Indo-China and other places in the Orient, South America, and Africa. The annual value of rubber exported from the Indies during the past five years averaged around \$120,000,000, or approximately 30 per cent of the value of all exports.

Sumatra was the principal rubber-producing region of the islands. Here, especially on the east coast, vast plantations covered areas as large as many of our states. The trees were lined up with geometrical precision, so that, looking through a rubber plantation from any angle, the rows extended straight out as far as the eye could see, like the pillars of a great cathedral. Each had its little metal cup, and every morning a coolie would come to every tree and make a fresh diagonal slash in its bark to start the sap running. Two of the largest plantations in Sumatra were owned by the American Goodyear and United States Rubber companies. Java, southern Borneo, southern Celebes, Lombok, and Sumbawa were also rubber-producing areas.

Sugar ranked next to rubber among the commercial agricultural commodities of the Indies. Most of it was grown in Java, where it constituted the main export crop. Recently, however, sugar fell upon evil days, for the world markets were glutted and prices dropped almost to the cost of production. During the past five years, the Indies supplied about 5 per cent of the world's sugar exports, the annual value ranging from \$25,000,000 to \$40,000,000, or an average of between 6 and 10 per cent of the total exports of the islands. About 20 per cent of the sugar production was retained in the Indies.

Tea, in normal years, was almost as important a commercial crop as sugar, its annual export value recently averaging around \$25,000,000, or 6 per cent of the total exports. Indonesian tea, of which all except 10 per cent was shipped out of the islands, constituted about 18 per cent of all the tea sold in the world market.

Copra, from which coconut oil is made, and palm oil were sup-

plied by the Indies in considerable quantity, constituting 28 and 18 per cent, respectively, of the world's export total of these products in recent years. Together the annual value of their shipments averaged \$50,000,000, or 13 per cent of all Indonesian exports.

The remaining principal agricultural commodities of the islands fell into two classes: those in which the Indies had a virtual world monopoly, and those which other areas also produced in large quantities. To the first category belonged quinine, pepper, and kapok fiber, of which the archipelago supplied, respectively, 90, 85, and 75 per cent of the world export total. To the latter class belonged coffee and agave and sisal fiber, used for making twine; the islands' share of the world market in these products was, respectively, 6 and 25 per cent. The relatively small coffee export makes one wonder why the American slang term for this beverage should be "Java." Other agricultural exports, comparatively minor in quantity, were tobacco, principally the very expensive Sumatra broadleaf; tapioca, used much more for making glue than as a food; spices of numerous varieties; and timber, mostly decorative hardwoods.

Riches from the Bowels of the Earth

The mineral wealth of the islands has hardly been tapped as yet, most mineralogists with field experience in the area believe. The vast hinterlands of Borneo and New Guinea hold promise of great future development. Even the abundant production of oil for two decades has hardly begun to draw upon the vast reserves in the subsoil. I have seen reports that few new discoveries of oil fields could be expected in the future, but I have it directly from a trustworthy friend who conducted confidential geological oil prospecting with the finest of modern equipment in Sumatra,

Borneo, Java, Celebes, and New Guinea that "the islands literally rest upon a sea of oil." The richest petroleum wells were in southern Sumatra and eastern Borneo. Both had large refineries, at Palembang and at Balikpapan. The Tarakan field, on an island north of Balikpapan, had no refinery, but its raw product was so fine that it could be piped directly from the wells into the bunkers of ships. Java had a few wells, and also a small refinery, in the central part of the island. The other fields were in north-eastern Sumatra and the island of Ceram in the Moluccas, near the naval base of Amboina. Drilling was started in northwestern New Guinea in 1939, but apparently this field was not yet in production at the time of the Japanese invasion.

Although petroleum with its by-products ranked second after rubber as the principal export of the Indies during the past five years, the archipelago supplied only 3 per cent of the world's total production, standing fifth among the oil-yielding countries. The export value averaged annually around \$85,000,000, or about 21 per cent of all Indies exports. This represented a bulk total of slightly more than 6,000,000 tons a year. By contrast, the United States production in 1940 was 125,000,000 tons. A third of the oil of the islands was produced by the Koloniale Petroleum Maatschappij, a Standard Oil of New Jersey affiliate incorporated in the Indies. Its wells were in southern Sumatra. The rest of the petroleum was produced by Dutch and British companies, principally the Royal Dutch Shell.

Tin ranked next to petroleum among the mineral exports of the Indies during the past five years. The average annual value of the shipments was around \$40,000,000, or 11 per cent of all exports from the islands. The amount of production varied, but Indonesia consistently held second place in world ranking, Malaya standing first. In 1940 the relative proportions of these two leading tin-producing countries were 37 and 28 per cent of the

world total. All of the Indonesian tin came from three small islands off the east coast of Sumatra—namely, Banka, Billiton, and Singkep; and most of the mines were owned and operated by the government.

The government also owned coal and gold mines in western Sumatra, but the amounts produced were never large. Most of the coal was used within the islands for ships and railways. Bauxite, the aluminum ore, was increasing in production in 1940, when 238,000 tons were exported. Other minerals, mined only in negligible quantities, but with considerable future possibilities, were manganese, iron, silver, nickel, lead, and sulphur.

Export Profits and Import Quotas

This analysis of the leading commercial products of the Indies demonstrates that the wealth of the islands, from the Dutch viewpoint, was derived principally from exports. Moreover, 90 per cent of these consisted of six products, in order of rank as follows: rubber (30 per cent), petroleum (21 per cent), vegetable oils (13 per cent), tin (11 per cent), sugar (8 per cent), and tea (6 per cent). These percentages represent approximate averages for the past five years. The importance of the islands as a rich producing area, with a self-sufficient food economy for the natives making large imports unnecessary, appears clearly in the balance of trade statistics. The export surpluses between 1920 and 1939 ranged from \$400,000,000 to \$100,000,000. The decline in the export surplus in the later years was owing to the effects of the depression of the 1930's, to the stubborn retention of the gold standard until 1936, and to increasing imports of military supplies. Nevertheless, the Indies were still paying higher export profits than any other colonial possession. British India, for instance, in 1938 had an

export surplus of only \$50,000,000, while Indonesia's balance exceeded \$100,000,000.

Compared with the export profits, import business was relatively unimportant. Still, the Dutch, fair-minded and businesslike to the end, decided in 1935 to set import quotas for countries trading with the Indies, so as to favor those which bought more of the islands' products. To make this policy doubly effective, supplementary export quotas were established also. Already, in the case of some commodities since the early 1920's, production restriction for the protection of price levels had been imposed upon certain products by export licensing and international agreements. But the recent quota system went much farther, and, as it turned out, hit Japan hardest of all. The Japanese in 1935 were taking little from the Indies, only 5 per cent of the exports, but were selling 30 per cent of all the foreign commodities imported into the islands. Holland took 23 per cent of the exports and sold 13 per cent of the imports. The United States balanced sales of 7 per cent with purchases of 14 per cent. Within two years, in 1937, the effects of the new policy began to show. Japan's share of the import market dropped to 25 per cent, Holland's rose to 19 per cent, and the United States increased the sale of its products in Indonesia to 10 per cent of the total. The poor customer was being squeezed out of the import market slowly but steadily. She replied finally by crashing in and cutting short the economic war, in which she was losing, by military conquest.

The Dutch effort to maintain a fair balance of trade with all foreign countries by apportioning imports is somewhat surprising, for Holland herself had only a small stake in the import market. The Dutch were primarily producers and sellers of raw products, not manufacturers. The leading import commodities of the Indies were textiles, foodstuffs (principally for white consumption),

metals, machines, and chemicals; and Holland produced little more of these than she needed for her own use. Moreover, for forty years she had been gradually abandoning the Indonesian market, with little protest, to such foreign articles as Australian butter and Japanese textiles. The import restrictions of the late 1930's were dictated by political rather than economic motives.

The Tempered Monopoly of the Dutch

Where the Dutch made their money in the Indies was in producing for export and in handling trade and transportation. A Dutch shipping company, the Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij, had a virtual monopoly of the extremely profitable inter-island trade, and the railroads were owned by the government. But the big returns came from investments in plantation agriculture, mining and oil production, and commercial banking. Of the total two billion dollars of European and American capital invested in the Indies, the Dutch held three-fourths. The British share was about 14 per cent; Franco-Belgian companies had 5 per cent; American investments accounted for 3 per cent; and German and Japanese, 1 per cent each. The largest amounts of non-Dutch capital were invested in the rubber plantations of Sumatra, where almost half of the total was held by the British, American, and Franco-Belgian companies. Aside from this, the only sizable non-Dutch shares were in British and American oil developments.

Although after 1900 the Hollanders relaxed their formerly complete monopoly of all the business enterprise in the islands and admitted increasing amounts of foreign capital, they never opened the doors very wide. Always the Dutch companies were favored in concessions, leases, licenses, and the other devices of control. This is probably as it should be; but the traditional close relations

between business and government in the Indies, a heritage from the old East India Company and the nineteenth-century period of monopoly, carried nationalistic favoritism farther than one might have expected in the case of the free-trading Dutch. There is no doubt that the powerful businessmen's associations of the Indies were close to the administration, and thus in a position to protect and develop their own interests. This business-in-government pattern made Holland one of the richest countries in the world by keeping Dutch companies virtually free from foreign competition in Indonesia. Unfortunately, it also operated as a brake on all liberalistic tendencies in native policy, which had to make way against constant and strong opposition from the vested—and really vested—business interests. The “balance-sheet mind” was always in evidence among the Dutch, although the liberal elements were steadily pushing it back during the past forty years.

Human Capital

The human stake of the big companies was the third of the reasons given for the profitable nature of the Indies—namely, the phenomenally cheap and tractable native labor supply. Whether openly stated or not, the interest of the commercial corporations lay in keeping the working masses both cheap and docile. The way to assure survival of this entrepreneur's paradise was to avoid raising the Indonesian standard of living and to restrict education. The two things tied in together, and both prevailed in the Indies. Lest this be taken as an indictment in Marxist vein, let me hasten to add that there was no “plot” on the part of the business interests to “enslave the masses.” They rested their case on good logic—within their frame of reasoning. Their task was to make money, and their vantage point in viewing social ques-

tions was therefore the balance sheet. They resisted heavy expenditures on education and other "humanitarian" projects because these would have raised taxes and reduced profits and dividends. They pointed to the obvious fact that the vast majority of the Indonesians were quite contented with their way of life, and raised the question whether it might not be unwise, even cruel, to infect them with the devastating germ of ambition. I think they had a case, but only a short-time case. If the Indies had not been a part of the dynamic world, if the islands had been isolated from the turbulence of international politics and economics, then the paternalistic paradise of the white masters might have been the best plan for the Indies.

Certainly it worked for many centuries and was working when the islands fell to the invaders in 1942. Fully 70 per cent of the Indonesians worked for themselves, mostly on little rice plots, from which they drew enough sustenance to keep themselves alive. The other 30 per cent represented a good proportion of the profit-making capital of the Indies—human capital. They were the wage-earners, laboring on the plantations and in the mines and oil fields for pay that was almost unbelievably low. Ten dollars a month was an excellent wage for an Indonesian worker; and on it he was able to keep well and even happy, because his wants were so modest. The great majority of them had a per capita income of less than \$50 a year. By contrast, the bulk of European salaries fell between \$2,000 and \$80,000 a year; while the alien Asiatics, mostly Chinese, had incomes clustering in the range from \$160 to \$2,000.

One argument used by the Dutch to justify their opposition to higher taxes for social and educational improvement was that they paid most of them already. This was true, but the principal reason they had the money to pay them was that the Indonesians took so little of the national income. Europeans provided 50 per

cent of all the revenue from income taxes; alien Asiatics, 30 per cent; and natives, the remaining 20 per cent. Of the entire revenue received by the government, European business—through corporation levies, excise taxes, customs duties, and miscellaneous imposts—paid one-half.

Indonesian Businessmen and Coolies

Despite the fact that Indonesians received so small a share of the income, in the past forty years they made marked progress in producing agricultural commodities for export. In 1898 their share in this market was only 10 per cent of the total; in 1913, 24 per cent; in 1930, 31 per cent; and in 1937, 46 per cent. The principal product was rubber, of which they supplied 50 per cent. As in all other types of commercial agriculture, however, most of the native plantations were small, and there were few Indonesian big businessmen. Some crops for export were grown almost exclusively by natives, such as pepper (100 per cent), copra (98 per cent), kapok (90 per cent), tapioca (80 per cent), and coffee (70 per cent). Their share of the tea production was 15 per cent; and of the tobacco sales, 8 per cent. They had no part in the production of sugar, palm oil, and quinine; and also no petroleum or tin investments. Of course, much of the profits from native-grown products went to the export companies, mostly Dutch, for the Indonesians had no way of selling their goods on the world market and had to dispose of them through middlemen. Still, the striking rise in native commercial agriculture from nearly nothing forty years ago to almost half of the total in 1937 is a good augury for the future of the Indonesians in this type of enterprise.

A tradition of the plantation system in the Indies was the "contract coolie" plan. Native workers were recruited, mainly in Java, for the plantations of Sumatra and the other islands, their

contracts providing for free transportation, housing, medical care, and regular wages. Employment was limited to a maximum of three years, at the end of which the coolies might sign on for another period or receive free return transportation to their home villages. This would appear to be fair, and it offered some relief for overpopulation. The opposition expressed, not only by Americans and other foreigners, but by many of the Dutch themselves, centered on "penal sanction." If a native under contract refused to work and ran away from his job, he could be fined or imprisoned and then sent back to work off the remainder of his term on the plantation. To many this looked like a modified form of slavery—even though it was slavery to which the coolie had agreed when he signed the contract. The antagonists believed that a man should not be allowed to "sell himself" into serfdom.

Whatever the merits of the case, the government, embarrassed by criticism at home and abroad, began in 1909 to restrict the recruiting of coolies under contracts involving penal sanction. In 1941 only a small proportion of Indonesian laborers were still working under such contracts, and the government had plans to abolish the system entirely by 1946. A few years ago in the United States Congress a proposal was made to exclude Sumatra rubber from the American market because it was produced by forced labor. Although this must have given the officials of the Good-year and United States Rubber companies some bad moments, the agitation quickly subsided when the Dutch government assured Congress that the contract coolie system was being rapidly eradicated.

Why There Were No Factories

There would appear to be some justification for the claim that the British have deliberately retarded the industrialization of

India so as to protect the market for the products of English industry. The Indian protest has been symbolized by Gandhi's spinning wheel, with its implication that Indians should make their own cloth by hand rather than accept British-made goods. The Dutch could have had no such motive in the Indies, for their factory production was geared to home consumption only. Nevertheless, industrialism was virtually nonexistent in Indonesia. Probably the reason was that the islands were so eminently suited to agricultural enterprise, and paid such handsome profits on this alone that no stimulus to industrialization was ever felt.

Statistics on occupations for 1938 show that 1,630,000 Indonesians were classified as industrial workers. But 670,000, or over 40 per cent, were home producers, mostly women, and principally occupied in handicrafts such as spinning, weaving, sewing, and batik-printing. Another 840,000, or slightly more than 50 per cent, were employed in very small plants, such as the sarong workshops of central Java. Only 120,000, or less than 10 per cent, worked in large factories such as textile mills, oil refineries, sugar mills, armories, and automobile assembly plants. In 1939 the Dutch, foreseeing the strong possibility of a German invasion of Holland, started an intensive program of industrial expansion in the Indies. Plans were drawn up for rapid construction of more oil refineries, textile mills, iron smelters, chemical plants, and armament works. The scheme was barely under way when the Japanese invaded the islands.

The Lure of the Indies for Japan

The Indies are a rich prize for any conqueror. Particularly is this so for Japan, with a dense population, an insufficient food supply, a high degree of industrialization, and a shortage of domestic minerals and other raw materials. Such a country needs a

hinterland, where there are no factories, but only fertile soil, abundant mineral deposits, and cheap labor inured to subservience. Indonesia is made to order on all these points. With the islands under her control, Japan would gain what she has lacked during the past fifty years of her rise to power—namely, a balanced, self-sufficient economy. Here are oil, coal, and metals; here are food and other agricultural products, such as rubber; and these are precisely the things the lack of which has constituted Japan's greatest weakness. Looking back from the vantage point of 1942, it now seems almost inevitable that the Japanese would pursue the course they have. The reason many people did not believe they would go after the Indies was that the archipelago lay at such a great distance that, despite its rich store of needed supplies, the difficulties of transportation to Japan over an enemy-threatened sea route would make the conquest unprofitable. This, indeed, is the vulnerable point of Japan at present. On the 4,000 miles between Batavia and Tokyo may rest the fate of the Pacific war of 1942.

VI

THE FUTURE

WRITING THIS BOOK IN THE MIDST OF A WORLD-WIDE WAR, when the Indies are in the hands of the Japanese enemy and the future is beset with doubt, I have tried to depict the archipelago under normal conditions, except insofar as the threat of invasion has affected these conditions during the past five years. Here at the end, with inventory taken and background facts assembled, I am going to express some candid opinions—personal, of course—concerning the future. I shall predicate my statements upon the assumption that the Allies will win the war, and that they will have the power to plan the future of Indonesia and the entire Orient. If they do not win, and Japan and Germany decide the fate of eastern Asia, this chapter will have been written in vain; for the opinions expressed in it are for democratic consumption only. I cannot imagine that the Germans, with their attitude on the Jews, could accept my views on race prejudice; nor the Japanese, with their treatment of the Koreans, my ideas as to self-government among the peoples of the East.

Reconquest of the Indies

I am not a military man, and should probably refrain from discussion of strategy. But the facts in the preceding chapter should

make it clear that a primary aim of the Allies in their Oriental warfare must be to prevent Japan from using the resources of the Indies. While it may be impossible for some time to drive the Japanese out of the islands by frontal attack, continuous harassment of their shipping routes from the Indies would nullify the principal gains of their conquest. This is extremely important; for, with Indonesia supplying products steadily to Japan, the latter could approximate a balanced economy, lack of which is her present glaring weakness—in which above all others the hope of victory over her lies. To use the products of the islands for military purposes, the Japanese must transport them to Japan; for there are no factories in Indonesia, and rice 4,000 miles away will not feed the hungry workers of Nippon.

One advantage Japan will derive from the Indies so long as she holds them, even though the connections between the archipelago and the homeland are broken, is the use of the islands as operating and supply bases. This advantage rests mainly upon oil and food. Within a few months, many of the petroleum fields will be functioning again; and the Japanese will have ample fuel for ships, airplanes, and land transport in the southern Pacific. Despite reported destruction of stores by the retreating Dutch, undoubtedly the vast bulk of foodstuffs in the islands were not harmed. Crops are harvested the year round in the Indies, and it will be easy for the Japanese to commandeer as much as they require for their troops. The whole battle will not be won, therefore, until the Indies are retaken; but much of the good they might do the Japanese can be nullified by constant attacks on the sea routes northward.

I step outside my proper sphere to make the foregoing point because it seems to me that many people are now inclined to write off the islands as lost, and see no reason for fighting over them. The folly of this attitude should be apparent by now. The

Japanese took the Indies primarily to get desperately needed supplies. The islands, they hope, will be their principal base for materials to carry on the war, because the rest of the world is shut off by blockade. The blockade of Japan, which is the main weapon of the Allies against her, will be useless if she has the Indies to draw upon.

Planning for the Future

When I began this book I had no intention of venturing into the realm of prediction. I was going to confine my account of the Indies to what has happened in the past, and to the situation in 1941, before the outbreak of war in the Pacific. My task, as I saw it, was to present a description of the islands and their people without indulging in gratuitous advice as to the future. The reason for this last chapter is that every time I have discussed the Indies, in private conversation or from the lecture platform, people have insisted that I express my opinion concerning plans for postwar rehabilitation. The prevailing sentiment has been that we must not only win the war, but must also begin now to prepare a just and enduring peace settlement. For what they are worth, then, I offer my views on the future. They have at least the virtue of resting upon first-hand acquaintance with the islands and years of intensive study.

The Question of Race

The new Orient is going to be a far different place from the old. The difference is going to arise from an entirely revised attitude on the race question. By a lucky combination of circumstances, mainly a rapid development in navigation and military weapons, the European peoples were enabled, some four hundred

years ago, to extend conquest over the entire "native" world. The "natives," who were just as good, man for man, as the Europeans, lacked the superior material equipment of the latter, and were either slaughtered or subjugated. The possessors of guns came to believe that they were also possessors of superior racial endowments, and attributed their success not to material advantages, but to innate mental and physical superiority. They were white, and the beaten peoples mostly black, brown, yellow, and red; consequently, inferiority must be linked with color and race.

This reasoning has passed into the cultural heritage of Europeans and Americans, and still prevails despite scientific disproof. The men who know most about the subject of race characteristics, the sociologists and anthropologists, are, except for the Nazi pseudo-scientists, virtually unanimous in asserting that there are no indications of inborn mental superiority or inferiority linked with skin color or other physical characteristics. Such expert opinion has gone largely unheeded, for it has not fitted into the traditional beliefs of the white race. In our country, for instance, most people still cling fervently to the credo that Negroes are inferior to whites.

The day of these beliefs is now drawing to a close. The myth of white superiority is exploded. A yellow people, the Japanese, have shown full capacity to master the very techniques that gave rise to the doctrine of the ascendancy of the white race. Another yellow people, the Chinese, are doing just as well in the technical sense, and are also demonstrating qualities of mind and spirit that are anything but inferior. The exalted white sahibs of Britain find themselves begging a formerly despised brown people, the Indians, to aid in saving them from defeat at the hands of a yellow foe. After four hundred years of riding high and serene on a false dogma, the peoples of the white race are being brought rudely face to face with reality. The anthropolo-

gists could not convince them; but, as usual in human affairs, it has taken bitter experience, suffering and death, to shake them out of their fool's paradise of racial vanity. "War is the great selector," says Keller, one of the foremost social scientists of our day; the present war is almost certainly going to eliminate many of our cherished but outmoded beliefs on race.

This laboring of the point of racial doctrine may seem digressive, but it is most important in the future relations between the Orient and the Western world. The whole course of European and American dealings with Oriental peoples has been directed by the principle, openly expressed or implicit in action, of white superiority over the yellow and brown natives. They have been treated as grown-up children, adults with arrested mental development, who must be subjected to paternalistic supervision, chastised or indulged according to their behavior, but never allowed to act as equals or to handle their own affairs.

Out of this major premise has been drawn a beautiful series of rationalizations. The white master has justified his exploitation of native labor at bare subsistence wages by insisting that these were sufficient for the brown people, and that if given more they would spend them foolishly. The very restricted educational facilities have been defended on the grounds that the "lower races" cannot learn very much anyway, and that too much schooling would merely disturb their happy serenity of mind. Lack of education was then used as an argument against giving the natives any more than a minor voice in governing their own islands. In short, racialistic rationalizations have served as a mask to conceal the true motive underlying denial of economic improvement, educational advancement, and increase in political participation of the natives—this motive being economic gain. It has been believed to be to the economic advantage of the Europeans to keep the Orientals insulated from knowledge of the outside world,

and to preserve them in their simple and stagnant state of culture. Educated natives were apt to get "foolish ideas," as demonstrated by the fire-eating agitators in the Volksraad, who were always trying to raise wages and taxes, extend the school system, and secure a greater share in government for their brown brothers.

The truth of my contention that racialistic ideas have contributed the main support of these attitudes toward natives becomes clear if one speculates on what would have been the course of events if the Indonesian peoples had been of the white race. Long since a storm of protest would have been raised over "oppression" and "exploitation"; and the democratic watchwords would have thundered forth in a blazing campaign for liberation of the masses. "They cannot do this to white people," would have been the cry. But since the Indonesians are of a different race—"lesser breeds without the law," in Kipling's forthright phrase—the champions of enlightenment have been regarded as hasty radicals and traitors to their own kind. When we have heard of the treatment of Slovak peasants by Hungarian overlords, or of Russian serfs by the Czarist nobility, we have been shocked that such things could happen to men of our own color in our own times; but we remain complacent when the people involved in discrimination and exploitation are of a race different from ourselves. What would be called discrimination and exploitation in the case of whites becomes rephrased into innocuous terms like "native administration" and "colonial development."

The End of Racial Imperialism

The time is now upon us to abandon the profit-making attitude toward colonial possessions and peoples which has prevailed for

the past four hundred years. I base my belief, not upon humanitarianism or idealism essentially, but upon hard international practicality. The imperialism of the past has treated the natives of subject territories as inert profit-producing masses, and has indeed made of them spiritless pawns in the game of international politics and business. The colonies have been regarded as money-making reservations of the home countries, as fields for exploitation of natural resources, material and human. The natives have been allowed to say little or nothing about the administration of their countries, and have therefore not been brought to feel that they had any particular stake in the maintenance of whatever government has ruled them.

In the case of the Indies, without mincing words, the war now going on has been fought by the Dutch and the Japanese *over* the Indonesians, not by the Dutch and the Indonesians against the Japanese. A few thousand professional native soldiers have fought hard beside their white comrades because it was their job to fight, but tens of millions of Indonesians have stood by during the battle, not understanding why it was going on nor what issues were involved, except for a dim realization that outsiders were again quarreling over what country was to rule the islands.

So long as the Indies and other colonial possessions are treated as mere booty of war, they will always constitute a danger to the peace of the world. They will exhibit themselves as prizes of the game of war, and as such will constitute a steady temptation to covetous nations who can see no reason why they should not try for a share of the rich stakes. I propose that an end be made to the traditional colonial imperialism, and that the former profit-making reservations, with their passive populations, be transformed into independent, self-contained countries, with free, self-

governing, well-educated citizens. Such nations of free men will be able to defend themselves, and will have good reason for defending themselves.

The course of world history has reached a point of critical decision, and on this decision will depend the future of human development. If one side wins, the democratic course toward liberty, tolerance, and equality of opportunity will be abandoned. But, even though the democratically inclined nations are victorious, their great concern must be to make democracy so secure, all over the world, that never again will it be threatened with the vision of death it now sees starkly before it. Its weak points, exposed by the present war itself, must be mended. And one of these weak points of democracy has been the colonies of European countries. The Indies, therefore, and all other colonial regions, must be transformed into bastions of democracy; and the only way to do this will be to make the native populations know what freedom means: by educating them, letting them govern themselves, and giving them the full fruits of their own land and their own labor. If they are going to be "on our side," they must be made like us, not put into a separate, inferior class of subject near-serfs. The very fact of this class differentiation is inconsistent with the working and the ideals of democracy.

Colonial Contrasts

The self-governing, independent Chinese have risen by the millions to fight off the alien invader. They know what is at stake, and will die for it. The Filipinos, intensively educated by what the British and Dutch used to scorn as sentimental, impractical American idealism, have rallied to the defense of their native land and refuse to submit to conquest. It has taken only

a little more than a generation to make these brown people champions of democracy, because they know what it means in their own lives. The Chinese and the Filipinos are not being fought over; they are fighting for themselves and for the cause in which they participate with their allies. The British and the Dutch also have vital stakes in the struggle—but their subject peoples do not, or at any rate have not been shown that they have. When Singapore was under siege, reports from the beleaguered city described the natives as “bewildered.” The Chinese and Filipinos—“natives” too—are not bewildered: they know what the shooting is about. The Indonesians, except for small contingents of trained soldiers, had no comprehension of the significance of the battle raging around them. Perhaps, after a period of Japanese control in the islands, the natives will recognize that the old master is better than the new. Perhaps the recent developments toward liberalization of native policy by the Dutch will be rewarded. But how much greater would have been the resistance if this policy had gone further!

If the natives of Malaya and the Indies remained passive in the war, the reaction of the Burmese appears as a much stronger indictment of British rule. In Burma, according to all reports, many of the people have actually turned against their white overlords and aided the invaders. Surely this is not because they want Japanese control; it is because they resent British domination. And now the day of reckoning has arrived in the last Oriental stronghold of Britain, India. The entire course of events has slowly but inexorably traced a gigantic message over the face of the Orient, for all who are not blinded by prejudice to read: “This is the end of the golden days of imperialism. This is the end of domination of one race by another. This is the beginning of self-government for the Oriental peoples.”

The Role of the Dutch

After the war is over—and assuming that the Allies win—it is not to be expected that the Indies will be at once miraculously transformed into an independent, self-sufficient national state. But progress toward this goal must be speeded as rapidly as possible. The Dutch should be given the task of directing this program. They know the islands better than any other country knows any of its colonies. They are experts in Indonesian affairs; and their administrative record has shown remarkable improvement over the past forty years. Their weak point has been overcaution in extending education and political participation to the natives. Much as it may pain some of my conservative Dutch friends (and although they may regard it as a kind of belated “I told you so,” in answer to the jibes I used to endure from them over America’s policy in the Philippines), I believe that these past-masters in colonial administration should learn from a bright-eyed newcomer to the field, and pattern their scheme of educational and political reform on the successful American experiment in the Philippines. Even though the costs of universal education may appear prohibitive in short-term perspective, this matter is of such basic importance that it should be given immediate consideration despite the expense. On it depends the next step, self-government. Just as fast as the natives attain educational qualification, they should be given the right to vote and to hold any office in the government. Details would have to be worked out; but already in the municipal, regency, community, and provincial councils, and in the Volksraad, a skeleton structure has been set up around which to build a solid system of representative government.

One very important reason why the Dutch should have a major

part in directing the reorganization of the Indies and the Orient has already been alluded to. They, above all other European or American nations, seem relatively free from racial obsessions. To be sure, they carry a good share of prejudice; but their treatment of half-castes particularly has shown that they have advanced beyond other colonial powers in racial tolerance. In this troublesome sphere even a little advantage is of extreme value.

The New Indonesia

I have already mentioned the fact that the Indies do not represent a national unit. There is no general Indonesian sense of nationality; rather, each tribe or group feels itself a separate entity, with few or no bonds linking it with other peoples in the islands. Therefore, there is no essential reason why a new "State of Indonesia" should be limited in territory to the Dutch Indies and the British and Portuguese enclaves in the islands. Indeed, on economic grounds as well as political, it might be advisable to plan for a much more extensive Indonesian state, to include all the Malay regions of the Orient—namely, the Indies, the Philippines, and Malaya as far north as the present borders of Burma and Siam. This wide area of racial, linguistic, and cultural similarity holds promise of natural development into nationhood. Moreover, whereas the Philippines are relatively poor in fertility and resources, the Indies and Malaya possess both in abundance; and, while the latter areas are backward in education and political sophistication, the American islands have had these intangible advantages for more than a generation.

An Indonesian state with these territories would offer many a knotty problem of administration. There is a vast gap in cultural achievement between the jungle tribes and the advanced Fili-

pinos, Malays, and Javanese, for instance; and this will persist for many generations. But with the great store of information on all the Indonesian peoples which the Dutch have amassed, planning could be done in the light of knowledge. Again, the Filipinos would have to guard against any imputation of capitalizing their political advantage unfairly. These and other questions would require considerable arbitration, especially in the early years of internal adjustment; and this is where the Dutch, Americans, and British could offer a guiding hand.

One obvious deficiency in the new Indonesia would be the virtual absence of industrial development. As mentioned before, however, the island area is so well adapted to the production of raw materials, both agricultural and mineral, that this would seem to offer the best possibilities for natural development. Already the Indies have made a start in one type of industrial activity—namely, the processing of raw materials into forms usable for final manufacture. This applies especially to petroleum, rubber, sugar, and coconut products. Oil and sugar refineries, mills for transforming latex into rubber, and plants for rendering coco-oil from the nuts represent good beginnings along the line in question. As for heavier industry, my own opinion is that the trend of world economic development has been toward too much machine fabrication at the expense of food and raw-material production. The world needs more hinterlands. People cannot eat machines and shoes and textiles; every country which seeks prosperity through the manufacture of such articles must have sources of materials and food, and markets for the sale of industrial products. Competition between the food-poor, factory-rich nations of Britain, Japan, and Germany for “pipe-lines to the soil” of industrially undeveloped areas has been a large factor in the causation of the present war.

The Indies can live and prosper—and actually help in main-

taining the necessary world balance between agriculture and industrialism—by remaining a producing hinterland for the dangerously expanding factory areas. Such a course, however, would require a safeguard against trade barriers which might interrupt mutual interchange of goods between factory and farm regions. The peasant countries of southeastern Europe, as well as the South American states, are examples of raw-material-producing areas which have encountered economic difficulties through having been shut off from exchange with industrialized nations. Free trade, with a minimum of tariff and other impediments, would have to accompany any world-wide plan for international division of labor which would aim at the utilization of each country's specialized endowments and skills.

While the Indies, the Philippines, and Malaya are eminently suited to the continued production of food and raw materials, certain other areas in the Orient have already progressed far along the path of industrialization. These are Japan, parts of China, and Australia. It would seem logical that these countries should become the factory areas of the Far East, linked with the Indonesian hinterland by economic interchange and free trade. Any program for welding them all together into a federalized governmental unit would probably be unrealizable for some time to come, as it would involve monumental difficulties in the apportionment of political power and the mutual adjustment of national traditions and ambitions. To expect the Chinese and Japanese to team up together, even within a loose federation of states, would appear foolishly optimistic. To convince the Australians, with their attitudes on race, that their best course would be to join an Oriental federation on a basis of equality with the yellow and brown nations, would be virtually impossible. But purely economic federation, with no political questions to stir up nationalistic antagonisms, seems quite realizable.

Economic Development of the Indonesians

Moving back from this wider perspective on the future, there are two internal problems the Indonesians must face even after they have set forth on the course toward better education and self-government. One of these concerns the economic development of the native population. It is to be expected that, as they become better qualified, they will take over more and more of the directive positions in business, and rise steadily in wage-earning occupations. But lack of capital would still shut them off from participation in the production of commercial commodities, which is the most profitable economic field in the Indies. The way to a solution has already been indicated by the rapidly increasing Indonesian share in rubber production, the principal difficulty here having been the small-scale character of native enterprises, which has made it impossible for the growers to market their goods except through middlemen. The proposed solution is by way of producers' co-operatives. In the native culture itself there is a sound basis for this development, for the Indonesian village is typically organized on co-operative lines, all the members owning the land in common and receiving shares in accordance with need. With this pattern already set, the scheme would represent a natural outgrowth of the people's own economic mores.

The Population Problem

The other problem is that of population, and concerns Java principally. We have already discussed the efforts of the Dutch to induce the Javanese to emigrate to the outer islands and thus relieve the pressing overpopulation of their land. Unfortunately,

this offers no long-range solution, because the Javanese reproduce so fast that even a greatly accelerated rate of emigration could not keep up with the natural increase. Birth control would seem to be the only plan holding any promise at all. Aside from opposition to contraception on the part of persons and groups with religious prejudice against it, the main obstacles in the way of a planned program of family limitation in Java have been the ignorance of the natives and the cost of instruction and equipment. But experience has demonstrated that this problem need not be attacked directly, for in every country where education has advanced, the standard of living has risen, and invariably the birth rate has declined. This applies to Catholic as well as Protestant nations. Whatever their traditional or religious convictions, people come to see that quantity conflicts with quality, and that the advantages they can give their children in the way of education and care decrease with each addition to the family. Increased education and a higher standard of living, therefore, can be expected to solve the Javanese population problem automatically. Even the lingering influence of the cult of ancestor worship will decline to disappearance with educational advancement.

Outlines of the New Orient

The blueprint for the future of the Orient, as I see it, would include a comprehensive plan for rapid extension of self-government—with the assistance of the Netherlands, America, and Britain—in the Indies, the Philippines, and Malaya; these areas to be joined eventually in a new state of Indonesia. China, Tibet, Thailand, Indo-China, and Korea would constitute a mainland federated state. India, Australia (with New Zealand), and Japan had best be allowed to pursue their independent political courses; but the interests of all the Orient would be well served by the

setting up of an economic federation, with free trade between its governmentally discrete units, to include these countries, Greater China, and the new state of Indonesia. The entire plan is predicated upon the assumption that the period of white imperialism in the Orient is past, and that the Far Eastern countries are ready to "come of age" in the family of nations. If it seems shockingly radical in its departure from traditional patterns, this is nothing more than the cataclysmic events of the present time demand. As for the scheme of nonpolitical economic federation in the Orient, I venture to predict that this procedure will be employed in the reconstruction of Europe and the rest of the Western world after the war. We may not yet be ready for a world state, or even for European, or American, or Oriental political federations of nations; but the way to future peace and international prosperity would appear to lie along the path of wider areas of free trade, so as to correct the pathological imbalance between industrialism and agriculture, manufacturing and raw-material production, which constitutes a perpetual threat to international amity. Competitive trade is a cause of war; but complementary trade would cement bonds of international friendship—and might eventually lead to that goal of highest hope, a world federation of nations.

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